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Chapter 1  





This thesis aims to explore the short-term impact of increased wages on the working 
hours of health personnel and their practice choice. An additional objective is to 
identify existing compensating differentials in the job market for health personnel.  
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1. Why study the labor supply of health personnel? 
 
The excess demand for nursing labor in the national health service (NHS) persists in 
many developed countries in spite of systematic increases in the education capacity in 
order to meet the demand. Many registered nurses (RNs) work part-time, or in non-
health jobs. Some are also temporarily out of the workforce. Nurses’ trade unions 
claim that a wage increase will increase not only recruitment into the nursing 
profession, but also the short-term labor supply of those already qualified. Higher 
wages are claimed to increase hours worked by personnel employed in the health 
sector, and attract nurses from non-health activities.  
 
RNs is not the only health profession facing a demand surplus in Norway. For many 
years there has also been i.a. an insufficient number of physicians. In most OECD 
countries health personnel is partially or fully publicly funded while practicing, either 
directly by wages or indirectly by reimbursements and fees. The health authorities 
motivate the funding by their responsibility to ensure the population access to health 
services. Yet, many countries suffer from personnel shortages in general or have an 
uneven distribution of personnel with shortages in the public sector, in certain medical 
specialties or in some geographical areas.  
 
Wages and other fees are considered to be important means for motivating health 
personnel to seek work in areas with special needs and to accept jobs with 
disamenities like night work. In most countries the health authorities try to influence 
the health personnel’s choice of specialization, practice type and working hours. 
Regulation through quotas has been widely used in countries with a national health 
service (NHS). With the deregulation of health markets, incentives such as the 
physician’s pay and practice income play a relatively more important role in the 
implementation of health policies.  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide a contribution to the understanding of wage 
reforms and their consequences. Wages are the dominating costs in the health sector, 
i.e. catering for more than 70% of hospital operational expenses (SINTEF 2002). 
Needless to say, wage increases incur significant strains on public budgets. It thus 8 
seems relevant to carefully assess the consequences of wage reforms on job choice 
and hours of work.  
 
From a research perspective, the best alternative is to introduce a natural experiment, 
randomly assigning wage increases, and comparing the behavioral responses of those 
receiving a wage increase with those who do not. Knowing that such experiments are 
unacceptable, economists have looked for alternative strategies. The use of structural 
labor supply models have been widespread both because of their strong connection 
between economic modeling and empirical analysis, and for the possibility of 
undertaking policy simulations. In this thesis I have used a sub-category of structural 
labor supply models, discretizing the budget constraint. The framework is well suited 
for the analysis of the labor supply of individuals facing a nonlinear budget set, such 
as health personnel who face a complicated pay scheme combined with step-wise tax 
brackets. The possibility to include sector-specific wages and a system for modeling 
other attributes of the jobs, like shift work and hospital strain, also improves the 
relevance of the framework. I also hope to provide a contribution to the method by 
adapting the models through detailed alternatives of hours, the possibility to combine 
jobs, a nested structuring of care level and shift choice and through the calculation of 
compensating variation for shift work.  
 
In the literature review by Antonazzo et al. (2003) of nurses’ labor supply, they 
emphasize the need to address the relative importance of pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
job characteristics. The non-pecuniary attributes of jobs like travel distance, shift 
work, patient mix, care level, combining them with family life and workload, are 
important to the physicians and nurses in their decision process. Yet wages remain the 
most central policy variable in the implementation of a human resource policy in the 
NHS. Perhaps this thesis can be seen as one possible response to the challenge by 
Antonazzo et al. (2003), and hopefully increase the accumulated scientific knowledge 
on the topic.  
 
The impact of changes in wages on working hours and job type is a highly relevant 
policy question, which involves complicated behavioral mechanisms. The purpose of 
this study is to better inform the policymaking in a sector where the health personnel 
caters for a high share of the total expenses. Some studies on these topics exist but 9 
mostly in a US or UK context. To my knowledge there are no other studies of the 
labor supply of health personnel that apply the type of modeling applied in this thesis.   
 
An additional goal is thus to apply and further develop the framework of discrete 
choice modeling in the analysis of labor supply and compensating variations. During 
the last decades researchers at the University of Oslo and Statistics Norway, as well as 
other international researchers, have developed a framework for the analysis of labor 
supply for individuals facing a nonlinear budget set. The framework is thus suitable 
for the analysis of health personnel facing a combination of the complicated 
regulations of payment in the health sector and step-wise tax brackets. The possibility 
to include sector-specific wages and a system for modeling other attributes of jobs, 
like shift work and hospital strain, also improves the relevance of the framework.  
 
 
2. Labor supply analyses for health personnel 
 
The analysis of individuals’ labor supply often focuses on two dimensions. The 
decision whether to work or not and the number of hours preferred if participating in 
the labor market. This definition might be enhanced to specify the types of jobs or 
sectors where the labor is supplied and to focus on the supply over a lifetime. E.g. in 
some periods of life it is preferable to reduce the hours worked, for instance in a 
situation with small children. The essays in this thesis focus on the hours of work for 
those already participating in the labor market, specified by sector or practice type.  
 
As this thesis focuses on the supply side in the market for health personnel, important 
aspects of the demand for labor are disregarded. The obvious reason for this is the 
need to simplify the analyses. The empirical argument is the amount of vacant 
positions, which should support the assumption that there were few restrictions on the 
demand side and ample opportunities for physicians and RNs to find their preferred 
combination of jobs and working hours.  
 
In the overview of the Norwegian labor supply research, Dagsvik (2003) discusses the 
many difficulties the researchers face. There is a striking lack of robust estimates on 10 
the impact of wage changes and tax reforms on the decision to work and the number 
of hours as illustrated by the following quote from Blundell et al. (1998) p. 827:    
 
“Labor supply effects have been notoriously difficult to estimate in a robust and 
generally accepted way. The difficulties that researchers typically face relate to the 
treatment of (nonlinear) tax schedules, the fact that individuals have different tastes 
over nonmarket time and consumption for reasons that cannot be controlled for using 
observable information, and the fact that individuals’ observed decisions represent 
intertemporal allocations as well as within period allocations”.  
 
The reviews of the empirical literature, i.a. Killingsworth (1983), Killingsworth and 
Heckman (1986), Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) confirms the large variation of the 
effects in labor supply models like the wage elasticity. Among others, a study by 
Mroz (1987) shows that different statistical and empirical approaches to the same data 
sample lead to large differences in the estimated supply elasticities.  
 
As most registered nurses are women, the literature on female labor supply provides 
an important background to this discussion. Killingsworth and Heckman (1986) 
provide a comprehensive review of the research, indicating that women’s workforce 
participation is responsive to changes in the wage rate, unearned income, spouse’s 
wage and marital status, as well as having children, particularly of preschool age. The 
survey indicates that labor supply elasticities for females are positive, i.e. the positive 
substitution effect outweighs the negative income effect.  
 
In relation to the nursing profession itself, a survey by Link (1992) summarizes the 
literature and finds that wage levels, and having children, influence labor force 
participation, although the responsiveness to wage changes has declined considerably 
over time. The latter finding reflects the fact that most RNs are now working in the 
US, as well as in other industrialized countries. In a recent review of the labor supply 
literature for nurses, Antonazzo et al. (2003) present the huge variation in results 
depending on the economic models and samples.  
 
Still, most physicians are men and at least the current working pattern was developed 
at a time when almost all physicians were men. The physicians generally work more 11 
hours than the RNs. Pencavel (1986) summarizes the labor supply literature for men. 
Much of the literature has focused on low and middle income individuals and 
families. Work by Feenberg and Poterba (1993) and Feldstein (1995) on high-income 
individuals suggests that these individuals are responsive to incentives. However, a 
number of other studies have found no such effect for the high-income group, as 
presented in the survey by Røed and Strøm (2002). Showalter and Thurston (1997) 
present their analysis of US physicians as a continuation of the research on white-
collar professions, and focus on tax effects on labor supply. In spite of the vast 
economic literature on physician behavior, labor supply studies are few and far 
between. Those that do exist show the wage elasticities of physicians who are not 
self-employed to be modest. Examples are Sloan (1975) and Noether (1986). Rizzo 
and Blumenthal (1994) focus on the impact on labor supply of wage and non-wage 
income for a sample of self-employed US physicians.  
 
For a general overview of the labor supply literature see Killingsworth (1983), 
Killingsworth and Heckman (1986), Blundell and MaCurdy (1999), and Blundell 
(2001).  
 
Rosen (1986) gives an introduction to the literature on compensating variations. 
“The theory of equalizing differences refers to observed wage differentials required to 
equalize the total monetary and non-monetary advantages or disadvantages among 
work activities and among workers themselves.” These ideas go back to the writings 
of Adam Smith. As presented by Rosen, the evidence of compensating variations 
related to a broad scope of working conditions, is mixed.  
 
When entering the job market, registered nurses (RNs) face job alternatives with 
differences in wages and other job attributes. Previous studies of the nursing labor 
market have shown large earnings differences between similar hospital and non-
hospital RNs. Corresponding differences are found in some of the analyses of shift 
and regular daytime workers. One example is a paper by Hirsch and Schumacher 
(1997) who focus on the wage differentials for US RNs and find significant shift 
premiums and hospital premiums. Lanfranchi et al. (2002) demonstrate how the 
estimation of a shift premium and shift choice fits well into the framework of 
switching regression models with endogenous switching. 12 
 
3. The application of discrete choice modeling in labor supply analyses 
 
Discrete choice models describe decision makers’ choices among alternatives. In this 
section I will give a presentation of some basic features of the methodology following 
Train (2003).  
 
To fit within a discrete choice framework, the set of alternatives, called the choice set, 
needs to exhibit three characteristics:  
i)  The choice set must be mutually exclusive. Choosing one alternative 
necessarily implies not choosing any of the other alternatives.  
ii)  The choice set must be exhaustive, in that all possibilities are included.  
iii)  The number of alternatives must be finite. 
 
Discrete choice models are usually derived under an assumption of utility-maximizing 
behavior by the decision maker. Thurstone (1927) originally developed the concepts 
in terms of psychological stimuli, leading to a binary probit model of whether 
respondents can differentiate the level of stimulus. Marschak (1960) interpreted the 
stimuli as utility and provided a derivation of utility maximization. Following 
Marschak, models that can be derived in this way are called random utility models 
(RUM). It is important to note, however, that models derived from utility 
maximization can also be used to represent decision making that does not entail utility 
maximization. Utility, as a constructed measure of well-being, has no natural scale or 
level, and only differences in utility matter.   
 
Random utility models are derived as follows: A decision maker, labeled n, faces a 
choice among J alternatives. The decision maker would obtain a certain level of utility 
from each alternative. The utility that decision maker n obtains from alternative j is 
nj U , j=1,…,J. This utility is usually assumed known to the decision maker but not the 
researcher. The decision maker chooses the alternative that provides the greatest 
utility. The behavioral model is therefore: choose alternative i if and only if 
ni nj UU j i >∀ ≠ .  
 13 
The researcher does not observe the decision maker’s utility. The researcher observes 
some attributes of the alternatives as faced by the decision maker, labeled  nj x j ∀ , and 
some attributes of the decision maker, labeled  n s , and can specify a function which 
relates these observed factors to the decision maker’s utility. The function is denoted 
( ) , nj nj nj VV x s j =∀  and is often called representative utility. Usually, V depends on 
parameters that are unknown to the researcher and therefore estimated statistically.  
 
Since there are aspects of utility that the researcher does not or cannot observe, 
nj nj VU ≠ . Utility is decomposed as  nj nj nj UVε = + , where  nj ε  captures the factors that 
affect utility but are not included in  nj V . Given its definition, the characteristics of  nj ε , 
such as its distribution, depend critically on the researcher’s representation of the 
choice situation.  
 
The researcher does not know  nj j ε ∀  and therefore treats these terms as random. The 
joint density of the random vector  1,..., nn n J ε εε =  is denoted  ( ) n f ε . With this 
density, the researcher is able to make probabilistic statements about the decision 
maker’s choice. The probability of decision maker n choosing alternative i is  
 





ni ni nj nj





=+ > + ∀ ≠
=− < − ∀ ≠
 
 
This probability is a cumulative distribution, namely, the probability that each random 
term  nj ni ε ε −  is below the observed quantity  ni nj VV − . Different discrete choice 
models are obtained from different specifications of this density, that is, from 
different assumptions about the distribution of the unobserved portion of utility. Logit 
and nested logit have closed-form expressions for this integral and are derived under 
the assumption that the unobserved portion of utility is a distributed iid extreme value 
and a type of generalized extreme value respectively. Probit is derived under the 
assumption that  ( ) . f  is a multivariate normal, and mixed logit is based on the 14 
assumption that the unobserved portion of utility consists of a part that follows any 
distribution specified by the researcher, plus a part that is an iid extreme value. With 
probit and mixed-logit the resulting integral does not have a closed form, and is 
evaluated numerically through simulation.   
 
In this thesis the decision makers are the registered nurses or physicians choosing 
between job alternatives. A job alternative not only specifies the practice type but also 
includes a specific number of hours. For the physicians I also allow for job-packages 
with a main job and an extra job, with specified hours in both. This creates a large set 
of alternative job-packages which the individuals must choose from. In the modeling 
of RNs, the job-packages are specified also with information about shift type. The 
models applied are multinomial logits and nested logit, with some adoptions.  
 
A more general issue is whether there should be a direct empirical application of the 
economic model presented, or if this approach is too difficult as there are many other 
aspects influencing peoples choices observed in markets that are not observable to 
economists. One alternative and less stringent approach is to use economic modeling 
to motivate the empirical analysis, but restrict the analysis to reduced form estimates 
and natural experiments. The downside of that approach is the lack of generality in 
the application of the results.  
 
 
4. The Norwegian Health Care System 
 
In Norway the health services are mainly publicly financed and provided by the 
government. Norway spends about 8% of its GDP on health. This is approximately 
2,400 USD PPP (purchasing power parities) annually (OECD 2002), of which 85% is 
publicly financed. The private share is mainly outpatient co-payments as inpatient 
services are offered free of charge.  
 
The primary care services are today mainly provided by private practitioners on 
public contracts, but in my thesis I use data from the years prior to the 2001 family 
physician reform. At that time there was a mix of 50% private providers with contract, 
40% ‘municipal health officers’, and the rest were private providers with no or a part 15 
refund from the National Insurance Scheme, and interns in their final practice year 
before qualifying. The municipalities provide and finance mother and child health 
centers, nursing homes and home nursing.   
 
The provision of outpatient services is split between special wards at the hospitals and 
specialists in private practices. Inpatient services are catered for by government 
providers or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) with a public contract. There is a 
waiting time for almost all non-acute health services that are publicly provided, 
normally weeks or months but in some low-priority cases, also years. In Norway it is 
prohibited to supply privately financed inpatient services, with the exemption of some 
hospitals with a national capacity of less than 100 beds. However, there is ample 
supply of private outpatient services offering the same services as hospital outpatient 
clinics for those who have sufficient willingness to pay. After public procurement to 
reduce NHS waiting lists, most private surgical procedures are paid out of pocket, as 
private health insurance schemes cover only a negligible share of the population.  
 
In the period of focus there have been a series of reforms influencing the demand and 
supply of health personnel. Activity-based funding was introduced at the hospitals in 
1997 and has since been a major reason for the increase in hospital activities. In 
specialist services, the number of discharges increased by 11% from 1995 to 2000. 
Outpatient consultations were increased by 13%. There was a 14% increase from 
1995 to 2000 in the number of employees at psychiatric and somatic institutions in the 
specialist health services. According to Statistics Norway (2001) the number of full-
time nursing positions increased by 23% to 27,415 in 2000. The number of full-time 
positions for auxiliary nurses was reduced by 4% to 8,386 in 2000, continuing the 
trend of registered nurses replacing this personnel category. The number of full-time 
positions for physicians was increased by 23% to 8,288 in 2000. But the financing 
reform was not the sole reason for the activity increase. All the usual factors like 
demographic change, technological development and wealth increase fuelled this 
development. In primary care the number of full-time positions for all professions 
increased by 30% in the primary care sector to 89,670 in 2000, reducing the ratio of 
full-time positions per patient to 0.44. 
 16 
In 1998 the public financing of private specialist practices was enhanced to include 
most private specialists, reducing patient co-payment and increasing the demand for 
private treatment. A public waiting time guarantee has also increased the focus on the 
need for increased capacity. The introduction of the patients’ right to choose their 
preferred hospital for elective treatment may also have promoted the hospitals 
attention to waiting time and treatment capacity. Recent reforms, taking place after 
my data time window, include the family physician reform (partly capitation based) in 
2001 and the transferrals of hospital ownership to five regional authorities in 2002.  
 
When analyzing the labor supply of physicians and RNs we face some additional 
difficulties which we are only partly able to deal with. The market for health 
personnel consists of a few large buyers in the public sector and a dominant public 
insurance scheme for the private practices. This implies that we have elements of a 
monopsonistic labor market where the buyers face an upward sloping supply curve. 
When considering a wage increase to attract the marginal worker, the hospital must 
take into account that they also must increase the wage for all personnel already 
employed at the hospital. In the public sector the wage bargaining is centralized, and 
seniority, formal qualifications and working hours seem to determine earnings 
together with the amount of overtime. In private practice the importance of 
unobserved heterogeneity is probably a more important determinant for earnings than 
for the other sectors.  
 
 
5. Characteristics of the Physician Labor Market 
 
After 6 years at university, medical students continue in internships with 1 year of 
hospital practice and 6 months of primary care practice. To become a licensed 
specialist you must undertake a training program while practicing as a jr. physician at 
a hospital or in a similar arrangement for primary care providers (PCPs). The median 
number of years from authorization to licensing as a specialist in my sample is 10 
years. A central committee has traditionally regulated the distribution of junior 
physicians and hospitals consultants. During the nineties there seemed to be an 
increased tendency of local initiatives where hospitals strengthened their physician 
staff without committee permits. In accordance with an increased market orientation 17 
in the health care sector, there seems to be a tendency that wage and other job 
characteristics will be more important for the distribution of physicians and as a way 
for the health authorities to attract personnel.  
 
There is almost full workforce participation among physicians, with few people 
working part-time and an insignificant group working in non-health sectors. A normal 
pattern is to work extra hours in the main job, but many physicians also work in a 
second position or evening practice. According to the Norwegian Medical Association 
(2002) there were 15,300 physicians in Norway below 67 years at the end of 1999. 
The rapidly increasing share of women had reached 31% that year. 59% of the 
workforce were qualified specialists.  
 
From 1994 to 1999 there were 1,900 Norwegians who completed their training and 
were licensed as physicians. During the same period a striking number of 6,000 
physicians of other nationalities received a permanent or a temporary license valid for 
six months of practice. The high number of licensed foreign physicians was due to 
active recruitment in the other Scandinavian countries and Germany. Many never 
arrived in Norway after all, whereas others returned after a period of practice. 
Approximately 2,300 physicians of other nationalities were active in 1999/2000, of 
whom 1,500 had permanent residencies and 800 temporary residencies. 35% of the 
foreign physicians had a licensed specialty.  
 
In 1999, 8,000 physicians worked mainly in public hospitals and 3,800 worked in 
primary care as municipal employees or in private practice with public funding. 800 
specialists worked in private practice with public funding as their main practice. 300 
physicians worked in companies, 600 in research and development and 400 in health 
administration. Private-for-profit hospitals where manned by a small number of full-
time employees, supplemented by public hospital physicians working part-time. There 
are some earnings differentials by sector as presented in Figure 1. Physicians mainly 
working in private practice have a higher mean income than those in other sectors. 
Hospital physicians follow in second place, with physicians working with 
administrative tasks earning considerably less.  
 18 
Approximately 800 vacant public positions were reported in 1997, the period this 
analysis focuses on. These vacancies existed in spite of campaigns to recruit foreign 
personnel, and at a time when the increases in educational capacity were beginning to 
take effect. Even though the institutional set-up and physician coverage rate varies a 
lot between countries, it is easy to find similar challenges in guiding personnel to 
serve the population with the highest needs in the other Scandinavian countries and 
the UK.  
 
As this thesis focuses on the supply side of the physician market, important aspects of 
the demand for physician labor are disregarded. The obvious reason is the need to 
simplify the model. The empirical argument is the many vacant positions that should 
support the assumption that there were few restrictions from the demand side and 
ample opportunities for the physicians to find their preferred combination of jobs and 
working hours. On the other hand, public providers faced block grants until July 1997 
when an activity based funding was introduced. This budget restriction may have 
forced the hospital administration to reduce hours of planned overtime in order to 
keep the budget. But even with restrictions on public hours, physicians are free to 
combine their hospital position with private practice or other jobs. Another motivation 
for public hospital physicians to have a second job in a private practice is the 
possibility to deduct practice related expenses from their earnings prior to taxation. 
These expenses include rents for an office in their own home, computers, books and 
journals. The register data used in this thesis only reports income after these expenses 
have been deducted.  
 
There is a selection process driving the choice of specialty, sector, participation and 
working hours. As almost all physicians work full-time the variation in working hours 
consists of extended hours in the main job and/or extra private practice. The wage 
differentials between specialties and sectors are significantly compressed compared to 
in the US, and the matching process seems less driven by expected income than in 
many other countries. E.g. the acceptability of shift-work seems to be important for 
the sector choice. Figure 2 present the annual median earnings (labor income, capital 
income, pension benefits, and social security payments) by specialty in 1997. The 
relative earnings have, however, been changing over the years in response to the 
various health sector reforms. The recent family physician reform has for instance 19 
dramatically increased the income of most PCPs. A similar wage reform took place in 
the hospital sector in 1996, and I have used this as a “natural experiment” to evaluate 
the predictions in my physician paper.  
 
There are also differences in specialty status, as ranked by patients and colleagues, 
and in gender mix. The income seems to be correlated with these factors. This gender 
effect can also be due to the fact that female physicians work less overtime and/or in 
private moonlighting than their male colleagues. However, the female share is high in 
i.a. primary care, which has seen a significant earnings increase lately. All analyses 
are made conditional on the physicians’ choice of specialty. Given the short-term 
perspective of this analysis, it is not possible to model the selection into specialties 
like in Nicholson and Soules (2001).  
 
Hours per week at public hospitals are dependent on the number of physicians sharing 
a shift plan. This is partly decided by the chief physician at ward level and her 
preferences. For a private practitioner with a public contract the earnings are decided 
by a block grant from the municipality, and fees for services with fixed fees. Private 
practitioners without a public contract, e.g. hospital physicians working private 
‘overtime’, are more market based in their price setting.  
 
 
6. The labor market for registered nurses 
 
According to Statistics Norway (2003) there were 77,819 registered nurses below 
retirement age in Norway in 2002, of whom 69,690 were employed. Those not 
employed were mainly on disability pensions, medical and vocational rehabilitation, 
early retirement or further education. Auxiliary nurses with a year of education after 
college are not included in these numbers. Norway is one of the countries with the 
highest density of nurses with 15.3 working nurses per 1,000 population in October 
2002. More than 90% of the nurses are women. 91.4% of the employed nurses were 
public employees. Registered nurses receive a minimum of three years of education at 
college level. Personnel in administrative positions have often completed a year of 
administrative training. Nurse specialist training also adds one or two years. 20 
 
50% of the nurses in our sample work in public hospitals. Close to 26% work in 
primary health care run by the municipalities in nursing homes, home nursing or 
health clinics. Only 5% are employed by private health services working in a private 
medical clinic or in the pharmaceutical industry. Some 15% work in non-health areas 
like public administration or in the service sector. Some of these teach at colleges or 
lower levels, work as occupational health nurses or in public health administration. 
6% earn their main income from different types of transfers like disability benefits. 
Around 1% earn less than the minimum income required to qualify for public 
pensions, and do not receive transfers beyond the same limit of NOK 40,000.  
 
There seems to be an underlying development over a nursing career that is impossible 
to identify through the short-term analysis presented in this thesis. The geographic 
location of colleges, family life and aging are probably important underlying forces. 
As shown in Figure 3-5 the share working shifts gradually decreases by age. Please 
observe that the figure is just a cross-sectional snapshot, and should be interpreted 
with caution. Almost all nurses work shifts in their first job, whereas 80% work shifts 
when they reach 60. The shift indicator includes different combinations of day, 
evening and night work that may also change by age. I do not have access to such 
details. The mean workload as measured by the percentage of a full-time position also 
varies by age from almost 95% when entering the job market, down to approximately 
75% in the thirties and the years with small children, rising again to 85% by the late 
forties before sinking below 80% at the age of retirement.  
 
The hospital share seems to gradually decrease by age from around 65% in their 
twenties to below 40% when they retire. The share living in municipalities with a high 
centrality index is at its highest right after graduation, decreasing to a stable level 
around 70% after a few years. This is probably an effect of RNs staying in the areas 
close to the nursing college for their first job, moving to less central areas when they 
establish a family.  
 
The earnings are presented with three lines in Figure 5. The middle line represents the 
annual labor income. Surprisingly the mean earnings are at their peak right after 
graduation when most nurses work full-time and shifts. The lowest earning is reached 21 
in the thirties with an almost 15% lower mean income. The labor income then rises to 
a peak in the late forties, decreasing again before retirement.  
 
The lowest line represents the income as reported by the Norwegian association of 
local authorities, NALRA. While NALRA reports monthly income by October 1
st, 12 
times this amounts to less than the annual income. One reason is that the local wage 
negotiations take place late in the fall. The month of September may also represent 
somewhat less overtime work than the annual average. Otherwise the NALRA 
measure follows the changes by age as the annual labor income. When looking at the 
top line however, the earnings dip in the thirties has disappeared due to public 




7. Register data at the Frisch Centre 
 
Over the years the Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research has built a database 
covering the entire Norwegian Population aged 16-69. I have matched this database 
with the register of licensed health personnel and an administrative register of wages 
and working time for health personnel employed by institutions organized by 
NALRA. The registers are collected by various public agencies and provided by 
Statistics Norway. The Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD) has provided 
a centrality index for the municipalities.  
 
The register data provide an opportunity for rich data analysis and all papers are based 
on these. The measurement error is reduced dramatically with access to detailed 
personnel administrative data records like the NALRA register. Each individual 
record comprises demographic information (age, gender, country of birth, marital 
status, etc.), education, specialization, income, employment status, industry code, 
practice type, and also hours of work, wages and shift type for public employees. I 
have also matched information about spouse and children with each health worker.  
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8. Summaries and main conclusions 
 
The Wage Impact on Physicians’ Labor Supply and Practice Choice.  
 
In most countries the health authorities try to influence the physicians’ choice of 
specialization, practice type and working hours. Regulations through quotas have 
been widely used in countries with a national health service (NHS). With the 
deregulation of health markets, incentives such as the physicians’ pay and practice 
income play a relatively larger role in the implementation of health policies. The 
purpose of this paper is to analyze how economic incentives affect the labor supply of 
physicians. I do this by estimating the effects of increased wages on the physicians’ 
total working hours, and their preferred combination of hours in their main job and 
hours in an extra job or private practice.  
 
A combination of jobs is common for physicians, and it is important to focus on the 
job mix as it seems reasonable to assume that physicians work differently in public 
and private services, facing different sets of incentives and budget mechanisms. The 
interaction between the main job and the extra job is also interesting. An efficient 
implementation of the health priorities will thus embrace preferences of practice 
forms, including a preference of whether a consultant should spend his/her spare time 
working extra hours in a public facility or in a private practice. 
 
In most OECD countries physicians are partially or fully publicly funded while 
practicing, by wage in the public sector and through financial contracts with private 
providers. Health authorities justify the funding with their responsibility to ensure that 
the population has access to health services. Yet many countries suffer from personnel 
shortages in general or within certain practice types and specialties. With a view to 
informing the policymaking process, the task of this paper is thus to identify the 
effects of increased wages on physicians’ working hours and sector choices.   
 
To analyze this question I apply a static neo-classical structural labor supply model 
with utility maximizing individuals. The model is inspired by approaches like that of 
Aaberge, Dagsvik and Strøm (1995). Relying on a discretization of the choice 23 
structure, I present an econometric framework that allows for non-convex budget sets, 
nonlinear labor supply curves and imperfect markets with institutional constraints. 
The physicians are assumed to make choices from a finite set of job possibilities, 
characterized by practice form, hours and wage rates. The individuals may combine 
their main position with an extra job (or private practice), making a variety of 
combinations of hours possible for each job. I take into account the complicated 
payment schemes for physicians, as well as taxes and household characteristics when 
estimating labor supply on Norwegian micro data. The results show a modest 
response in total hours to a wage increase, but a reallocation of hours in favor of the 
sector with increased wages. The predictions are evaluated by means of a ‘natural 
experiment’; a policy reform significantly increasing hospital wages.  
 
The analysis presents two types of settings. One with four possible practice types: 
hospital, municipal primary care, private practice and other jobs like public 
administration, NGOs, occupational health and private businesses that is not directly 
patient related. The other setting focuses on the hospital physicians and their choice 
between overtime work at the hospital or working in a private practice as an extra job.  
 
 
Will increased wages increase nurses’ working hours in the health care sector? 
 
Whereas physicians traditionally work many hours per week, registered nurses often 
work part-time, at least during the years they have small children. In Norway there 
has also been some attention focused on RNs who are not working in the health sector 
and how one can motivate them to return to patient related work. The nurses’ trade 
organizations claim that a wage increase will increase the short-term labor supply in 
the health care sector. This paper is an application of the framework presented above 
to identify the effects of job type-specific wage increases on the RNs practice type 
and hours through policy simulations on micro data.  
 
As for the physicians the individual’s labor supply decision can be considered as a 
choice from a set of discrete alternatives (job packages). These job packages are 
characterized by attributes such as hours of work, sector specific wages and other 
sector specific aspects of the jobs. There are no extra jobs in this model as this is 24 
much less common for RNs. The nurses choose the job package that maximizes their 
utility given a nonlinear budget set that incorporates taxes. The three sectors or job 
types are public hospitals, public primary care services and other “non-health” or 
“non-patient” jobs within public administration, private businesses and NGOs.  
 
I undertake the analysis for married and single female RNs separately, as there is 
reason to believe that the two groups respond differently to financial incentives. For 
married females the results indicate job type specific wage elasticities for hours of 
work of 0.17 in hospitals and 0.39 in primary care. The total hours worked in health 
and non-health jobs combined are actually predicted to be slightly reduced, but the 
change is not significantly different from zero. Single females are somewhat more 
responsive to wage changes than married ones. 
 
I do not analyze the impact of wage increases as an instrument to mobilize those not 
working. One argument for not including this group is the differences in personal 
characteristics compared to those working. Another is the relative small number of 
RNs not working, making the framework presented less suitable.  
 
 
Nurses’ labor supply with endogenous choices of care level and shift type. 
A nested discrete choice model with nonlinear income.  
 
One weakness of the analysis of the nursing labor market as presented above is the 
disregard of the shift dimension, an important characteristic when RNs make their job 
choice. This paper explicitly includes shift choice in the analysis, but the sample is 
limited to the public health sector due to data restrictions. Where the preceding 
nursing paper addresses the possibility of attracting RNs to the health sector from 
other non-health jobs, this paper focuses on the job-choices and working hours of 
those already working in the health sector. The reason is that shift information is only 
included in the NALRA register, which covers hospitals and primary care institutions 
owned by local authorities.  
 
Shift work has a documented negative impact on workers’ health and social life, 
effects that are compensated for with higher wages and shorter working hours. Many 25 
countries face a ‘nursing shortage’, and increasing wages is argued to lead to an 
increase in the short-term labor supply in the health care sector . Omitting shift work 
in the evaluation of such policies may lead to biased estimates of the wage elasticities.  
 
This paper presents an econometric analysis that allows the nurses to compose their 
‘job package’ in three steps by choosing: a) hospital or primary care, b) daytime or 
shift work and c) one of four categories of hours. The utility maximization problem is 
solved by discretizing the budget set and choosing the optimal job package from a 
finite set of alternatives.  
 
There is some variation in the responsiveness to wage between shift and day workers 
and by care level. The job-specific elasticities are small but positive. However, the 
simulation of a wage increase in all job types when conditioning the analysis to those 
already participating in the sector, indicates a slight reduction of hours. Thus, the 
income effect seems to be dominating in the labor supply of nurses. 
 
  
Compensating differentials for nurses 
 
When entering the job market registered nurses (RNs) face job alternatives with 
differences in wages and other job attributes. Previous studies of the nursing labor 
market have shown large earnings differences between similar hospital and non-
hospital RNs. Corresponding differences can be found in some of the analyses of shift 
and regular daytime workers.  
 
The theory of equalizing differences predicts that people with difficult working 
conditions are compensated with higher wages. Shift hours in Norway are 
compensated both with an hourly wage premium, and with shorter mandated working 
hours for a full-time position. Health workers may choose shift work because of 
compensating wage differentials, but it is also possible that they have preferences for 
shift work.  Compared to other studies of compensating variation, this study has the 
advantage of focusing on differentials within a single occupation, so preferences and 
abilities are more homogeneous than for broader groups of workers. 
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Lehrer et al. (1991) refer to the differences in job attributes between hospital and non-
hospital settings. If hospital jobs involve rather unpleasant characteristics, such as a 
high degree of stress and job hazards, then hospitals must pay a compensating 
differential in order to attract nurses of a given quality. In this paper I do not, 
however, compare the hospital RNs with colleagues working in a practitioner's office, 
but with nurses working shifts at nursing homes and in home nursing. They may have 
an equal need for compensation to care for a less prestigious patient group, often with 
less qualified colleagues and poorer staffing than is the case at hospitals.     
 
In the first part of this paper I analyze the wage differentials in the Norwegian public 
health sector, applying a switching regression model. The motivation is to explore 
whether the wage differentials found in international studies prevail in a setting with 
highly centralized wage bargaining and monopsonistic employers. I find no hospital 
premium for the shift RNs and a slightly negative hospital premium for the daytime 
RNs, but it is not significant for the hospital job choice. I find a positive shift 
premium. The wage rate is 19% higher for the shift working hospital RNs and 18% 
higher for the sample of primary care workers. The shift premium is only weakly 
significant for the shift work choice for the sample of hospital RNs, and not for the 
primary care RNs. I identify certain selection effects.  
 
In the second part of the paper I focus on the shift compensation, and present a 
structural labor supply model with a random utility function. I explicitly include the 
choice between shift work and daytime hours where the registered nurses (RNs) 
maximize utility given a nonlinear budget set that incorporates taxes. This is done to 
identify the expected compensation necessary for the nurses to remain on the same 
utility level when they are “forced” from a day job to a shift job. The expected 
compensating variations are derived by Monte Carlo simulations and presented for 
different categories of hours. I find that on average the offered combination of higher 
wages, shorter working hours and increased flexibility overcompensates for the health 
and social strains related to shift work.  27 
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Figure 1. Mean total annual income by sector, NOK in 1997. 
Sector is allocated by the main source of income. Hospital and public primary care physicians working 
75% or more in the public sector are allocated to the public sectors even if they earn more in their 
part-time private practices.  
 
  Sector 
A  Other activities, e.g. central administration, NGOs, non-health companies 
FU  Research and development 
KF  General and health sector administration in municipalities and counties 
KP Municipal  medical  officer 
O  Social security and other transfers 
KS  Hospitals outside of Oslo 
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Figure 3. Percentage of full-time and share working shifts for public registered nurses. 
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Figure 4. Share of public RNs working in hospitals and share living in the most central  municipalities. 
Means by age in 2000. 
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Figure 5. Total income (upper line), labor income, and “NALRA income” (lower line).  Annual means by age 












There is a political objective within the NHS to strengthen the physician services in 
underserved sectors and areas. Increased wages is one instrument for boosting the hours 
provided by the personnel. Many physicians have several jobs, making the effect of a sector 
specific wage increase difficult to assess. E.g. an increase in public sector wages may 
influence the hours provided in private extra practice.  
 
This study applies an econometric framework that allows for non-convex budget sets, 
nonlinear labor supply curves and imperfect markets with institutional constraints. The 
physicians are assumed to make choices from a finite set of job possibilities, characterized by 
practice form, hours and wage rates. Individuals may combine their main position with an 
extra job or private practice, making a variety of combinations of hours possible for each job. 
I take into account the complicated payment schemes for physicians, as well as taxes and 
household characteristics, when estimating labor supply on Norwegian micro data.  
 
The results show a modest response in total hours to a wage increase, but a reallocation of 
hours in favor of the sector with increased wages. The predictions are evaluated by means of a 
‘natural experiment’; a policy reform significantly increasing hospital wages.  36 37 
1. Introduction 
 
In most countries the health authorities try to influence the physicians’ choice of 
specialization, practice type and working hours. Regulations through quotas have been widely 
used in countries with a National Health Service (NHS). With the deregulation of health 
markets, incentives such as the physicians’ pay and practice income play a relatively more 
important role in the implementation of health policies. The purpose of this paper is to 
analyze how economic incentives affect the labor supply of physicians. I will do this by 
estimating the effects of increased wages on the physicians’ total working hours, and their 
preferred combination of hours in their main job and hours in an extra job or private practice.  
 
A combination of jobs is common for physicians, and it is important to focus on the job mix 
as it seems reasonable to assume that physicians work differently in public and private 
services, facing different sets of incentives and budget mechanisms. The interaction between 
the main job and the extra jobs is also of interest (Iversen, 1997). An efficient implementation 
of the health priorities will thus embrace preferences of practice forms, including a preference 
of a whether a consultant should spend his/her spare time working extra hours in a public 
facility or in a private practice. 
 
Physician labor is an important input both directly, and as the ‘captain of the ship’ with 
responsibility for initiating the treatment and choosing the quality of the care provided. In 
most OECD countries physicians are partially or fully publicly funded while practicing. 
Health authorities justify the funding with their responsibility to ensure the population access 
to health services. Yet many countries suffer from personnel shortages in general or have an 
uneven distribution of personnel, with shortages in the public sector, in certain medical 
specialties or practices and in some regions. 
 
Pencavel (1986) summarizes the labor supply literature for men with the conclusion that the 
elasticities of hours with respect to wages are very small. Much of the literature has been 
focused on low- and middle-income individuals and families. Work by Feenberg and Poterba 
(1993) and Feldstein (1995) on high-income individuals suggests that these individuals are 
responsive to incentives. However, a number of other studies have found no such effect for 
the high-income group, as presented in the survey by Røed and Strøm (2002).  
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Showalter and Thurston (1997) present their analysis of US physicians as a continuation of 
the research on white-collar professions, and focus on tax effects on labor supply. A key 
finding is that self-employed physicians are sensitive to the marginal tax rate, with a supply 
elasticity of 0.33, whereas the effect is small and insignificant for employed physicians. In 
spite of the vast economic literature on physician behavior, labor supply studies are few and 
far between. Those that do exist show the wage elasticities of physicians who are not self-
employed to be modest. Examples are Sloan (1975) and Noether (1986). Rizzo and 
Blumenthal (1994) focus on the impact on labor supply of wage and non-wage income for a 
sample of self-employed US physicians. They find an uncompensated wage elasticity for male 
doctors of 0.23, with a compensated wage elasticity of 0.44. There are no published studies of 
physician labor supply on Norwegian data
1.   
 
A common criticism of traditional studies of labor supply is that they fail to address the 
complications created by institutional constraints, such as contracted working hours and 
absence of individual worker choice. The choice framework presented here is an attempt to 
address these issues. The physicians are faced with job packages consisting of a main job with 
specific hours and an extra job with specific hours. Each physician may choose between four 
sectors or practice types in the main job. The agents maximize utility given a nonlinear budget 
set that incorporates taxes in a static neo-classical structural labor supply model. The basic 
framework is similar to that of Aaberge et al (1995) and van Soest (1995).  
 
The observed fact that physicians work long hours may either be due to economic incentives 
or other attributes of the job. There are many attributes of a job that are partly or fully 
unobservable to the researcher. Examples are shift work, the possibility for maternity leave, 
expected working hours, workload, how challenging the work is, etc. These characteristics 
will in many cases determine the labor supply. These characteristics, except for sector choice, 
are captured by random elements in preferences and choice sets.  
 
                                                 
1 However there is a working paper by Baltagi, Bratberg and Holmås (2003) analysing 1303 Norwegian 
physicians working as hospital consultants over the period 1993-97. They estimate a long-run wage elasticity of 
about 0.55, and reject the static model that estimates the short run wage elasticities to slightly above 0.3. A 
possible reason for their high elasticities compared to other studies might be their use of a log-linear framework, 
with no explicit modelling of taxes and excluding seconds jobs in their analysis.    39 
The main finding is a limited response in the total labor supply to a wage increase, 
corresponding to results reported in the literature for high-income professionals and employed 
physicians. Knowing the physicians’ high initial workload, and the complicated institutional 
regulations, this seems reasonable. There is, however, a potential for changes in the sector 
mix in response to a sector-specific wage increase. The model predicts the observed changes 
in hours worked fairly satisfactory; the hours worked in the main job are slightly 
underpredicted whereas the hours in the extra job are slightly overpredicted.  
 
The paper is organized as follows: The following section gives an overview of the 
characteristics of the physician labor market in Norway. The model and data are described in 
Section 3 and 4, while Section 5 present the results, and includes a section where the 
estimated parameters are used when predicting choices in 1997. The predictions are evaluated 
by comparison with the chosen alternatives. The final section provides conclusions and points 
out directions for further research.  
 
 
2. Characteristics of the physician labor market 
 
In Norway the health services are mainly publicly financed and provided by the government. 
Some services, however, especially in primary care, are provided by private practices and 
institutions on public contracts. The provision of outpatient services is shared between special 
wards at the hospitals and specialists in private practices. There is waiting time for almost all 
non-acute health services that are publicly provided, normally months. It is prohibited to 
supply privately financed inpatient services, with the exemption of some hospitals with a 
National capacity of less than 100 beds. However, there is ample supply of private outpatient 
services offering the same services as hospital outpatient clinics for those who are willing to 
pay. After public procurement to reduce NHS waiting lists, most private surgical procedures 
are paid out of pocket, as private health insurance schemes cover only a minimal share of the 
population. For an overview of the Norwegian health care system, see van den Noord et al. 
(1998) and European Observatory on Health Care Systems (2000).  
 
Hospital physicians are salaried public employees. There are no general restrictions of private 
extra practice and moonlighting is common. Primary care physicians are today mainly 
provided by private practitioners on public contracts, but as we are focusing on the time 40 
period prior to the 2001 family physician reform, there was a mix of 50 percent private 
providers with contracts and 40 percent ‘municipal health officers’. The rest were private 
providers with no or a part refund from the National Insurance Scheme, and interns in their 
final practice year before qualifying.  
 
Around 800, or around 7% of the public positions were reported vacant in 1997. These 
vacancies existed in spite of campaigns to recruit foreign personnel, and as the increases in 
educational capacity were beginning to take effect. Even though the institutional setup and 
physician coverage rate varies a lot between countries, it is easy to find similar challenges in 
guiding personnel to serve the population with the highest needs in the other Scandinavian 
countries and the UK.  
 
As this paper focuses on the supply side in the physician market, important aspects of the 
demand for physician labor are disregarded. The obvious reason is the need to simplify the 
model. The empirical argument is the amount of vacant positions, which should support the 
assumption that there were few restrictions on the demand side and ample opportunities for 
physicians to find their preferred combination of jobs and working hours. On the other hand, 
public providers faced block grants until July 1997 when an activity based funding was 
introduced. This budget restriction may have forced hospital administrations to reduce hours 
of planned overtime in order to stay within the budget. But even with restrictions on public 
hours, physicians are free to combine their hospital position with private practice or other 
jobs. Another motivation for public hospital physicians to have a second job in a private 
practice is the chance to deduct practice related expenses from their earnings prior to taxation. 
These expenses include rents for an office in their own home, PCs, books and journals. The 
register data used in this paper only reports income after a deduction of these expenses.  
 
A selection process drives the choice of specialty, sector, participation and working hours. As 
almost all physicians work full-time, the variation in working hours consists of extended 
hours in the main job and/or extra private practice. Wage differentials between specialties and 
sectors are significantly compressed compared to in the US, and the matching process seems 
less driven by expected income than in many other countries. For instance, the acceptability 
of shift-work seems to be important for the sector choice. There are still specialty differences 
in status and gender mix, with a higher female share in primary care and psychiatrics. In 41 
private practice the importance of unobserved heterogeneity is probably higher as a 
determinant for earnings than for the other sectors.  
 
All analyses are made conditional on the physicians’ choice of specialty. Given the short-term 
perspective of this analysis it is impossible to model the selection into specialties like 
Nicholson (2002). However, the individual specific wages capture the effect specialty has on 
earnings. The four alternative job categories are made general enough to be relevant for all 
specialties. Each physician should be able to find attractive jobs in all categories. Individual 
specific choice sets are not implemented in this paper.  
 
When analyzing the labor supply of physicians we face some additional difficulties which we 
are only partly able to cope with. The market for health personnel consists of a few large 
buyers in the public sector and a dominant public insurance scheme for the private practices. 
This implies that we have elements of a monopsonistic labor market where buyers face an 
upward-sloping supply curve. When considering a wage increase to attract the marginal 
worker, the hospital must take into account that they must also increase the wages of all 
physicians at the hospital. In the public sector the wage bargaining is centralized, and 
seniority, formal qualifications and working hours seem to determine earnings. Hours per 
week depend on the number of physicians sharing a shift plan. This is partly decided by the 
chief physician at ward level and his/her preferences. For a private practitioner with a public 
contract the earnings are decided by a block grant from the municipality, and fee for service 
with fixed fees. Private practitioners without a public contract, e.g. hospital physicians 
working private ‘overtime’, are more market based in their price setting.  
 
In the following we let the physicians choose between different sectors or job types. The 
alternatives are given in Table 1: Hospitals, Public primary care, Private practice and Other 
practices like health administration and research and development. To simplify the analysis, 
there is only one possible extra job when the main job is selected. The extra job is Private 
practice, except Other practices for those who are self-employed. In Appendix 1, Table A1 
presents the distribution of main jobs actually chosen. In part of this analysis I will focus on 
the hospital physicians with possibilities for moon-lightening in an extra private practice. I do, 
however, open up for a variety in the combinations of working hours in the two jobs. The 
reason for the focus on a subset of hospital physicians is the superiority of the data offering 
reliable observations of hours worked. 42 
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3. Model and econometric issues   
 
I apply a static neo-classical structural labor supply model with single decision-makers. The 
physician’s utility depends on income, leisure and other characteristics of the jobs. The utility 
maximization problem is solved by discretizing the nonlinear budget set and choosing the 
optimal job type, hours of work and income combination from a finite set of alternatives. The 
approach presented here assumes that agents choose among “job packages”, or more 
specifically - combinations of jobs, each being defined by a main job and an extra job with 
specific choices of hours. Examples of other applications of this framework includes Aaberge 
et al (1995) and van Soest (1995).  
 
A “job package” is described by i, the choice of main job (and the matching extra job), the 
hours  ij H  in the main job, and hours  ik h  in the extra job. The individual specific wage rate per 
hour in the main job  () ij ij WH  depends on hours worked. The wage  ik w  in the extra job is 
independent of hours. In addition there are other job characteristics that may affect 
preferences and hence choices. As an example we may think of specific skills involved in the 
job, patient mix or shift work. I let the i represent these factors in the set-up.  
 43 
Since preferences are unknown to the analyst, I will assume a random utility model. The 
utility depends on consumption C, hours in the main job H, hours in the side job h and other 
characteristics i. 
 
( ,, , ) ( ,, ) ( ,, , ) UCHhi vCHh CHhi ε =+      (1)  
 
where 
(( ) ) ijk ij ij ij ik ik CCH W H h w =+ ,  ij HH = ,  ik hh =  
 
Cijk is consumption in the job-package, with practice type i, with specific hours of work Hij in 
the main job and hik in the extra job. εijk  is a stochastic term with an iid extreme value 
distribution with an expected mean of 0 and a variance of 
22 /6 σπ . The random term εijk 
captures the fact that attributes other than income and hours not observed here affect labor 
supply, e.g. type of job, shift work etc. The last element in the random term represents other 
characteristics of both jobs in the job combination, as the choice of an extra job is fixed when 
the main job is chosen.  
 
Wij(Hij) is a piecewise linear wage relation in main job i capturing the agreed terms of 
overtime compensation. This is particularly important when analyzing the labor supply of 
hospital consultants, as they have a relatively moderate regular wage rate, but a complicated 
package of different compensations for extended working hours and night shifts
2. In the 
private practice, physicians face the same costs, reimbursements and fees for the marginal 
patient as for the first. This is only an approximation as fixed costs like office rent and 
medical equipment are significant for some specialties. The earnings in the main job and extra 
job are expressed as 
 
Rij= Wij (Hij) Hij                    (2) 
                                                 
2 A hospital consultant has a basic 37.5 hours working week, but shift work reduces this to 35.5 hours per week. 
Most physicians have agreed to a contract of extended working hours with 2.5 hours per week. This is paid with 
a regular wage rate, but compensated for with an additional transfer of NOK 19,900 per year. For the interval 
from 38 to 40.5 hours per week they are compensated with 50 percent extra per hour on top of their regular 
wage. This rises to 100% for the next five hours, whereas shift plans with more than 45.5 hours per week 
compensate the additional hours with 200% extra. 44 
 
ik ik ik rw h =                 ( 3 )  
 
The consumption or more correctly the disposable income corresponding to the choice i, j, k  
is given by the budget constraint  
 
Cijk= f(Rij+ ik r) + I                   (4) 
 
The f(.) function represents the net-of-tax income, which is a compound of earnings in the 
main job and earnings in the extra job. I is family income other than the physician’s own 
earnings (capital income after tax, spouses income after tax, transfers). A non trivial 
assumption made is that the spouse’s hours of work are exogenous as there is reason to 
believe that the spouse’s choice of working hours will correlate either negatively, e.g. if one 
of the parents must look after the children, or positively as they prefer spending their leisure 
time together.  
 
Let B be the opportunity set, i.e. it contains all the feasible “job-packages” available to the 
individual. We exclude non-market opportunities from B as the share of physicians not 
participating in the labor market is negligible
3. Thus for all physicians Hij >0, but  0 ik h ≥ . The 
physicians do not differ with regard to the number of available job sectors or practice types, as 
I have chosen four practice categories that should be feasible to all physicians
4. Note that for 
the same physician, wage rates may differ across jobs, and that the wage rates vary with hours 
worked at hospitals and in primary care. Having access to their employment contracts, we are 
able to derive the compensation schemes for extended hours.  
 
The physicians have a choice of Hij ={18, 22, 28, 35.5, 37.5, 40.5, 45.5, 50, 55} hours per 
week in the main job. In addition to a main job, the model gives them the possibility for hik = 
{0, 6, 12, 18, 24} hours per week in the extra job. As stated above  I assume that the 
                                                 
3 See Aaberge , Colombino, Strøm & Wennemo (1998) for an example including non-market opportunities.  
4 There are of course differences in choice sets related to specialties and geographic regions, but the broad 
categories of job types applied here should not be too limiting. The data restricts the number of job types we are 
able to model. E.g. we cannot separate income from a municipal casualty clinic or a private practice.   
 45 
physicians chose the same type of extra job, given their main job. E.g. if the main job is as a 
hospital consultant, the extra job is in a private practice, the most common type of extra job 
observed for each practice type. 
 
In traditional labor supply offered wages are determined by human capital characteristics, and 
offered hours are uniformly distributed. However, in real life wages may vary across sectors 
for observationally identical workers, and jobs with a specific number of hours may be more 
available in the market than other jobs, e.g. “full-time” jobs. I introduce an opportunity 
density where I assume that offered hours are uniformly distributed except for full-time hours 
and for private practice jobs. This density is assumed to reflect that offered hours, except for 
full-time workload, is equally available in the market. It also corrects for the fact that if the 
physicians choose to work in a private practice, the hours available in the market will be less 
regulated (or not at all) relative to jobs in the public sector. Hours in the side job are 
uniformly distributed. 
 
Since hours of work and consumption are given when the job package is given, the 
physician’s choice problem is a discrete one, namely to find the job that maximizes utility. As 
already mentioned, the analyst does not observe preferences and neither does he observe all 
details of the job-packages available in the market. The problem solved by the physician looks 
like this:  
  
(, , ) max [ , , ]
ij ik




(,,() ,, ) . ij ik ij ij ik HhWH wi B ∈               (6) 
 
Let ( , ) ijk ij ik PHh be the probability that the physician will choose a “job package” with Hij  
hours of work in the main job and hik hours of work in the side job. When the random error 
terms are iid extreme value distributed, the probability can be expressed as 
 
{} ,, (,) P r ( m a x )
rt rs
ijk ij ik ijk rts rH h B PHh U U
∈ ==              (7) 46 
 
I follow the modeling explained in Aaberge, Colombino and Strøm (1999) and get  
 
exp( / ) ( )
(,)












            (8) 
 
Due to the assumption of extreme value distributed utilities it follows readily that the choice 
probabilities are multinominal logits. By setting  (.) g =1 in (8) we get the standard 
multinominal logit.  
 
The analyst has incomplete knowledge or information about variables entering the choice set 
B, and one way to take account of this incomplete knowledge is to specify probability 
distributions for these variables. The  (.) g  function is a probability density that enters the 
choice probabilities due to job-specific offered hours available in the market. The 
interpretation of the “opportunity density extended” version of the standard multinominal 
logit given in (8), is that the attractiveness of a choice measured by exp( / ) i V σ  is weighted by 
a function saying how available this choice is in the market. For more details about this 
methodology I refer to Aaberge, Colombino and Strøm (1999).  
 
Next we have  
 
12 ( ) exp( ) ij ij ij gH K L ν ν =+                               (9) 
 
where ( ) ij gH is the marginal probability density of offered hours. We will assume that offered 
hours are uniformly distributed except for full-time hours. This density is assumed to reflect 
that offered hours, except for full-time workloads, are equally available in the market.  ij K =1 
if the main job is a full-time job (35.5 hours per week or more), and  ij K =0 otherwise.  ij L =1 if 
the main job is private, and  ij L =0 otherwise. The latter captures the fact that if the main job is 
private, the hours available in the market will be less regulated (or not at all) relative to jobs in 
the public sector.  
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It should be noted that the offered wages depend on hours worked; that is  ( ) ij ij ij WW H = . This 
expression also enters the deterministic part of the utility function through disposable income 
ijk C . The reason why I am able to identify  / ijk V σ  is because I use detailed institutional 
information to derive how offered wages  ij W  vary with hours worked. Given this institutional 
information, wage equations are estimated to capture how human capital characteristics and 
sector-specific constants affect expected wages.  
 
The deterministic part of the preferences is represented by the following “Box-Cox” type 
utility function,  
 









− −− − −
=+              (10) 
where  
 
0 ( ) , 1,..,7 qq XX q β ββ =+ =       
 
See for instance, Heckman and MaCurdy (1980), and Aaberge, Dagsvik and Strøm (1995) for 
empirical analyses applying this specification. An advantage of using this specification is that 
it is flexible enough to yield both negative (backward-bending labor supply curve) and 
positive wage elasticities. 8,760 is the total number of annual hours, while α , λ , γ  and the 
s β′  are unknown parameters. For the utility function to be quasi-concave, we require λ <1 
and γ <1. Note that if  0 λ →  and  0 γ → , the utility function converges to a log-linear 
function. An alternative is to represent the utility function with a polynomial like van Soest 
(1995).  
 
The characteristics are: X1= Age of the physician, X2= Number of children below six years of 
age, X3=1, if the spouse is not working, =0 otherwise, X4=1, if the individual is from Norway; 
=0 otherwise, X5=1, if female, =0 otherwise. X6=1, if the physician is a specialist in surgery, 
internal medicine or laboratory medicine, =0 otherwise.  
 
The parameters (α, λ, γ, β0, β1, β2, β3, β4, β5 , β6,  1 ν ,  2 ν ) are estimated in a maximum-
likelihood procedure. Note that σ is not identified and is absorbed in α and β.   48 
 
4. Sample and variable construction 
 
This study is based on several of the administrative data registers covering Norwegian 
residents. Using the register of authorized health personnel as an identifier, I link information 
about demography, income and employment relations. The main years of analysis are 1995 
and 1997. Our trimming procedure excludes personnel below 28 and above 66 years of age, as 
many retire at 67. Some personnel categories have access to early retirement, but it was not 
common at that time. Individuals with an inconsistent professional status or missing important 
variables are excluded. A discussion of the data quality and summary statistics for key 
individual level variables are provided in Appendix 1. The sample consists of 9,663 
individuals in 1995 and 12,252 in 1997 as presented in Table A3. Some sets of analysis have 
additional restrictions, and the number of observations is reported in the respective sections.  
 
Individuals who have multiple jobs have been assigned a main job and an extra job. Personnel 
working full-time in public hospitals, or at other institutions organized by the Norwegian 
Association of Local and Regional Authorities (NALRA), have this job assigned as their main 
job. For the rest of the sample the main job is the one with highest annual earnings. Each 
individual is only assigned two jobs. It is not uncommon to have even more jobs, but these 
tend to be minor both when it comes to hours and income, and are therefore disregarded. The 
annual taxable earnings do however include all jobs. Each individual is assigned an hourly 
wage not only in the sectors they are observed in, but also a predicted wage they would earn if 
they were to work in some of the other sectors. I exploit the richness of the register data in 
this procedure, including specialty, residency and observed experience from the previous 20 
years. See Appendix 2 for wages, and Appendix 3 for taxes.  
 
 
5. Empirical results 
 
This section presents the results from four sets of analysis. The first three are based on subsets 
of hospital physicians working in 1995. The fourth set is an analysis of all physicians working 
in 1997. Each analysis contains a discussion of the estimated parameters of the model, before 
the observed and predicted choices of working hours and sector mix are presented. For 
hospital physicians I also present an 'experiment', using the parameters estimated on 1995 data 49 
to predict hours in 1997, using hourly wages in 1997. This is no genuine panel data analysis, 
but a cross-sectional analysis from 1995 used to make out-of-sample predictions in 1997. I 
evaluate these predictions through comparisons with the observed choices in 1997.  
 
The physicians choose between nine categories, or intervals, of hours in their main job and 
five categories of hours in the extra job. This is of course a simplification of the actual 
variation in working time, but should cover the most common choices. E.g. a primary care 
physician may face the choice of a full-time private practice or a combination of four days a 
week in the private practice and one day working at the local mother & child health center. 
For hospital physicians a more common dilemma is whether to spend their spare time 
working extended hours at the public hospital, or in a private practice. 
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Section 5.1 presents an analysis based on the largest available sets of hospital physicians with 
a complete NALRA data set from 1995 or 1997. Section 5.2 limits the sample to male 
specialist consultants working with internal medicine, surgery or laboratory medicine. This is 
done in order to focus on a more homogenous group with a particular potential for private 
extra practice as their training is completed. Like section 5.1, the analysis in section 5.3 
includes jr. and sr. physicians, but only those observed with complete records in both 1995 
and 1997. Using an identical sample for 1995 and 1997 simplifies the prediction evaluation 
when predicting out of sample in 1997.  
 
I assume that hospital physicians have an extra job in a private practice. If they do not work in 
a second job I regard this as zero hours in this job. In sections 5.1-5.3 I present the observed 
choices of hours in the hospital job and in the private job in 1995, prior to four predictions for 
the same year. The first prediction is based on the observed wages, the second with a ten 
percent wage increase in the hospital sector, then a similar increase in private 'wages' only, 
and finally a ten percent increase in both wages. Section 5.4 continues with an 'experiment' - 
using the estimates from 1995 to predict the choices for the hospital physicians in 1997 based 
on observed wages for this year. The predictions are compared with the observed choices in 
1997.  
 
Section 5.5 adopts a broader perspective and includes all physicians allocated to four 
alternative sectors. The advantage of this approach is the ability to predict the changes in 
average working hours for all physicians from sector specific wage increases. The 
disadvantage is that I rely on data with poorer quality than the NALRA data. The extra job is 
also here restricted to private practice, the most common choice observed. The exception is 
private practitioners with other job types as their extra job. This includes education and 
research, health administration, NGOs, industrial medical officers etc. Section 5.6 sums up the 
general results. Appendix 4 presents figures illustrating the observations and predictions for 
the four sets.  
 
From Table 3 we observe that all parameters are sharply determined and that λ  and γ  are 
estimated to yield a quasi-concave utility function. On the data set considered to be of the best 
quality, λ  is estimated to be close to 1, which implies that utility is a linear function of 51 
income. It is interesting to note that the estimates of λ  and γ  are similar across these first 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.1 Hospital physicians 
 
The first subset contains all physicians working at NALRA hospitals in 1995 or 1997, 
with a complete record of overtime compensation. This includes physicians under 
specialist training and consultants. The model parameters presented in Table 3 are all 
significant with the exception of some of the  s β  in the leisure component. The 
income term in the utility function (10) is estimated with a λ  of 0.86 and an α  of 
2.23. The γ  in the leisure component is estimated to -1.50.  2 β  and  5 β  are significant 
and positive, meaning that individuals with a child below 6 years of age and women 
value leisure more than average. The opposite occurs for the hospital specialist 
represented by  6 β . The older physicians value leisure more than average, but this 
effect is not significant at the five percent level. The  s β  related to whether the spouse 
works or not and country background are less sharply determined. The  ( ) ij gH -
function in (9) with a dummy representing a full-time position is represented with the 
significant parameter  1 v of 4.93. 
 
Table 4 Physicians at NALRA hospitals in 1995. Observed and predicted choices 
Jr. physicians and hospital consultants 
         Predictions with  Predictions with  Predictions with 
      Observed Predicted a 10% increase in a 10% increase in 
a 10% increase 
in  
       hours   Hours   hospital wages  private wages  all wages 
                        
Hours per week    s.d.  s.d.  s.d.  s.d.   s.d.
Hospital   42.3 (6.2) 41.8 (1.2) 42.5 (1.4) 41.7 (1.2)  42.4 (1.4)
Private extra practice  4.1 (6.2) 5.2 (0.9) 5.0 (0.9) 5.7 (1.0)  5.5 (1.0)
Total     46.5 (8.6) 47.0 (1.9) 47.5 (2.1) 47.4 (2.0)  47.9 (2.1)
                        
Hours per year                    
Hospital   2032 (298) 2008 (60) 2041 (68) 2002 (59)  2034 (67)
Private extra practice  198 (296) 250 (43) 240 (41) 275 (49)  264 (47)
Total     2230 (413) 2258 (93) 2281 (98) 2277 (97)  2299 (102)
                        
Elasticities          Total  Main job  Extra job     
Effect of an increase in hospital wages    0.10*(0.05) 0.16* (0.05) -0.40* (0.16)   
Effect of an increase in private wages    0.08*(0.02) -0.03* (0.01) 0.99* (0.14)   
Effect of an increase in all wages     0.18*(0.06) 0.13* (0.04) 0.56* (0.26)   
N=2775                      
                
Standard deviations in brackets.  
* Significantly different from zero at a 95 percent confidence level.                 
This table corresponds to Table P4 in Appendix 5. 54 
 
Table 4 presents the average hours in the hospital job and in the private extra practice. 
The corresponding Table P4 in Appendix 4 presents the observed shares and predicted 
probabilities for the alternative choices of ‘job-mix’ for the nine categories of hours in 
the main job, in combination with the five possible alternatives in the extra job, which 
are used to derive the hours of work. The 2,775 physicians have an ‘observed’ 
average of annual working hours per year of 2,230. Their labor is shared between 
2,032 hours per year, or 42 hours per week, in their hospital job, and 198 hours per 
year in a private job, corresponding to 4 hours per week.  
 
When I compare the ‘observed’ hours with the predictions from the model, I slightly 
underpredict hours in the hospital job (2,008 vs. 2,032 hours) and overpredict hours in 
the private practice (250 vs. 198 hours), in total an average of 28 hours less per year. 
The ‘observed’ hospital working hours lie within the predicted confidence interval 
(standard deviation of 60). The private practice hours are less accurately predicted 
with a standard deviation of 43. The model thus predicts the total hours reasonably 
well, but the predictions of sector mix are slightly biased.  
 
In a policy simulation I now introduce a 10 percent wage increase for the hospital job, 
keeping private ‘wages’ constant. The predictions are a small increase in hours in the 
hospital job, 33 hours per year or a 1.6 percent increase. There is a predicted reduction 
in the private extra job of 10 hours per year, or a 4 percent reduction. The total effect 
is a predicted 23 hour, or 1 percent, increase. The opposite effect occurs with a 10 
percent ‘wage‘ (fee) increase in private practice - 6 hours less per year at the hospital, 
and 25 hours more in the private practice. With a 10 percent wage increase in both 
sectors, the model predicts a mean increase in labor supply of 41 hours per year, 
where the hospital job absorbs 26 hours of the increase.  
 
The wage elasticities are positive and significantly different from zero. Looking at 
changes in total hours from an increase in the hospital wage, I find a wage elasticity 
of 0.10. The sector specific elasticities are 0.16 in the hospital job and -0.40 in the 
private practice. The wage elasticity when increasing the private wages is 0.08 for 
total working hours, -0.03 in the hospital job and 0.99 in the private practice. With an 
increase in both wages, the elasticity is 0.18 in total hours, 0.13 at the hospital and 55 
0.56 in the private practice. In all cases the total change in hours worked is moderate, 
with elasticities in the range of 0.1-0.2. The exception is the private practice with a 
small number of hours worked in the reference case creating high elasticities up to 1.  
 
 
5.2 Male hospital consultants  
 
Restricting the sample to male hospital consultants working with internal medicine, 
surgery or laboratory medicine, leaves us with 1,521 observations in 1995. This group 
is expected to be more active both in the main job and in particular the extra practice 
as their training is completed. Male physicians traditionally also have less leisure than 
their female colleagues. The model parameters are presented in Table 3. The income 
term in the utility function is estimated with a λ  of 0.85 and an α  of 2.67. The γ  in 
the leisure component is estimated to - 1.40.  2 β  is positive and significant, meaning 
that those with children below 6 years of age value leisure more than average. The 
() ij gH -function is represented with a parameter  1 v of 5.08. 
 
The consultants have an ‘observed’ average of annual working hours per year of 
2,305, divided between 2,086 hours per year, or 43.5 hours per week, in their hospital 
job, and 219 hours per year in a private job, corresponding to 4.6 hours per week.  
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Table 5 Male Hospital Consultants at NALRA Hospitals in 1995. 
Observed and Predicted Choices 
       Predictions with   Predictions with   Predictions with 
   Observed   Predicted 10%  increase  in   10% increase in   10% increase in 
     hours    hours   hospital wages  private wages  all wages 
                     
Hours per week                 
Hospital   43.5 (6.1)  42.9 (1.0) 43.9 (1.1) 42.7 (1.0) 43.7 (1.1)
Private extra practice  4.6 (6.2)  5.4 (0.6) 5.1 (0.5) 6.0 (0.7) 5.7 (0.6)
Total   48.0 (8.3)  48.3 (1.1) 49.0 (1.2) 48.7 (1.2) 49.4 (1.2)
                    
Hours per year                
Hospital   2086 (295)  2061 (47) 2107 (54) 2052 (46) 2098 (54)
Private extra practice  219 (299)  257 (27) 244 (26) 288 (31) 275 (30)
Total   2305 (398)  2318 (54) 2352 (59) 2340 (55) 2373 (60)
                     
Elasticities           Total hours   Main job   Extra job    
Effect of an increase in hospital wages   0.15* (0.03) 0.23* (0.03) -0.49* (0.09)  
Effect of an increase in private wages    0.10* (0.02) -0.04* (0.01) 1.21* (0.08)  
Effect of an increase in all wages     0.24* (0.03) 0.18* (0.03) 0.68* (0.12)  
N=1521 
Standard deviations in brackets. 
This table corresponds to Table P5 in Appendix 5. 
 
 
Comparing the ‘observed’ hours with the predictions from the model as presented in 
Table 5, I find an underprediction of hours in the hospital job (2,061 vs. 2,086 hours) 
and an overprediction of hours in the private practice (257 vs. 219 hours), totaling to 
13 hours more per year on average. Like the first model the prediction of total hours is 
good, but the predictions of sector mix are biased. As expected this group works more 
in average in both jobs compared to the section above. Moving to the policy analysis I 
find a similar pattern to that of the whole group of hospital physicians, but higher 
elasticities.  
 
5.3 Hospital physicians with full data sets in 1995 and 1997 
The next set is an analysis of 1,036 hospital physicians with complete NALRA data of 
overtime work observed in both 1995 and 1997. An argument for looking at this 
group is to analyze the same individuals before and after the major wage increase in 
the health sector from 1995 to 1997, when undertaking the experiment in the next 
section.  
 
As presented in Table 3, the income term in the utility function is estimated with a λ  
of 0.93 and an α  of 2.79. The γ  in the leisure component is estimated to - 1.31. Not 57 
all the variables in the β -function are significant, but the following are: age, number 
of children below six years of age, gender. The older the physician is, the more he/she 
values leisure, and the same goes for parents with small children and women. The 
hospital specialists values leisure less than average, but this effect is not significant at 
the five percent level.   
 
Table 6 Hospital Physicians, observed both in 1995 and 1997. 
Observed and predicted Choices.  Jr. physicians and hospital consultants 
       Predictions with   Predictions with  
Predictions with 
a  
    Observed   Predicted a 10% increase in   a 10% increase in   10% increase in 
     hours    hours   hospital wages  private wages  all wages 
                       
Hours per week    s.d.   s.d.  s.d.  s.d.   s.d.
Hospital   44.4 (5.8)  43.3 (1.5) 44.5 (1.7) 43.1 (1.4)  44.3 (1.7)
Private extra practice  3.6 (5.9)  4.9 (0.9) 4.6 (0.9) 5.6 (1.1)  5.2 (1.0)
Total   48.0 (8.4)  48.2 (2.0) 49.1 (2.2) 48.7 (2.1)  49.5 (2.2)
                     
Hours per year                    
Hospital   2130 (279)  2079 (70) 2136 (83) 2070 (68)  2127 (81)
Private extra practice  174 (283)  234 (43) 219 (41) 267 (52)  251 (49)
Total   2304 (403)  2312 (95) 2355 (103) 2337 (99)  2378 (107)
                       
Elasticities           Total hours   Main job  Extra job      
Effect of an increase in hospital wages   0.19* (0.06) 0.27* (0.06) -0.60* (0.17)   
Effect of an increase in private wages    0.10* (0.03) -0.04* (0.01) 1.41* (0.18)   
Effect of an increase in all wages     0.28* (0.06) 0.23* (0.06) 0.74* (0.27)   
N=1036 
Standard deviations in brackets. 
This table corresponds to Table P6  in Appendix.5. 
 
From Table 6 we see that the hospital physicians have an ‘observed’ average of 
annual working hours per year of 2,130 compared to the predicted 2,079 hours per 
year. The private practice hours are ‘observed’ with 174 hours and predicted with 234 
hours per year. The sums for observed and predicted hours are close, at 48 hours per 
week - 2,304 hours and 2,312 hours respectively per year. Like in the previous models 
the prediction of total hours is good, but the predicted sector mix deviates from the 
observed one. From Table P6 in Appendix 4 we observe that common ‘job packages’ 
with 45.5 or 50 hours per week at the hospital and no private income, are 
underpredicted.  
 
The next step is the policy analysis with a 10 percent wage increase for the hospital 
job, keeping private ‘wages’ constant. The prediction is an increase of 3 percent for 58 
hospital hours, or 57 hours per year. The private hours are predicted to be reduced by 
six percent or 15 hours per year. The total is an increase of 43 hours or 2 percent. Like 
in section 5.1 the opposite effect occurs with a 10 percent ‘wage‘ (fee) increase in 
private practice: An average of 9 hours less per year in the hospital job or two percent 
reduction in hospital hours, and an increase of 33 hours or 14 percent in private 
practice hours, corresponding to a one percent increase in total hours.  
 
With a 10 percent wage increase in both sectors, the model predicts a mean increase 
in the labor supply of 66 hours per year, of which the hospital job absorbs 48 hours. 
Looking at changes in total hours after an increase in the hospital wage, I find a wage 
elasticity of 0.19. The sector specific elasticities are 0.27 in the hospital job and -0.60 
in the private practice. The wage elasticity when increasing the private wages is 0.10 
for total working hours, -0.04 in the hospital job and 1.41 in the private practice. With 
an increase in both wages the elasticity is 0.28, 0.23 at the hospital and 0.74 in the 
private practice. In all policy simulations the total change in hours worked is small, 
with wage elasticities from 0.1 to 0.3.  
  
 
5.4 Predictions based on 1997 data 
 
In this section I present an ‘experiment’ applying the models in 5.1-5.3 based on 1995 
data to predict the labor supply in 1997. I use the ‘observed’ hourly wages in 1997, in 
the meaning of the calculated wages based on income and available data on hours. 
Combining these wages with parameters estimated on 1995 data gives an opportunity 
to evaluate the reliability of the predictions by comparing the predicted choices with 
the observed ones. Table 7 displays the three subsets of hospital physicians with 
private extra practice presented in the sections above.  59 
 
Table 7 Prediction experiment on 1997 Data 
Observed choices in 1997 and predicted choices in 1997.  
Predictions based on 1995 model parameters and 1997 wages.  
Hospital physicians    
All hospital physicians  Male hospital consultants  observed in 1995 & 1997 
    
N=1553  
N=790 N=1036  
    
Predicted with    Predicted with    Predicted with 
    Observed 1997  1997 wages      Observed 1997  1997 wages      Observed 1997  1997 wages  
  
Hours per week     
s.d. 
s.d. s.d. s.d. s.d. s.d.
Hospital   43.4  (-7.1) 42.7 (-1.2) 45 (-6.8) 44.1 (-0.8) 43.7 (-6.5) 42.7 (-1.2)
Private extra practice     3.6  (-5.9) 5.5 (-1.3)   4 (-6.2) 6.2 (-0.9)   3.2 (-5.5) 5.5 (-1.3)
Total   47  (-9.1) 48.2 (-2.3) 49 (-9) 50.3 (-1.2) 46.9 (-8.6) 48.2 (-2.3)
            
Hours per year           
Hospital   2082  (-342) 2049 (-59) 2160 (-326) 2116 (-40) 2096 (-310) 2049 (-59)
Private extra practice     171  (-285) 266 (-60)   194 (-299) 298 (-44)   156 (-266) 266 (-60)
Total   2254  (-435) 2315 (-110) 2354 (-432) 2414 (-55) 2252 (-411) 2315 (-110)
Standard deviations in brackets. This table corresponds to Table P7 in Appendix 5. 
 
I find that the predictions overestimate the total hours in all alternatives by up to three 
percent. In all samples, the average labor supply at hospitals is underestimated, 
whereas the private extra job is overestimated.  
 
In the first set the predicted amount of average hours in the hospital job is 2,049, 
compared to 2,082 hours per year observed. For the private practice the model 
predicts 266 hours per year compared to our calculated 171. The total hours predicted 
for hospital consultants are 2,414, compared to 2,354 hours observed per year. The 
number of private hours is also here significantly higher than the one calculated based 
on survey data. For the group observed with a complete data set for both years, the 
prediction is 2,049 hours per year in the hospital job and 266 in private practice, 
compared to 2,096 and 156 ‘observed’ hours. The predicted total hours thus 
outnumber the ‘observed’ ones by 63, or almost 3 percent. The largest deviation 
between prediction and observation occurs in the sample using the same individuals to 
estimate the parameters used in the predictions.  
 
The predictions of total hours are more or less in the region of the observed choices, 
and the predictions have the correct direction of changes in hospital hours from 1995 
to 1997 when comparing Table 7 to Tables 4-6. The private hours are overpredicted, 
but the predicted direction is correct.  60 
5.5 A note on the changes in observed hours from 1995 to 1997.  
 
In light of the major increase in hospital wages from 1995 to 1997, it is also 
interesting just to look at the changes in observed hours. The focus here will be on the 
hospital hours, observed with a complete data set before and after the hospital pay 
reform. Table 8 reports two measures on hourly wages, a basic wage before 
compensations and benefits, and the mean of total income divided by total hours. We 
know that the marginal wage when working overtime is three times the wage of the 
first hour. The mean basic wage was around NOK 150 in 1995 increased by 12-14 
percent the next two years after correcting for price increases. The total income 
divided by all hours gives a mean hourly wage of NOK 210-230 in 1995, increasing 
around 35 percent in 1997 due to changes in the payment structure for overtime work.  
 
During the same period there was a small reduction in average number of hours 
worked, from 2,130 hours per year to 2,096 for individuals with a complete data set 
prior to and after the pay reform. This equals a reduction from 44.4 to 43.7 hours per 
week. Some specialists, like anesthetists, typically work 48 hours per week, others no 
more than the general contract of 37.5 hours per week. In a period with a significant 
wage increase we thus observe a small reduction in hours worked. This result may be 
due to a strong income effect, or institutional mechanisms reducing physicians’ 
overtime in order to keep the budget in spite of a marked wage increase. For the first 
two subsets however, we observe a positive labor supply response of about 4 percent 
for the male specialists.  
 
Table 8 
Changes in observed hours and mean hourly wages. Hospital physicians 1995-1997.  
 N  Hospital  hours  Basic hourly wage    Income/Hours 
   1995 1997  1995 1997 Change  1995 1997Change     1995  1997 Change
      
Hospital physicians  2775 1553 2032 2082 2 % 146 166 12 %  211  278  33 %
  (298)(342) (17.0)(14.6)  (36.5)  (40.6) 
Male consultants  1521 790 2086 2160 4 % 151 171 14 %  228  308  35 %
  (295)(326) (14.1) (9.5)  (28.7)  (23.8) 
Hospital physicians obs. In 95-97  1036 1036  2130 2096 -2 %  150 169 12 %   214  291  36 %
  (279)(310) (16.4)(12.4)  (36.5)  (36.9) 
1995 prices 
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The data on private hours are less reliable, but included in Figure 4 in Appendix 4. In 
all the sets of hospital physicians there is a reduction in private work. My calculations 
indicate a reduction in the extra job, with an average of about 20 hours per year. The 
direction of this change seems reasonable given the major increase in hospital wages, 
making it relatively more profitable to continue at the hospital instead of moving to a 
private practice. The size of the effect however, is uncertain.   
 
 
5.6 All physicians practicing in 1997 
 
Expanding the sample to include all physicians practicing in 1997 gives us an 
opportunity to analyze the impact on all sectors of changes in sector specific wages. 
The physicians have a job choice between four sectors as described by Table A8. 55 
percent of the physicians have a main job in the hospital sector, 31 percent as private 
practitioners, 7 percent as municipal health officers and the remaining 6 percent have 
other jobs, e.g. within health administration and research. The extra job is restricted to 
private practice, the most common choice observed. The exception is private 
practitioners with other as their extra job. As before, the working hours are set to zero 
if they do not work in an extra job.  
 
The parameter estimation, as presented in Table 3, gives an income term in the utility 
function with a λ  of 0.59 and an α  of 3.45. The γ  in the leisure component is 
estimated to –3.72.  The older the physician, the more he/she values leisure, and the 
same goes for parents with small children, individuals whose spouse does not work or 
who have a foreign background, and women. The  ( ) ij gH -function is estimated with a 
dummy for full-time work and a dummy for private practitioners.  
 
From Table 9 we see that the physicians have an ‘observed’ average of 1,953 working 
hours per year in their main job, compared to the predicted 1,895 hours per year. The 
more uncertain estimation of the extra job is ‘observed’ with 365 hours and predicted 
with 439 hours per year. The sums are close with 2,319 hours ‘observed’ and 2,333 
hours predicted per year. This sample gives less precise predictions than the three 
subsets of hospital physicians, but the prediction of total hours is better than the 62 
predictions for the main job and the second job. The total working hours correspond 
to 48 hours per week. The amount of hours in the extra job is higher than in the 
previous samples for hospital physicians. This is not only due to the inclusion of other 
sectors, but also that private practitioners with a public contract receive income from 
several sources. As I have not been able to aggregate these sources in this set, I 
register the block grant from the municipality as an extra job.  
 
In the policy analysis the predicted effect of a 10 percent increase in hospital wages is 
an increase of 3 percent, or 51 hours per year, in the hospital hours. The private hours 
are predicted to be reduced by five percent or 22 hours per year. This gives a total 
increase of 30 hours, or one percent. A ten percent increase in wages in public 
primary care has small effects on the mean working hours for all physicians, partly 
due to their limited share of the total population also after a simulated wage increase. 
A ten percent wage increase results in an average of 5 hours more worked in the main 
job, and 3 hours less in the extra job.   
 
A 10 percent ‘wage‘ (fee) increase in private practice reduces the hours in the main 
job for those working private practice as their extra job, and increases the hours for 
those working private practice as their main job. The result is a minimal predicted 
change of 7 hours less per year in the main job. The hours in the extra job are 
increased by 4 percent, driven by the hospital physicians with a second job in private 
practice. A similar policy experiment with an increase in other wages, predicts no 
major change in the main job, and a 1.5 percent increase in extra job hours. 
 
If all wages are raised by 10 percent, there is a mean increase of 50 hours per year in 
the main job and no change in the extra job. The wage elasticity in this case is 0.22 
and significantly different from zero. As reported in Table 9 the elasticities for all the 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The previous sections have presented three samples of hospital physicians and one 
complete set of all physicians working in Norway. The reason for the focus on 
hospital physicians is the superiority of the data on working time compared to the 
other sectors. It is important to remember that this discrete choice application is only 
an approximation, with 9 alternative hours in the main job and five alternatives when 
having a side job. 
 
The observed and predicted choice of hours in the main job and extra job is presented 
in Figure 1 - Figure 3 in Appendix 4. The first bar to the left represents hours worked 
in 1995. The second is for predicted hours with unchanged wages. The third 
represents a prediction of hours with a 10 percent increase in hospital wages. The two 
subsequent bars represent similar policy experiments in private practice and for all 
sectors simultaneously. The two bars to the right represent observations in 1997 and 
predictions for 1997 in a policy experiment where I use the parameters estimated on 
1995 data and the ‘observed’ wages from 1997 to predict the choices in 1997.  
 
In all applications I find a modest response in the total hours worked to a wage 
increase in hospitals. The model predicts that the hospital physicians respond to a 
wage increase by increasing their hours at the hospital and reducing their private 
hours. The opposite goes for an increase in private practice fees. A similar pattern 
emerges in all samples of the model. The predictions are reasonable adequate, with 
the general tendency being that the hours worked at the hospital are slightly 
underpredicted, whereas the private hours are overpredicted. When increasing only 
hospital wages, the ‘hospital specific’ elasticities ranged from 0.16 to 0.27. Focusing 
on the total hours worked, the elasticities ranged from 0.10 to 0.19. When simulating 
an increase in all wages, the elasticities are higher, ranging from 0.18 to 0.28. 
 
Compared to the high quality of the data for hospital physicians, the hours in the 
private sector must be seen as an approximation of the unobserved working hours. As 
presented in each table the effect of a wage increase on total labor supply is modest.  
The wage elasticities, in total and by sector, are presented in each table. There are no 
major deviations from this results related to gender, specialty and geographic region 65 
that are found in the predictions and not presented here. Of course, with such small 
predicted behavioral responses it is difficult to identify any differences. A reason for 
the lack of gender differences is probably that female hospital physicians choose to 
work, or are ‘forced’ to work, in the same shift plan as male physicians. A preference 
for shorter working hours would thus lead to a job choice in another sector like the 
health administration, as a municipal health officer/public primary care physician or a 
part-time private practice, for which we do not have access to data of the same detail 
as the NALRA data. The regional similarities are probably due to the centralized 
wage determination in the health sector, with almost identical wages and fees 
throughout the country.  
  
This section also presented an ‘experiment’ with the hospital physicians – predicting 
choices in 1997 using the parameter estimates from 1995 and the ‘observed’ wages 
from 1997. The predictions of total hours are in the region of the observed choices, 
whereas the predictions only have the correct direction of changes in the hospital 
hours in two of the three cases. The private hours are overpredicted and the observed 





The aim of this paper has been to identify the effect of increased wages on working 
hours and sector choice. I find that the physicians are sensitive to wage changes when 
determining their labor supply. This holds for the three subsamples of employed 
hospital physicians, studied in detail due to the superior data quality. 
 
The predictions indicate ‘job specific’ elasticities that are modest yet positive and 
significant. The effect on total hours is lessened, however, as the responded increase 
of hours in the care sector where wages rise, is matched by a reduction of hours in the 
other practice types. The result is a change in the sector mix and a 
modest increase in total hours.  
 
The Norwegian response to the increasing need for personnel, fueled by intensified 
specialization and institutional reforms, has been to increase the educational capacity 66 
and import foreign personnel. The results presented in this paper indicate that the 
alternative of increasing the hours worked for those already participating by 
increasing wages, would put a strain on public budgets. There is also a danger that a 
sector-specific wage increase may result in a “bidding war”. The history describes 
various health sector reforms with practice specific wage increases to attract 
personnel to their sector. The significant wage increase in the hospital sector used in 
this study is only one example.  
 
Due to the limited time period presented here, I am unable to document changes in the 
choice of specialization as a response to changes in expected life-time earnings. This 
is an interesting topic for further research, but requires data from a long time period as 
it takes 5-15 years from completing university studies to becoming licensed as a 
specialist. 
 
In a policy perspective, this analysis predicts a modest response to a wage increase in 
total hours worked. The results are in line with the existing research on employed 
physicians and the more general literature on high-income professionals. A high-
income group with full participation and many hours worked per year is not 
responsive to increased wages in their total labor supply. However, there might be a 
potential in influencing the choice of sector mix as documented by this study. 67 
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Appendix 1   Data quality and summary statistics  
 
There are asymmetries in the information levels depending on whether the physicians 
are employed or in private practice, and on the type of employer. For all groups I have 
information about annual earnings prior to and after taxation, employment status, and 
demographic variables. I have information about the date of medical authorization and 
specialization for up to three specialist licenses for all physicians ‘accumulated’ in 
1998. I assume that the latest achieved specialty is the one that is practiced.  
 
For employees I have days worked during the year and annual earnings by employer. 
Start and stop days are, however, a bit unclear as many employers report employment 
during the whole year even though the actual job was short term. Statistics Norway has 
developed an estimate of hours worked per year by employer and in total. There is also 
a more robust measure with information about hours worked presented in broad 
categories: Less than 4 hours, 4-19 hours, 20-29 hours, and 30 hours or more per 
week. All employers are coded by the NACE Standard Industrial Classification, which 
gives us detailed information of their sector and type of activity. Institutional 
knowledge of the different industries and categories of employers provides 
information of regular working hours. 
 
For employees in institutions owned by municipalities and county authorities I also 
have information on wages and regular working hours for one month of each year. For 
most of these institutions I also have the possibility of calculating the amount of 
planned and unplanned extra hours. The Norwegian Association of Local and Regional 
Authorities (NALRA) collects the data on 1 October. At this time of the year the 
central wage bargaining is completed, but the local wage bargaining is not and 
therefore not registered. There are some minor inconsistencies, which I ignore, 
between the monthly salary and the registered annual income from the same employer. 
In addition to the aforementioned unregistered local wage increase, this is probably 
due to uneven workloads throughout the year as physicians work extra overtime during 
periods with high workloads or when many physicians are on holiday during the 
summer, or due to other extraordinary activities, such as campaigns to reduce patient 
waiting lists. The NALRA data covers most hospitals, public primary care and local 
health administrations. 71 
 
For those working at hospitals owned by the central government or contracted 
charities, I have access to the contract terms of jr. physicians and specialist 
consultants. I also know that a physician working at one of the two hospitals owned by 
the central government has the same contract as those working for the municipality of 
Oslo. However, these prestigious hospitals have a reputation of ‘demanding’ an extra 
unpaid effort from aspiring physicians. Physicians working for non-profit private 
hospitals in other localities have the same terms as NALRA employees outside Oslo. I 
am thus able to have a well-informed opinion about their regular and extended 
working hours knowing their annual income, years of experience and specialty for all 
physicians. The same goes for other public employers like central health authorities or 
the general administration.  
 
For self-employed physicians I have no information about hours worked in the register 
data. Using a study by Statistics Norway of self-reported working hours and income 
for primary care providers and private specialist consultants, I have some clues 
regarding the distribution of working hours for these groups. I assume that all of the 
self-employed physicians’ earnings are health related. Most of the PCPs and private 
specialist have a contract with their municipality or county council and the National 
Insurance Scheme.  
 
I approximate the private hourly wages based on our knowledge on annual private 
income and average income per hour from survey data. This probably underestimates 
the private wages for hospital consultants, and thus overestimates the hours worked 
privately. Anecdotal evidence indicates an hourly wage of about NOK 1,000, or three 
times the average of the estimated wage for full-time private specialist practitioners. 
Looking more closely at private income, there are significant variations between 
specialties. Physicians working with ear, nose and throat and ophthalmology are on top 
with 20 percent of their total income from private practice, whereas others like brain 
surgeons had a significantly lower share. The physicians have the right to deduct 
private practice expenses from their earnings prior to taxation. These expenses include 
home office rent, PCs, professional literature, phone etc. and create an extra 
motivation for employees to work in a second job as a private practitioner. The register 72 
data only includes private income after these deductions. This leads to a downward 
bias in the estimated hours.  
 
Hourly wage is the applied earnings measure for the employees too. For most 
physicians this is straightforward, as I know the monthly regular wage and working 
hours. The centralized wage determination in the health sector, with almost identical 
wages and fees trough out the country simplifies this task. For 2,775 physicians in 
1995 and 1,553 in 1997 I also know the compensation for working extended hours, 
and when the different levels of overtime compensation (50%, 100% and 200%) take 
effect.  
Hospital physicians have to work longer than their regular working hours of 37.5 hours 
per week or 35.5 hours per week for those working shifts. There is a national 
agreement to extend the number of weekly hours by 2.5. In addition there are local 
agreements at ward level extending the total hours per week up to 48 hours per week 
in the shift plan for all physicians. The amount of planned overtime depends on factors 
like patient load, amount of vacant positions and shift plan. In addition there is a need 
for “unplanned” overtime work in situations with absent personnel or a high workload. 
Some wards split the overtime “fairly” and include almost all overtime in the planned 
part. Other wards may reduce the planned overtime all physicians must share, and 
leave the rest to unplanned overtime for those who volunteer.  
 
Authorized foreign physicians are excluded when they do not have a permanent 
residency in Norway or if they have a permanent residency code, but no income or 
address in Norway. Some people in this group obtain an authorization but never arrive 
in Norway. Others, like many of the Scandinavians, work in Norway for a shorter 
period (up to 6 months). These physicians are often fully employed in their home 
countries and work in Norway during holidays or when they have a week off in their 
shift plan.  
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Some of the individuals were dropped due to missing data .  
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Table A2 The more restrictive data sets used as a basis for the hospital analysis.  
Data used in section 5.1-5.4 
Variable      Label                                              Mean  Std Dev 
      
b970_5        No. of children below 6 years of age       0.47 0.68
ektejobb      Spouse does not work:  1=yes 0=No            0.31 0.46
ektelege      Spouse is a physician: 1=Yes 0=No            0.19 0.39
ektespl       Spouse is a Registered nurse: 1=Yes 0=No      0.17 0.38
cnorway       From Norway                              0.83 0.38
female        Female                                     0.26 0.44
married       Married                                    0.78 0.41
age           Age                                        46.3 8.85
nonw          Nonwage income – spouse, capital, etc.     208000 167000
rek           Specialty with extra pay in hospitals      0.13 0.34
duma          Dummy if hospital                          0.49 0.5
dumb          Dummy if private                           0.32 0.46
dumc          Dummy for pai info                         0.37 0.48
paitid        Pai info  - more restrictive               0.31 0.46
ubehagd       Pai info – more complete                   0.26 0.44
nonspes       Not qualified specialist                   0.28 0.45
s_gp          Specialist GP/Primary care medicine        0.23 0.42
s_non_gp      Specialist   (Except in GP/PCM)            0.49 0.5
s_surg        Spec.Surgery                               0.14 0.35
s_int_me      Spec.Internal medicine                     0.2 0.4
s_psych       Spec.Psychiatry                            0.07 0.26
s_lab         Spec.Laboratory medicine                   0.06 0.23
      
SECTORS      
Sector main job - dummies          
s_1       KS – Hospitals out of Oslo                       0.35 0.48
s_2       OS – Oslo hospitals                            0.14 0.35
s_3       Municipal primary care                         0.09 0.28
s_4       Private without public contract                0.1 0.31
s_5       Other                                          0.05 0.22
s_6       Research and development                       0.05 0.23
s_7       Private with public contract                   0.21 0.41
Alternative sector allocation     
sm1       Hospitals                                      0.49 0.5
sm2       Private practice                               0.32 0.46
sm3       Other                                          0.19 0.39
      
Extra job       
b_1    Hospital, no extra job                           0.28 0.45
b_2    Hospital, with extra wage                        0.12 0.32
b_3    Hospital, with extra nonwage job                0.09 0.28
b_4    Private, no extra job                             0.24 0.42
b_5    Private with extra job                            0.08 0.27
b_6    Other, no extra job                               0.07 0.26
b_7    Other, with extra job                             0.12 0.33
      
HOURS      
HOURS MAIN JOB 4 alternatives     
h_m1    Part–time <17.5 hours per week                   0.07 0.25
h_m2    Part–time <35 hours per week                     0.08 0.28
h_m3    Full-time                                        0.62 0.48
h_m4    Full-time - extended hours >38 hours per week     0.22 0.42
Extra job - hours     
h_b1      0  (hours <1)                                  0.59 0.49
h_b2      1<hours<7*48                                   0.16 0.37
h_b3      Hours >7*48                                    0.24 0.43
N=8718 75 
Table A3 Summary statistics  
All physicians in 1997 (after trimming). Data used in section 5.5 
Variable     Mean Std Dev
rekr9697  Specialist recruitment pay  0.12 0.33
kapinnt97 Capital  income  49400 155000
overf97 Transfers  10100 25700
b970_5  Children < 6 years  0.54 0.71
statsp97 Savings  4200 22600
eies97  Spouse's income after tax  158000 156000
Nonw Nonwage  income  208000 199800
Ektejobb  Spouse does not work=1  0.35 0.48
Ektelege  Spouse is a physician=1  0.19 0.39
Ektespl  Spouse is a nurse=1  0.16 0.37
Cnorway  Born in Norway=1  0.81 0.40
Female Female  0.29 0.45
Married Married  0.76 0.43
Age Age  45.0 9.1
  Age - Hospital outside of Oslo  44.3
  Age - Hospitals in Oslo  44.9
  Age - Public primary care  42.8
  Age - Private practice  46.3
  Age - Other  45.6
S_1  Hospital outside of Oslo  0.35 0.48
S_2  Hospitals in Oslo  0.20 0.40
S_3  Public Primary care  0.07 0.25
S_4  Private practice  0.31 0.46
S_5  Other 0.06 0.24
we1  Wage per hour - S_1  242.8 34.5
we2  Wage per hour - S_2  218.9 37.1
we3  Wage per hour - S_3  199.3 20.9
we4  Wage per hour - S_4  265.0 46.9
we5  Wage per hour - S_5  191.1 30.7
h_b1  Hours extra job 1    0 h/w 0.30 0.46
h_b2  Hours extra job 2    6 h/w   0.39 0.49
h_b3  Hours extra job 3  12 h/w 0.14 0.35
h_b4  Hours extra job 4  18 h/w 0.08 0.27
h_b5  Hours extra job 5  24 h/w 0.09 0.28
h_m1  Hours main job 1  18 h/w 0.03 0.18
h_m2  Hours main job 2  22 h/w 0.03 0.18
h_m3  Hours main job 3  28 h/w 0.23 0.42
h_m4  Hours main job 4  35.5 h/w 0.03 0.17
h_m5  Hours main job 5  37.5 h/w 0.01 0.10
h_m6  Hours main job 6  40.5 h/w 0.13 0.34
h_m7  Hours main job 7  45.5 h/w 0.10 0.30
h_m8  Hours main job 8  50  h/w 0.42 0.49
h_m9  Hours main job 9  55 h/w 0.01 0.10
N=9528      
Note that this is the sample after trimming. The allocation between sectors in this data set is somewhat 
different than in table A3, in an attempt to separate private practices with and without public funding. 
This data set does not contain such contract information.  
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Appendix 2    Hourly wages 
 
Annual income by sector 
I have constructed sector-specific hourly wages for all physicians, including sectors 
where they are not participating. The first step in this process is to sort the jobs by the 
NACE standard industrial classification (supplemented with SAMDATA and NALRA 
hospital codes), and aggregate into sectors or job types. As described in table A3, I 
have chosen to use seven ‘sectors’ when I construct hourly wages:  a) local hospitals 
outside of Oslo, b) Oslo hospitals, c) municipal medical officer/public primary care, d) 
private practice with a municipal contract, e) private practice without a municipal 
contract, f) medical research at universities or pharmaceutical companies and g) other 
work, for central health authorities, NGOs etc.  
 
Private nonwage income, as well as wage income from private-for-profit health 
providers, is allocated to the private sector. The physicians are allocated to public jobs 
in hospitals and primary care if their working hours indicate that they work more hours 
in their public job than in their private practice. Otherwise the main job is the one with 
the highest annual earnings. In the analysis I have aggregated the sectors to four: local 
hospitals, Oslo hospitals, municipal medical officer, private practice, and other (S_1-
S_5). For comparisons I have also used the alternative with three sectors: hospitals, 
private practice, and other (SZ_1-SZ_3).   
 
I had to simplify the choice set of extra work and introduce the following rules:  
•  If you work within a hospital, public primary care or ”other” then your extra 
job is private. 
•  If you work in the private sector your extra job is other. 
 
Hours 
The most challenging task is to find the number of hours worked per year. I have used 
the best available data in each sector, but their quality is very variable as described in 
section 4. For the NALRA hospitals this gives accurate observations, whereas we have 
reasonably good institutional knowledge for the other employees.  
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Hourly wages in hospitals 
Using the detailed NALRA data, I am able to observe the hourly wage dependent on 
hours worked. This is important, as the marginal wage for overtime work for hospital 
consultants is up to 200 percent higher than the hourly wage they earn during their first 
35.5 hours per week. The Oslo hospitals have the same wage structure as the rest of 
the country, but the basic wage is about 3 percent higher.  
 
Hourly wages in private practice 
For the self-employed we only have access to the group average of income and hours 
per year from a survey by Statistics Norway (1995 and 1998). I used this survey to 
calculate an average hourly wage for general practitioners and private specialists. I 
then approximated the hours worked, based on their reported income. An argument in 
defense of this practice is that all physicians with a public contract are covered by the 
same financing scheme. Private practitioners without such contracts will however have 
greater variations in hourly wages. Anecdotal evidence suggests that for some 
specialties the hourly wage may be considerably higher than the average reported in 
the survey. This is unobservable in our data.  
 
Weeks per year 
I assume that all physicians work 48 weeks per year, using their 4 weeks of paid 
holiday. For a standard job in public administration this equals 1,800 hours per year.  
 
Experience 
Experience is constructed on earnings histories available from the Norwegian National 
Insurance Scheme, which was established in 1967. Individual ‘pension entitlements’ in 
this scheme are linked to their income histories. An alternative measure, years since 
date of authorization, was also tested. There are small differences between the 




Intuitively there is reason to believe that there is a selection into the different sectors 
driven by unobserved factors like preferences and productivity. When I estimate 
hourly wages for each individual, also in sectors where they do not work, I should take 78 
this selection into consideration. In practice there seems to be no major differences 
between the hourly wages predicted by OLS and a Heckman two-step procedure. An 
effect occurs in the hospital sector, but for reasons of comparison, OLS is preferred. 
The wage regressions for 1995 are presented in table A4 and table A5. The regressions 
from 1997 are similar and not presented here. 79 
Table A4 Wage Relation 1995 
     Public Public    Private  Private  Universities  Other 
    hospitals  primary  practice  practice  R & D  jobs 
    Basic wage care  w/o public  w/ public      
OLS        Basic wage contract  contract       
Female Female=1  -0.0121 -0.0319 -0.0821 -0.1183 -0.0410 -0.1236
   (0.0032) (0.0067) (0.0331) (0.0239) (0.0220) (0.0345)
Nonspes  Not registered specialist=1   -0.0750 -0.0247 -0.0750 0.0366 0.0656 0.1440
   (0.0042) (0.0089) (0.0330) (0.0244) (0.0228) (0.0452)
s_surg Specialist  in surgery=1  -0.0037 0.0162 0.0510 0.0311 -0.0388 0.2324
   (0.0033) (0.0366) (0.0477) (0.1138) (0.0365) (0.0667)
s_prim 
Specialist in primary care 
medicine=1  -0.0394 0.0163 -0.0741 0.1011 -0.0665 0.0312
   (0.0058) (0.0093) (0.0293) (0.0266) (0.0444) (0.0567)
s_social 
Specialist in social medicine/public 
health=1  -0.0119 0.0387 0.1441 0.1458 0.1158 0.2792
   (0.0150) (0.0154) (0.1134) (0.0786) (0.0408) (0.0485)
s_psych  Specialist in psychiatry=1  0.0164 0.0153 -0.0758 0.1030 -0.0363 0.0242
   (0.0045) (0.0419) (0.0551) (0.0602) (0.0392) (0.0656)
s_lab  Specialist in laboratory medicine=1  0.0123 -0.0102 0.0943 (dropped) 0.1276 0.0859
   (0.0049) (0.0511) (0.1529) (0.0294) (0.1138)
Regionb  Geographical region B =1  0.0000 -0.0253 0.0333 0.0703 0.0112 -0.0969
  East except Oslo/Akershus  (0.0057) (0.0154) (0.0450) (0.0285) (0.0578) (0.0627)
Regionc  Geographical region C =1  0.0115 -0.0055 0.0956 0.1269 -0.2278 0.0373
  West (0.0051) (0.0148) (0.0430) (0.0294) (0.1296) (0.0529)
Regiond  Geographical region D =1  0.0017 -0.0009 0.0235 0.1016 -0.0270 0.0744
  Middle (0.0049) (0.0135) (0.0441) (0.0310) (0.0224) (0.0489)
Regione  Geographical region E =1  0.0253 -0.0139 0.0960 0.0732 -0.0479 0.0473
  North (0.0048) (0.0144) (0.0389) (0.0321) (0.0204) (0.0529)
Age Age  -0.1521 0.1896 0.8869 0.6346 0.0364 1.9380
   (0.0680) (0.1745) (0.8466) (0.5769) (0.4585) (1.0886)
age2 Age  squared/10  0.6106 -0.5437 -3.0331 -1.7766 -0.1830 -6.3723
   (0.2293) (0.5965) (2.7684) (1.9298) (1.4994) (3.6865)
age3 Age^3/1000  -0.9815 0.6949 4.5466 2.1201 0.4259 9.3188
   (0.3381) (0.8924) (3.9726) (2.8346) (2.1447) (5.4645)
age4 Age^4/100000  0.5598 -0.3346 -2.5333 -0.9110 -0.3289 -5.0985
   (0.1842) (0.4935) (2.1133) (1.5441) (1.1347) (2.9940)
AgeAFP  If age ≥  62 years then =1  -0.0214 0.0308 0.2157 -0.0869 0.0526 0.3469
  Qualify for early retirement  (0.0132) (0.0511) (0.1340) (0.1364) (0.0648) (0.1874)
erf95 
Years of work experience last 20 
years  0.0114 0.0067 0.0705 0.1192 0.1163 0.0418
   (0.0100) (0.0182) (0.1192) (0.0840) (0.1691) (0.1911)
erf952 Experience^2/10  -0.1905 0.0742 -0.8405 -2.5934 -2.2459 -0.7048
   (0.1633) (0.3057) (1.9384) (1.3299) (2.3547) (2.7971)
erf953 Experience^3/1000  1.4876 -1.1418 4.9185 17.7870 15.8168 4.7878
   (1.0414) (2.0238) (12.0914) (8.1977) (13.3914) (16.6350)
erf954 Experience^4/100000  -3.7024 3.6146 -9.7911 -38.4166 -35.4875 -10.1518
   (2.2689) (4.5491) (25.7079) (17.2955) (26.7688) (34.5831)
Cnordic 
From Nordic country except 
Norway=1  0.0083 0.0173 0.1105 -0.0249 -0.0563 -0.0621
   (0.0063) (0.0150) (0.0590) (0.0421) (0.0439) (0.0762)
coecd_no 
From OECD area except the Nordic 
countries=1  -0.0048 -0.0017 0.0338 -0.0151 -0.0329 -0.0241
   (0.0056) (0.0123) (0.0501) (0.0403) (0.0457) (0.0533)
Cglobal Non-OECD  background=1  -0.0060 -0.0332 -0.0717 -0.0095 -0.0182 -0.0577
   (0.0067) (0.0135) (0.0811) (0.0455) (0.0512) (0.0912)
Married Married=1  0.0111 -0.0141 -0.0074 0.0249 0.0126 0.0156
   (0.0032) (0.0076) (0.0327) (0.0239) (0.0201) (0.0336)
b950_5  No. Of Children Aged 0-5  -0.0035 -0.0130 -0.0140 -0.0047 -0.0088 -0.0220
   (0.0020) (0.0041) (0.0220) (0.0148) (0.0134) (0.0212)
kommsen1  Centrality index 1 =1   0.0183 0.0152 -0.0376 -0.0023 0.0198 0.0012
   (0.0069) (0.0088) (0.0709) (0.0376) (0.1028) (0.0684)
kommsen2  Centrality index 2 =1   0.0174 0.0177 -0.1399 -0.0024 (dropped) -0.0203
   (0.0058) (0.0140) (0.0963) (0.0553) (0.0988)
kommsen3  Centrality index 3 =1   0.0000 0.0126 0.0481 -0.0280 -0.0276 -0.1055
   (0.0045) (0.0117) (0.0707) (0.0334) (0.1233) (0.0807)
kommsen4  Centrality index 4 =1   -0.0055 0.0002 -0.1090 -0.0236 (dropped) -0.1024
   (0.0153) (0.0130) (0.0899) (0.0551) (0.1074)
kommsen5  Centrality index 5 =1   -0.0003 -0.0546 0.0091 -0.0358 (dropped) -0.2751
   (0.0086) (0.0218) (0.0779) (0.0427) (0.1198)
kommsen6  Centrality index 6 =1   0.0058 0.0027 -0.0680 -0.0483 0.1169 0.0227
 
Centrality index 7 = reference (most 
central) (0.0046) (0.0133) (0.0432) (0.0275) (0.0725) (0.0640)
Constant   6.0794 2.4814 -4.2482 -2.7055 4.3360 -17.1348
   (0.7441) (1.8796) (9.6029) (6.3916) (5.2087) (11.9178)
R2 adjusted    0.5873 0.4446 0.0591 0.0766 0.4402 0.3404
Number of obs.    3636 570 770 1192 459 331
Dependent variable is log of hourly wage. Standard errors in parenthesis.  80 
Table A5 Heckman selection correction as an alternative to OLS 
Log basic wage per hour in the hospital sector 
              
      Coef. Std. Err. z
Female Female=1  -0.0104 0.0035 -2.97
Regionb  East except Oslo/Akershus  -0.0008 0.005 -0.17
Regionc West  0.0029 0.0056 0.53
Regiond Middle  -0.0014 0.0051 -0.28
Regione North  0.0199 0.0051 3.91
Nonspes  Not registered specialist=1   -0.0994 0.0044 -22.72
s_surg Specialist  in surgery=1  -0.0037 0.0037 -1.02
s_prim  Specialist in primary care medicine=1  -0.0384 0.0063 -6.1
s_social  Specialist in social medicine/public health=1  -0.015 0.0166 -0.9
s_psych  Specialist in psychiatry=1  0.0242 0.005 4.83
s_lab  Specialist in laboratory medicine=1  0.0114 0.0054 2.12
erf95  Years of work experience last 20 years  -0.0267 0.0107 -2.51
erf952 Experience^2/10  0.3803 0.1724 2.21
erf953 Experience^3/1000  -1.6976 1.0978 -1.55
erf954 Experience^4/100000  2.876 2.3881 1.2
Constant   4.968 0.0228 218.21
        
Selection correction       
Female Female=1  -0.2013 0.064 -3.15
Regionb  East except Oslo/Akershus  0.4422 0.1086 4.07
Regionc West  0.7033 0.1049 6.71
Regiond Middle  0.2221 0.0852 2.61
Regione North  0.3698 0.0866 4.27
Cnordic  From Nordic country except Norway=1  -0.0336 0.1134 -0.3
coecd_no  From OECD area except the Nordic countries=1  0.0081 0.1117 0.07
Cglobal Non-OECD  background=1  -0.0559 0.1288 -0.43
Nonspes  Not registered specialist=1   0.1902 0.0874 2.18
s_surg Specialist  in surgery=1  0.1043 0.0707 1.48
s_prim  Specialist in primary care medicine=1  0.1571 0.1282 1.23
s_social  Specialist in social medicine/public health=1  0.3516 0.3714 0.95
s_psych  Specialist in psychiatry=1  -0.0548 0.0892 -0.62
s_lab  Specialist in laboratory medicine=1  0.1949 0.1091 1.79
erf95  Years of work experience last 20 years  0.2577 0.1957 1.32
erf952 Experience^2/10  -3.862 3.2166 -1.2
erf953 Experience^3/1000  22.7395 20.6823 1.1
erf954 Experience^4/100000  -49.2674 45.3462 -1.09
Age Age  -2.6499 1.3505 -1.96
age2 Age^2/10  9.2902 4.5359 2.05
age3 Age^3/1000  -13.8651 6.6622 -2.08
age4 Age^4/100000  7.546 3.6169 2.09
AgeAFP  If age >=62 years then =1  -0.4121 0.2563 -1.61
Married Married=1  -0.0355 0.0638 -0.56
b950_5  No. Of children aged 0-5  -0.0076 0.0398 -0.19
kommsen1  Centrality index 1 =1   0.2741 0.1429 1.92
kommsen2  Centrality index 2 =1   0.7319 0.1586 4.61
kommsen3  Centrality index 3 =1   0.4864 0.1091 4.46
kommsen4  Centrality index 4 =1   -0.3676 0.2455 -1.5
kommsen5  Centrality index 5 =1   0.1217 0.1877 0.65
kommsen6  Centrality index 6 =1   0.0752 0.0982 0.77
Constant   27.2178 14.8384 1.83
        
/athrho   -0.7242 0.0978 -7.4
/lnsigma   -2.4537 0.0172 -142.26
Rho   -0.6195 0.0603 
Sigma   0.086 0.0015 
Log likelihood     2638.6   
Number of obs.  4086     
Table A4 Heckman selection correction as an alternative to OLS    
 
 
Table A6 A comparison of log basic wage per hour in the hospital sector.  
 Obs Mean Std.  Dev. Min Max 
OLS  3636 4.98 0.09 4.73 5.13 
Heckman  3636 4.99 0.09 4.77 5.10 
The basic wage is supplemented by compensations for shift work, extended hours and personal benefits. A 
compensation of 50%, 100% or 200% is added to the salary when working overtime.  81 
  
Table A7 Observed wage per hour by sector. Predicted if missing. 1995. 
Sector Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Basic wage – Hospital  new1 144.0 13.7
Hospitals   nwz1 210.4 36.7
Private w/o public contract  new4 274.1 45.1
Private w/o public contract  new7 268.6 41.3
Basic wage – Primary Care  new3 148.1 8.8
Universities, R&D  new6 154.7 26.9
Other  new5 190.4 37.4
N=9874 
nwe1 and nwe3 are the basic salaries prior to a set of compensation benefits. I apply the exact compensation scheme. The other 
variables are total earnings divided by the estimated number of hours per year. The private sector categories are merged in the 









Table A9 Tax rules applied in 1995 
(Married class G4 and G5 and working singles) 
Income = Y  Tax 
0 – 20 954  0 
20 954 – 143 500  0.302Y – 6 328 
143 500 – 212 000  0.358Y – 14 364 
212 000 – 239 000  0.453Y – 34 504 
239 000 -  0.495Y – 44 542 
  
 
Table A10 Tax rules applied in 1997 
(Married class G4 and G5 and working singles) 
Income = Y  Tax 
0 – 22 344  0 
22 344 – 156 500  0.302Y – 6 748 
156 500 – 233 000  0.358Y – 15 512 
233 000 – 262 500  0.453Y – 37 647 




Capital income is taxed at 28 percent.  82 









































Figure 1 Hours worked at the hospital and in a private extra practice. 
All hospital physicians with data on extra hours. Observed and predicted hours in hospital job and in private extra practice. a) 
Observed hours in 1995; four predictions in 1995 based on: b) observed wages, c) a 10 percent wage increase in the hospital 
sector, d) a 10 percent ‘wage’ (fee) increase in the private sector and e) a 10 percent wage increase in both sectors. f) Observed 
















































Figure 2 Male hospital consultants - Hours worked at the hospital and in a private extra practice. 
Male specialist consultants with data on extra hours. Observed and predicted hours in hospital job and in private extra practice. 
a) Observed hours in 1995; four predictions in 1995 based on: b) observed wages, c) a 10 percent wage increase in the hospital 
sector, d) a 10 percent ‘wage’ (fee) increase in the private sector and e) a 10 percent wage increase in both sectors. f) Observed 
hours in 1997 and g) predicted hours in 1997 based on observed wages and ‘preferences’ based on the 1995 data. 
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Figure 3  Hospital physicians observed in 1995 & 1997- Hours worked at the hospital and in a private extra practice. Observed 
and predicted hours in hospital job and in private extra practice. a) Observed hours in 1995; four predictions in 1995 based on: 
b) observed wages, c) a 10 percent wage increase in the hospital sector, d) a 10 percent ‘wage’ (fee) increase in the private sector 
and e) a 10 percent wage increase in both sectors. f) Observed hours in 1997 and g) predicted hours in 1997 based on observed 











































Figure 4 Observed hours per year in 1995 and 1997 in hospital jobs, and calculated estimates of hours in private practice for 
hospital physicians. Public hospital salaries increased significantly during this period. 84 
 







































Figure 5 Average working hours per week  for all physicians in 1997 - Main and extra job.   a) Observed hours in 1997;  six 
predictions in 1997 based on: b) observed wages, c) a 10 percent wage increase in the hospital sector, d) a 10 percent wage 
increase in the public primary care sector, e) a 10 percent ‘wage’ (fee) increase in the private sector, e) a 10 percent wage 
increase in the remaining sectors, and  f) a 10 percent wage increase in all sectors. 85 
Appendix 5 Observed and predicted choices 
 
Table P4 Physicians at NALRA hospitals in 1995. Observed and predicted choices 
Jr. physicians and hospital consultants 
        Predictions with   Predictions with   Predictions with 
  Main  Extra Observed Predicted a 10% increase in  a 10% increase in   a 10% increase in 
   hours  hours shares   probability   hospital wages  private wages  both wages 
PH11 18  0 0.0050 0.0709 0.0036 0.0030 0.0029 0.0026 0.0034 0.0029  0.0028 0.0025
PH12 18  6 0.0040 0.0628 0.0032 0.0021 0.0026 0.0018 0.0033 0.0022  0.0027 0.0019
PH13 18 12 0.0011 0.0329 0.0026 0.0012 0.0021 0.0011 0.0028 0.0014  0.0023 0.0012
PH14 18 18 0.0018 0.0424 0.0018 0.0007 0.0015 0.0006 0.0022 0.0008  0.0017 0.0007
PH15 18 24 0.0004 0.0190 0.0012 0.0004 0.0009 0.0003 0.0015 0.0005  0.0012 0.0004
PH21 22  0 0.0029 0.0536 0.0027 0.0020 0.0023 0.0018 0.0026 0.0019  0.0022 0.0017
PH22 22  6 0.0011 0.0329 0.0023 0.0012 0.0019 0.0011 0.0024 0.0013  0.0020 0.0012
PH23 22 12 0.0014 0.0379 0.0017 0.0006 0.0014 0.0006 0.0019 0.0007  0.0016 0.0006
PH24 22 18 0.0004 0.0190 0.0011 0.0003 0.0009 0.0003 0.0014 0.0004  0.0011 0.0004
PH25 22 24 0.0007 0.0268 0.0007 0.0002 0.0006 0.0002 0.0009 0.0003  0.0007 0.0002
PH31 28  0 0.0072 0.0846 0.0017 0.0009 0.0015 0.0009 0.0016 0.0009  0.0014 0.0009
PH32 28  6 0.0014 0.0379 0.0013 0.0005 0.0011 0.0004 0.0013 0.0005  0.0011 0.0005
PH33 28 12 0.0011 0.0329 0.0009 0.0002 0.0007 0.0002 0.0009 0.0002  0.0008 0.0002
PH34 28 18 0.0011 0.0329 0.0005 0.0001 0.0004 0.0001 0.0006 0.0001  0.0005 0.0001
PH35 28 24 0.0011 0.0329 0.0003 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001  0.0003 0.0001
PH41 38  0 0.1157 0.3199 0.1151 0.0373 0.1071 0.0378 0.1077 0.0369  0.1005 0.0372
PH42 38  6 0.0422 0.2010 0.0743 0.0109 0.0684 0.0121 0.0751 0.0117  0.0694 0.0128
PH43 38 12 0.0151 0.1221 0.0427 0.0055 0.0390 0.0053 0.0467 0.0059  0.0427 0.0057
PH44 38 18 0.0058 0.0757 0.0214 0.0058 0.0194 0.0052 0.0253 0.0069  0.0230 0.0062
PH45 38 24 0.0058 0.0757 0.0092 0.0039 0.0083 0.0035 0.0117 0.0050  0.0106 0.0045
PH51 37.5  0 0.0962 0.2949 0.0918 0.0245 0.0867 0.0255 0.0859 0.0244  0.0813 0.0252
PH52 37.5  6 0.0523 0.2226 0.0570 0.0055 0.0534 0.0066 0.0577 0.0060  0.0541 0.0071
PH53 37.5  12 0.0216 0.1455 0.0314 0.0047 0.0291 0.0043 0.0343 0.0050  0.0319 0.0046
PH54 37.5  18 0.0086 0.0926 0.0150 0.0046 0.0138 0.0041 0.0177 0.0054  0.0163 0.0049
PH55 37.5  24 0.0050 0.0709 0.0060 0.0028 0.0055 0.0025 0.0077 0.0036  0.0071 0.0032
PH61 40.5  0 0.0944 0.2925 0.0872 0.0153 0.0848 0.0168 0.0814 0.0157  0.0795 0.0171
PH62 40.5  6 0.0295 0.1694 0.0508 0.0027 0.0490 0.0030 0.0513 0.0025  0.0496 0.0030
PH63 40.5  12 0.0105 0.1017 0.0260 0.0054 0.0249 0.0048 0.0283 0.0057  0.0272 0.0052
PH64 40.5  18 0.0040 0.0628 0.0114 0.0042 0.0108 0.0038 0.0134 0.0049  0.0128 0.0045
PH65 40.5  24 0.0079 0.0887 0.0042 0.0021 0.0039 0.0020 0.0053 0.0027  0.0050 0.0025
PH71 45.5  0 0.1438 0.3509 0.0649 0.0050 0.0679 0.0052 0.0605 0.0054  0.0634 0.0057
PH72 45.5  6 0.0577 0.2331 0.0339 0.0059 0.0351 0.0055 0.0341 0.0056  0.0354 0.0053
PH73 45.5  12 0.0180 0.1330 0.0152 0.0050 0.0156 0.0050 0.0165 0.0054  0.0170 0.0053
PH74 45.5  18 0.0101 0.1000 0.0057 0.0027 0.0058 0.0027 0.0067 0.0032  0.0069 0.0032
PH75 45.5  24 0.0076 0.0867 0.0017 0.0011 0.0018 0.0011 0.0022 0.0014  0.0022 0.0014
PH81 50  0 0.1038 0.3050 0.0646 0.0133 0.0743 0.0146 0.0601 0.0122  0.0693 0.0134
PH82 50  6 0.0559 0.2297 0.0301 0.0099 0.0342 0.0109 0.0302 0.0097  0.0345 0.0107
PH83 50 12 0.0187 0.1356 0.0118 0.0055 0.0133 0.0061 0.0128 0.0059  0.0145 0.0065
PH84 50 18 0.0065 0.0803 0.0038 0.0023 0.0042 0.0025 0.0044 0.0026  0.0050 0.0029
PH85 50 24 0.0047 0.0683 0.0009 0.0007 0.0011 0.0008 0.0012 0.0009  0.0013 0.0010
PH91 55  0 0.0180 0.1330 0.0585 0.0221 0.0747 0.0280 0.0543 0.0203  0.0695 0.0258
PH92 55  6 0.0036 0.0599 0.0235 0.0116 0.0298 0.0146 0.0236 0.0115  0.0299 0.0145
PH93 55 12 0.0029 0.0536 0.0078 0.0048 0.0098 0.0059 0.0084 0.0051  0.0106 0.0064
PH94 55 18 0.0022 0.0465 0.0020 0.0015 0.0025 0.0018 0.0024 0.0017  0.0029 0.0021
PH95 55 24 0.0014 0.0379 0.0065 0.0160 0.0046 0.0116 0.0061 0.0153  0.0043 0.0111
         1.0000   1.0000   1.0000   1.0000   1.0000  
Standard deviations in italics                
                     
Hours per week                  
Hospital   42.3 6.2 41.8 1.2 42.5 1.4 41.7 1.2  42.4 1.4
Private extra practice  4.1 6.2 5.2 0.9 5.0 0.9 5.7 1.0  5.5 1.0
Total     46.5 8.6 47.0 1.9 47.5 2.1 47.4 2.0  47.9 2.1
                      
Hours per year                   
Hospital   2032 298 2008 60 2041 68 2002 59  2034 67
Private extra practice  198 296 250 43 240 41 275 49  264 47
Total     2230 413 2258 93 2281 98 2277 97  2299 102
                     
Elasticities           Total hours   Main job   Extra job      
Effect of an increase in hospital wages   0.1007* 0.0490 0.1627* 0.0453* -0.3961 0.1604 *  
Effect of an increase in private wages    0.0831* 0.0218 -0.0304* 0.0074* 0.9896 0.1401 *  
Effect of an increase in all wages     0.1800* 0.0598 0.1318* 0.0427* 0.5633 0.2596 *  
N=2775                   
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Table P5 Male hospital consultants at NALRA hospitals in 1995. 
Observed and predicted choices 
       Predictions with   Predictions with   Predictions with 
  Main  Extra Observed    Predicted a 10% increase in  a 10% increase in   a 10% increase in 
   hours  hours shares    probability   hospital wages  private wages  all wages 
PH11 18  0 0.0033  0.0573  0.0017 0.0008 0.0013 0.0007 0.0016 0.0007  0.0012 0.0006
PH12 18  6 0.0039  0.0627  0.0019 0.0008 0.0014 0.0007 0.0019 0.0008  0.0015 0.0007
PH13 18 12 0.0007  0.0256  0.0018 0.0007 0.0013 0.0006 0.0020 0.0008  0.0015 0.0006
PH14 18 18 0.0013  0.0363  0.0015 0.0005 0.0011 0.0004 0.0018 0.0006  0.0013 0.0005
PH15 18 24 0.0000  0.0000  0.0011 0.0004 0.0008 0.0003 0.0014 0.0005  0.0010 0.0004
PH21 22  0 0.0020  0.0444  0.0015 0.0006 0.0012 0.0005 0.0013 0.0005  0.0011 0.0005
PH22 22  6 0.0007  0.0256  0.0015 0.0005 0.0011 0.0005 0.0015 0.0005  0.0012 0.0005
PH23 22 12 0.0013  0.0363  0.0013 0.0004 0.0010 0.0003 0.0014 0.0004  0.0011 0.0004
PH24 22 18 0.0000  0.0000  0.0010 0.0003 0.0007 0.0002 0.0012 0.0003  0.0009 0.0003
PH25 22 24 0.0007  0.0256  0.0006 0.0002 0.0005 0.0002 0.0008 0.0003  0.0006 0.0002
PH31 28  0 0.0000  0.0000  0.0010 0.0003 0.0009 0.0003 0.0009 0.0003  0.0008 0.0003
PH32 28  6 0.0013  0.0363  0.0009 0.0002 0.0007 0.0002 0.0009 0.0002  0.0007 0.0002
PH33 28 12 0.0007  0.0256  0.0007 0.0001 0.0006 0.0001 0.0008 0.0002  0.0006 0.0002
PH34 28 18 0.0000  0.0000  0.0004 0.0001 0.0004 0.0001 0.0005 0.0001  0.0004 0.0001
PH35 28 24 0.0020  0.0444  0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001  0.0003 0.0001
PH41 38  0 0.0815  0.2737  0.0906 0.0179 0.0804 0.0181 0.0833 0.0170  0.0740 0.0171
PH42 38  6 0.0388  0.1932  0.0663 0.0089 0.0584 0.0097 0.0670 0.0091  0.0591 0.0099
PH43 38 12 0.0151  0.1221  0.0419 0.0051 0.0366 0.0055 0.0465 0.0056  0.0408 0.0060
PH44 38 18 0.0059  0.0767  0.0224 0.0039 0.0195 0.0037 0.0272 0.0047  0.0237 0.0045
PH45 38 24 0.0039  0.0627  0.0099 0.0026 0.0085 0.0023 0.0131 0.0035  0.0114 0.0031
PH51 37.5  0 0.0631  0.2433  0.0744 0.0125 0.0673 0.0130 0.0683 0.0120  0.0619 0.0124
PH52 37.5  6 0.0598  0.2372  0.0520 0.0054 0.0466 0.0063 0.0525 0.0055  0.0472 0.0064
PH53 37.5  12 0.0263  0.1601  0.0311 0.0034 0.0278 0.0036 0.0345 0.0036  0.0309 0.0039
PH54 37.5  18 0.0131  0.1140  0.0157 0.0028 0.0139 0.0026 0.0190 0.0034  0.0169 0.0032
PH55 37.5  24 0.0066  0.0808  0.0065 0.0018 0.0057 0.0016 0.0086 0.0023  0.0076 0.0021
PH61 40.5  0 0.0828  0.2757  0.0779 0.0093 0.0732 0.0103 0.0715 0.0093  0.0673 0.0100
PH62 40.5  6 0.0342  0.1818  0.0503 0.0028 0.0469 0.0038 0.0507 0.0028  0.0474 0.0038
PH63 40.5  12 0.0092  0.0955  0.0276 0.0028 0.0255 0.0028 0.0305 0.0029  0.0283 0.0030
PH64 40.5  18 0.0039  0.0627  0.0126 0.0024 0.0115 0.0022 0.0152 0.0029  0.0140 0.0027
PH65 40.5  24 0.0079  0.0885  0.0046 0.0014 0.0042 0.0012 0.0061 0.0018  0.0056 0.0017
PH71 45.5  0 0.1368  0.3437  0.0662 0.0045 0.0680 0.0046 0.0607 0.0049  0.0625 0.0050
PH72 45.5  6 0.0592  0.2360  0.0372 0.0023 0.0379 0.0018 0.0374 0.0022  0.0382 0.0017
PH73 45.5  12 0.0178  0.1321  0.0174 0.0026 0.0176 0.0025 0.0192 0.0028  0.0195 0.0026
PH74 45.5  18 0.0099  0.0988  0.0066 0.0016 0.0066 0.0016 0.0080 0.0020  0.0080 0.0019
PH75 45.5  24 0.0072  0.0848  0.0020 0.0007 0.0020 0.0007 0.0026 0.0009  0.0026 0.0009
PH81 50  0 0.1446  0.3519  0.0781 0.0116 0.0900 0.0125 0.0714 0.0110  0.0828 0.0120
PH82 50  6 0.0789  0.2697  0.0380 0.0067 0.0434 0.0071 0.0381 0.0066  0.0438 0.0071
PH83 50 12 0.0243  0.1541  0.0151 0.0037 0.0172 0.0040 0.0166 0.0040  0.0189 0.0044
PH84 50 18 0.0092  0.0955  0.0048 0.0016 0.0054 0.0017 0.0057 0.0019  0.0065 0.0021
PH85 50 24 0.0053  0.0724  0.0011 0.0005 0.0013 0.0005 0.0015 0.0006  0.0017 0.0007
PH91 55  0 0.0230  0.1500  0.0830 0.0220 0.1086 0.0285 0.0757 0.0203  0.0999 0.0265
PH92 55  6 0.0053  0.0724  0.0339 0.0101 0.0440 0.0129 0.0339 0.0101  0.0443 0.0130
PH93 55 12 0.0046  0.0677  0.0110 0.0040 0.0142 0.0050 0.0120 0.0043  0.0156 0.0055
PH94 55 18 0.0026  0.0512  0.0027 0.0012 0.0035 0.0015 0.0033 0.0014  0.0042 0.0018
PH95 55 24 0.0013  0.0363  0.0020 0.0050 0.0013 0.0033 0.0017 0.0042  0.0012 0.0030
         1.0000    1.0000   1.0000   1.0000   1.0000  
Standard deviations in italics                
                     
Hours per week                  
Hospital   43.5  6.1  42.9 1.0 43.9 1.1 42.7 1.0  43.7 1.1
Private extra practice  4.6  6.2  5.4 0.6 5.1 0.5 6.0 0.7  5.7 0.6
Total     48.0  8.3  48.3 1.1 49.0 1.2 48.7 1.2  49.4 1.2
                     
Hours per year                  
Hospital   2086  295  2061 47 2107 54 2052 46  2098 54
Private extra practice  219  299  257 27 244 26 288 31  275 30
Total     2305  398  2318 54 2352 59 2340 55  2373 60
                     
Elasticities           Total hours   Main job   Extra job     
Effect of an increase in hospital wages   0.1461* 0.0301 0.2252* 0.0342 -0.4911* 0.0928   
Effect of an increase in private wages    0.0957* 0.0158 -0.0434* 0.0074 1.2072* 0.0792   
Effect of an increase in all wages     0.2390* 0.0279 0.1833* 0.0337 0.6773* 0.1237   
N=1521                   
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Table P6 Hospital physicians, observed both in 1995 and 1997. 
Observed and predicted choices.  Jr. physicians and hospital consultants 
        Predictions with   Predictions with   Predictions with 
  Main Extra  Observed   Predicted a 10% increase in  a 10% increase in   a 10% increase in 
   hours hours  share   probability   hospital wages  private wages  all wages 
PH11 18 0  0.0019 0.0439  0.0017 0.0016 0.0012 0.0013 0.0015 0.0015  0.0011  0.0012
PH12 18 6  0.0029 0.0538  0.0016 0.0012 0.0011 0.0009 0.0017 0.0012  0.0012  0.0010
PH13 18 12  0.0000 0.0000  0.0013 0.0007 0.0009 0.0006 0.0015 0.0009  0.0011  0.0007
PH14 18 18  0.0010 0.0311  0.0010 0.0004 0.0007 0.0004 0.0013 0.0006  0.0009  0.0005
PH15 18 24  0.0000 0.0000  0.0007 0.0003 0.0005 0.0002 0.0010 0.0004  0.0007  0.0003
PH21 22 0  0.0010 0.0311  0.0013 0.0010 0.0010 0.0009 0.0012 0.0010  0.0009  0.0008
PH22 22 6  0.0000 0.0000  0.0011 0.0007 0.0008 0.0006 0.0012 0.0007  0.0009  0.0006
PH23 22 12  0.0019 0.0439  0.0009 0.0004 0.0006 0.0003 0.0010 0.0004  0.0007  0.0004
PH24 22 18  0.0000 0.0000  0.0006 0.0002 0.0004 0.0002 0.0008 0.0003  0.0006  0.0002
PH25 22 24  0.0000 0.0000  0.0004 0.0002 0.0003 0.0001 0.0005 0.0002  0.0004  0.0002
PH31 28 0  0.0039 0.0620  0.0008 0.0005 0.0006 0.0004 0.0007 0.0005  0.0006  0.0004
PH32 28 6  0.0000 0.0000  0.0006 0.0003 0.0005 0.0002 0.0006 0.0003  0.0005  0.0002
PH33 28 12  0.0000 0.0000  0.0004 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 0.0005 0.0001  0.0004  0.0001
PH34 28 18  0.0010 0.0311  0.0003 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001  0.0002  0.0001
PH35 28 24  0.0000 0.0000  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 0.0001  0.0001  0.0001
PH41 38 0  0.0772 0.2671  0.0998 0.0373 0.0857 0.0370 0.0914 0.0364  0.0790  0.0357
PH42 38 6  0.0232 0.1505  0.0657 0.0129 0.0558 0.0142 0.0669 0.0137  0.0572  0.0149
PH43 38 12  0.0068 0.0820  0.0381 0.0065 0.0321 0.0066 0.0432 0.0071  0.0366  0.0073
PH44 38 18  0.0010 0.0311  0.0191 0.0058 0.0160 0.0050 0.0241 0.0073  0.0203  0.0063
PH45 38 24  0.0048 0.0693  0.0080 0.0037 0.0067 0.0031 0.0113 0.0053  0.0094  0.0045
PH51 37.5 0 0.0753 0.2640  0.0783 0.0247 0.0687 0.0254 0.0717 0.0243  0.0633  0.0246
PH52 37.5 6 0.0309 0.1731  0.0494 0.0072 0.0429 0.0086 0.0502 0.0077  0.0439  0.0091
PH53 37.5 12 0.0048 0.0693  0.0273 0.0047 0.0235 0.0046 0.0309 0.0051  0.0267  0.0050
PH54 37.5 18 0.0039 0.0620  0.0129 0.0042 0.0110 0.0036 0.0163 0.0053  0.0140  0.0046
PH55 37.5 24 0.0048 0.0693  0.0051 0.0024 0.0043 0.0021 0.0071 0.0035  0.0061  0.0030
PH61 40.5 0 0.0985 0.2981  0.0812 0.0180 0.0745 0.0199 0.0743 0.0182  0.0684  0.0197
PH62 40.5 6 0.0270 0.1622  0.0478 0.0037 0.0434 0.0052 0.0485 0.0038  0.0443  0.0054
PH63 40.5 12 0.0068 0.0820  0.0243 0.0049 0.0219 0.0044 0.0275 0.0052  0.0249  0.0048
PH64 40.5 18 0.0029 0.0538  0.0105 0.0038 0.0093 0.0034 0.0132 0.0048  0.0118  0.0042
PH65 40.5 24 0.0058 0.0759  0.0037 0.0019 0.0033 0.0017 0.0052 0.0027  0.0046  0.0024
PH71 45.5 0 0.1834 0.3872  0.0668 0.0065 0.0678 0.0076 0.0609 0.0073  0.0622  0.0083
PH72 45.5 6 0.0714 0.2577  0.0346 0.0046 0.0349 0.0038 0.0351 0.0043  0.0355  0.0035
PH73 45.5 12 0.0164 0.1271  0.0152 0.0045 0.0152 0.0042 0.0172 0.0049  0.0173  0.0046
PH74 45.5 18 0.0097 0.0978  0.0055 0.0025 0.0055 0.0024 0.0069 0.0031  0.0069  0.0030
PH75 45.5 24 0.0097 0.0978  0.0016 0.0009 0.0015 0.0009 0.0022 0.0013  0.0022  0.0013
PH81 50 0  0.1535 0.3606  0.0832 0.0160 0.0970 0.0167 0.0757 0.0147  0.0888  0.0157
PH82 50 6  0.0792 0.2701  0.0379 0.0108 0.0439 0.0115 0.0384 0.0107  0.0446  0.0114
PH83 50 12  0.0261 0.1594  0.0143 0.0060 0.0165 0.0066 0.0161 0.0067  0.0186  0.0073
PH84 50 18  0.0068 0.0820  0.0043 0.0024 0.0049 0.0027 0.0054 0.0030  0.0062  0.0034
PH85 50 24  0.0077 0.0876  0.0010 0.0007 0.0011 0.0008 0.0014 0.0010  0.0016  0.0011
PH91 55 0  0.0319 0.1757  0.0962 0.0345 0.1313 0.0454 0.0873 0.0312  0.1199  0.0414
PH92 55 6  0.0087 0.0928  0.0372 0.0168 0.0504 0.0219 0.0376 0.0167  0.0512  0.0221
PH93 55 12  0.0029 0.0538  0.0116 0.0065 0.0156 0.0086 0.0130 0.0073  0.0176  0.0096
PH94 55 18  0.0039 0.0620  0.0028 0.0019 0.0037 0.0025 0.0035 0.0024  0.0047  0.0032
PH95 55 24  0.0019 0.0439  0.0037 0.0108 0.0022 0.0068 0.0035 0.0101  0.0021  0.0064
     1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000   
Standard deviation in italics                
                     
Hours  per  week                 
Hospital   44.4 5.8  43.3 1.5 44.5 1.7 43.1 1.4  44.3  1.7
Private extra practice  3.6 5.9  4.9 0.9 4.6 0.9 5.6 1.1  5.2  1.0
Total     48.0 8.4  48.2 2.0 49.1 2.2 48.7 2.1  49.5  2.2
                      
Hours per year                    
Hospital   2130 279  2079 70 2136 83 2070 68  2127  81
Private extra practice  174 283  234 43 219 41 267 52  251  49
Total     2304 403  2312 95 2355 103 2337 99  2378  107
                     
Elasticities           Total hours   Main job   Extra job      
Effect of an increase in hospital wages   0.1855* 0.0565 0.2735* 0.0601 -0.6019* 0.1688   
Effect of an increase in private wages    0.1048* 0.0265 -0.0434* 0.0117 1.4141* 0.1752   
Effect of an increase in all wages     0.2821* 0.0621 0.2290* 0.0558 0.7402* 0.2720   




Table P7 A prediction experiment on 1997 data 
Observed choices in 1997 and predicted choices in 1997.  
Predictions based on 1995 model parameters and 1997 wages.  
    
All hospital physicians  Male hospital consultants  Hospital physicians observed in 
1995 & 1997 
    N=1553 N=790  N=1036 
  Main Extra     Predicted with      Predicted with      Predicted with 
   hours hours  Observed 1997  1997 wages  Observed 1997  1997 wages  Observed 1997  1997 wages 
PH11 18 0  0.0064 0.0800  0.0025 0.0022 0.0025 0.0503 0.0009 0.0004 0.0029 0.0538  0.0025  0.0022
PH12 18 6  0.0013 0.0359  0.0024 0.0015 0.0000 0.0000 0.0012 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000  0.0024  0.0015
PH13 18 12  0.0019 0.0439  0.0020 0.0009 0.0025 0.0503 0.0013 0.0004 0.0019 0.0439  0.0020  0.0009
PH14 18 18  0.0013 0.0359  0.0016 0.0005 0.0013 0.0356 0.0013 0.0005 0.0010 0.0311  0.0016  0.0005
PH15 18 24  0.0032 0.0567  0.0011 0.0004 0.0051 0.0710 0.0012 0.0005 0.0010 0.0311  0.0011  0.0004
PH21 22 0  0.0058 0.0759  0.0020 0.0015 0.0038 0.0615 0.0008 0.0003 0.0048 0.0693  0.0020  0.0015
PH22 22 6  0.0019 0.0439  0.0018 0.0010 0.0025 0.0503 0.0010 0.0003 0.0010 0.0311  0.0018  0.0010
PH23 22 12  0.0013 0.0359  0.0014 0.0005 0.0000 0.0000 0.0010 0.0003 0.0010 0.0311  0.0014  0.0005
PH24 22 18  0.0000 0.0000  0.0010 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0009 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000  0.0010  0.0002
PH25 22 24  0.0019 0.0439  0.0007 0.0002 0.0025 0.0503 0.0007 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000  0.0007  0.0002
PH31 28 0  0.0097 0.0978  0.0014 0.0008 0.0013 0.0356 0.0007 0.0002 0.0077 0.0876  0.0014  0.0008
PH32 28 6  0.0019 0.0439  0.0011 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0007 0.0002 0.0019 0.0439  0.0011  0.0004
PH33 28 12  0.0026 0.0507  0.0008 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 0.0001 0.0010 0.0311  0.0008  0.0001
PH34 28 18  0.0039 0.0621  0.0005 0.0001 0.0038 0.0615 0.0005 0.0001 0.0019 0.0439  0.0005  0.0001
PH35 28 24  0.0019 0.0439  0.0003 0.0001 0.0025 0.0503 0.0003 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000  0.0003  0.0001
PH41 38 0  0.1120 0.3155  0.0967 0.0392 0.0506 0.2194 0.0633 0.0140 0.0956 0.2941  0.0967  0.0392
PH42 38 6  0.0212 0.1443  0.0663 0.0115 0.0127 0.1119 0.0548 0.0074 0.0154 0.1234  0.0663  0.0115
PH43 38 12  0.0058 0.0759  0.0412 0.0056 0.0025 0.0503 0.0412 0.0057 0.0039 0.0620  0.0412  0.0056
PH44 38 18  0.0019 0.0439  0.0228 0.0075 0.0000 0.0000 0.0263 0.0060 0.0000 0.0000  0.0228  0.0075
PH45 38 24  0.0026 0.0507  0.0110 0.0058 0.0013 0.0356 0.0139 0.0048 0.0019 0.0439  0.0110  0.0058
PH51 37.5 0  0.0824 0.2751  0.0786 0.0275 0.0633 0.2436 0.0535 0.0107 0.0936 0.2915  0.0786  0.0275
PH52 37.5 6  0.0373 0.1897  0.0519 0.0064 0.0266 0.1610 0.0443 0.0049 0.0405 0.1973  0.0519  0.0064
PH53 37.5 12  0.0097 0.0978  0.0310 0.0051 0.0063 0.0794 0.0315 0.0041 0.0135 0.1155  0.0310  0.0051
PH54 37.5 18  0.0052 0.0716  0.0164 0.0060 0.0025 0.0503 0.0189 0.0044 0.0048 0.0693  0.0164  0.0060
PH55 37.5 24  0.0058 0.0759  0.0074 0.0042 0.0013 0.0356 0.0094 0.0033 0.0058 0.0759  0.0074  0.0042
PH61 40.5 0  0.1017 0.3024  0.0776 0.0204 0.1316 0.3383 0.0593 0.0099 0.1245 0.3303  0.0776  0.0204
PH62 40.5 6  0.0258 0.1585  0.0482 0.0028 0.0367 0.1882 0.0453 0.0032 0.0319 0.1757  0.0482  0.0028
PH63 40.5 12  0.0071 0.0839  0.0268 0.0059 0.0101 0.1002 0.0295 0.0035 0.0097 0.0978  0.0268  0.0059
PH64 40.5 18  0.0026 0.0507  0.0130 0.0056 0.0025 0.0503 0.0160 0.0038 0.0029 0.0538  0.0130  0.0056
PH65 40.5 24  0.0045 0.0670  0.0054 0.0033 0.0051 0.0710 0.0070 0.0026 0.0068 0.0820  0.0054  0.0033
PH71 45.5 0  0.1410 0.3482  0.0637 0.0081 0.1291 0.3355 0.0581 0.0071 0.1448 0.3521  0.0637  0.0081
PH72 45.5 6  0.0528 0.2237  0.0356 0.0050 0.0392 0.1943 0.0384 0.0009 0.0483 0.2144  0.0356  0.0050
PH73 45.5 12  0.0116 0.1071  0.0175 0.0060 0.0190 0.1366 0.0213 0.0029 0.0125 0.1114  0.0175  0.0060
PH74 45.5 18  0.0077 0.0876  0.0073 0.0039 0.0114 0.1062 0.0096 0.0026 0.0068 0.0820  0.0073  0.0039
PH75 45.5 24  0.0032 0.0567  0.0025 0.0018 0.0038 0.0615 0.0034 0.0014 0.0039 0.0620  0.0025  0.0018
PH81 50 0  0.1436 0.3508  0.0722 0.0103 0.1696 0.3755 0.0819 0.0108 0.1458 0.3530  0.0722  0.0103
PH82 50 6  0.0534 0.2250  0.0362 0.0103 0.0759 0.2651 0.0468 0.0050 0.0550 0.2281  0.0362  0.0103
PH83 50 12  0.0219 0.1464  0.0156 0.0073 0.0367 0.1882 0.0220 0.0043 0.0203 0.1410  0.0156  0.0073
PH84 50 18  0.0116 0.1071  0.0056 0.0036 0.0190 0.1366 0.0082 0.0026 0.0097 0.0978  0.0056  0.0036
PH85 50 24  0.0071 0.0839  0.0016 0.0013 0.0114 0.1062 0.0023 0.0010 0.0029 0.0538  0.0016  0.0013
PH91 55 0  0.0419 0.2003  0.0750 0.0221 0.0570 0.2319 0.1051 0.0212 0.0415 0.1996  0.0750  0.0221
PH92 55 6  0.0200 0.1399  0.0327 0.0146 0.0266 0.1610 0.0502 0.0106 0.0193 0.1377  0.0327  0.0146
PH93 55 12  0.0090 0.0945  0.0119 0.0073 0.0152 0.1224 0.0192 0.0055 0.0077 0.0876  0.0119  0.0073
PH94 55 18  0.0039 0.0621  0.0035 0.0027 0.0051 0.0710 0.0056 0.0022 0.0039 0.0620  0.0035  0.0027
PH95 55 24  0.0006 0.0254  0.0043 0.0103 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 0.0015 0.0010 0.0311  0.0043  0.0103
         1.0000   1.0000   1.0000   1.0000   1.0000   1.0000   
Standard deviations in italics                
                      
Hours per week                  
Hospital   43.4 7.1  42.7 1.2 45.0 6.8 44.1 0.8 43.7 6.5  42.7  1.2
Private extra practice  3.6 5.9  5.5 1.3 4.0 6.2 6.2 0.9 3.2 5.5  5.5  1.3
Total     47.0 9.1  48.2 2.3 49.0 9.0 50.3 1.2 46.9 8.6  48.2  2.3
                        
Hours per year                      
Hospital   2082 342  2049 59 2160 326 2116 40 2096 310  2049  59
Private extra practice  171 285  266 60 194 299 298 44 156 266  266  60




Table P9 All physicians in 1997. Observed and predicted choices.   
      Predictions with  Predictions with  Predictions with Predictions with Predictions with 
 Main ExtraObserved  share Predicted choice
a 10% increase 
in   a 10% increase in 
a 10% increase 
in  
a 10% increase 
in  
a 10% increase 
in  
   hours hours           hospital wages primary care wages private wages other wages all wages 
PH11 18 0 0.0091  0.0951  0.0088 0.0077 0.0082 0.0078 0.0087 0.0077 0.0077 0.0070 0.0084  0.0074 0.0069 0.0066
PH12 18 6 0.0106  0.1024  0.0132 0.0088 0.0121 0.0090 0.0131 0.0087 0.0122 0.0082 0.0130  0.0086 0.0107 0.0080
PH13 18 12 0.0043  0.0655  0.0183 0.0097 0.0164 0.0102 0.0180 0.0095 0.0178 0.0095 0.0183  0.0095 0.0155 0.0092
PH14 18 18 0.0048  0.0693  0.0232 0.0107 0.0204 0.0115 0.0227 0.0103 0.0239 0.0117 0.0235  0.0102 0.0206 0.0107
PH15 18 24 0.0047  0.0686  0.0263 0.0125 0.0228 0.0131 0.0258 0.0118 0.0290 0.0155 0.0269  0.0114 0.0246 0.0131
PH21 22 0 0.0057  0.0751  0.0118 0.0090 0.0111 0.0092 0.0117 0.0090 0.0105 0.0083 0.0113  0.0085 0.0095 0.0080
PH22 22 6 0.0079  0.0884  0.0165 0.0095 0.0153 0.0100 0.0164 0.0094 0.0154 0.0088 0.0163  0.0093 0.0138 0.0089
PH23 22 12 0.0054  0.0730  0.0212 0.0095 0.0193 0.0104 0.0210 0.0093 0.0207 0.0092 0.0213  0.0094 0.0185 0.0094
PH24 22 18 0.0063  0.0791  0.0247 0.0097 0.0221 0.0108 0.0244 0.0093 0.0256 0.0104 0.0251  0.0093 0.0226 0.0101
PH25 22 24 0.0068  0.0823  0.0255 0.0106 0.0224 0.0114 0.0251 0.0101 0.0281 0.0131 0.0262  0.0099 0.0245 0.0115
PH31 28 0 0.0826  0.2753  0.0170 0.0110 0.0162 0.0114 0.0169 0.0109 0.0156 0.0106 0.0163  0.0103 0.0143 0.0102
PH32 28 6 0.0569  0.2316  0.0213 0.0103 0.0200 0.0111 0.0212 0.0102 0.0202 0.0097 0.0210  0.0100 0.0187 0.0101
PH33 28 12 0.0330  0.1785  0.0242 0.0088 0.0224 0.0101 0.0241 0.0087 0.0240 0.0082 0.0244  0.0090 0.0222 0.0093
PH34 28 18 0.0276  0.1638  0.0245 0.0078 0.0224 0.0092 0.0243 0.0076 0.0255 0.0078 0.0251  0.0079 0.0235 0.0086
PH35 28 24 0.0324  0.1772  0.0213 0.0077 0.0191 0.0084 0.0211 0.0074 0.0234 0.0091 0.0220  0.0075 0.0214 0.0086
PH41 38 0 0.0055  0.0737  0.0199 0.0118 0.0193 0.0122 0.0199 0.0118 0.0190 0.0123 0.0191  0.0108 0.0178 0.0117
PH42 38 6 0.0092  0.0957  0.0214 0.0097 0.0205 0.0104 0.0214 0.0097 0.0209 0.0098 0.0212  0.0094 0.0200 0.0102
PH43 38 12 0.0057  0.0751  0.0203 0.0072 0.0193 0.0081 0.0203 0.0072 0.0206 0.0067 0.0206  0.0075 0.0198 0.0080
PH44 38 18 0.0055  0.0737  0.0165 0.0053 0.0154 0.0060 0.0164 0.0052 0.0174 0.0049 0.0170  0.0058 0.0167 0.0060
PH45 38 24 0.0035  0.0588  0.0108 0.0041 0.0100 0.0043 0.0108 0.0040 0.0120 0.0044 0.0113  0.0044 0.0115 0.0047
PH51 37.5 0 0.0020  0.0446  0.0210 0.0125 0.0205 0.0129 0.0210 0.0125 0.0203 0.0134 0.0202  0.0114 0.0192 0.0126
PH52 37.5 6 0.0038  0.0614  0.0216 0.0100 0.0208 0.0107 0.0216 0.0100 0.0213 0.0104 0.0214  0.0097 0.0205 0.0107
PH53 37.5 12 0.0018  0.0422  0.0194 0.0072 0.0185 0.0080 0.0194 0.0072 0.0197 0.0069 0.0197  0.0075 0.0192 0.0081
PH54 37.5 18 0.0009  0.0307  0.0146 0.0050 0.0138 0.0056 0.0146 0.0050 0.0155 0.0046 0.0151  0.0055 0.0151 0.0058
PH55 37.5 24 0.0012  0.0340  0.0088 0.0035 0.0082 0.0037 0.0088 0.0035 0.0098 0.0037 0.0092  0.0038 0.0095 0.0041
PH61 40.5 0 0.0324  0.1772  0.0257 0.0117 0.0251 0.0122 0.0258 0.0117 0.0250 0.0134 0.0249  0.0105 0.0239 0.0124
PH62 40.5 6 0.0489  0.2157  0.0248 0.0081 0.0239 0.0089 0.0248 0.0081 0.0247 0.0090 0.0246  0.0078 0.0239 0.0093
PH63 40.5 12 0.0252  0.1567  0.0205 0.0051 0.0195 0.0058 0.0205 0.0051 0.0211 0.0050 0.0207  0.0053 0.0206 0.0061
PH64 40.5 18 0.0106  0.1024  0.0139 0.0036 0.0131 0.0040 0.0139 0.0036 0.0149 0.0036 0.0143  0.0040 0.0145 0.0042
PH65 40.5 24 0.0139  0.1169  0.0072 0.0027 0.0068 0.0027 0.0072 0.0027 0.0081 0.0031 0.0076  0.0029 0.0079 0.0031
PH71 45.5 0 0.0261  0.1595  0.0345 0.0093 0.0347 0.0096 0.0348 0.0094 0.0338 0.0121 0.0337  0.0081 0.0334 0.0106
PH72 45.5 6 0.0381  0.1914  0.0293 0.0052 0.0291 0.0054 0.0295 0.0052 0.0295 0.0065 0.0292  0.0047 0.0295 0.0061
PH73 45.5 12 0.0187  0.1354  0.0205 0.0040 0.0202 0.0039 0.0207 0.0040 0.0214 0.0042 0.0208  0.0039 0.0215 0.0041
PH74 45.5 18 0.0079  0.0884  0.0112 0.0035 0.0109 0.0033 0.0113 0.0036 0.0122 0.0039 0.0115  0.0036 0.0123 0.0037
PH75 45.5 24 0.0121  0.1092  0.0044 0.0021 0.0042 0.0020 0.0044 0.0022 0.0050 0.0025 0.0046  0.0021 0.0050 0.0024
PH81 50 0 0.1285  0.3346  0.0573 0.0205 0.0613 0.0234 0.0578 0.0202 0.0546 0.0175 0.0564  0.0208 0.0584 0.0198
PH82 50 6 0.2146  0.4106  0.0424 0.0166 0.0448 0.0182 0.0428 0.0164 0.0421 0.0151 0.0423  0.0166 0.0451 0.0164
PH83 50 12 0.0436  0.2041  0.0248 0.0118 0.0259 0.0125 0.0250 0.0118 0.0258 0.0119 0.0250  0.0117 0.0275 0.0124
PH84 50 18 0.0172  0.1301  0.0107 0.0065 0.0110 0.0066 0.0108 0.0065 0.0117 0.0071 0.0108  0.0064 0.0124 0.0073
PH85 50 24 0.0132  0.1142  0.0031 0.0024 0.0031 0.0024 0.0031 0.0024 0.0035 0.0028 0.0031  0.0024 0.0037 0.0028
PH91 55 0 0.0048  0.0693  0.0998 0.0679 0.1177 0.0833 0.1008 0.0673 0.0928 0.0586 0.0991  0.0684 0.1101 0.0734
PH92 55 6 0.0025  0.0501  0.0605 0.0440 0.0702 0.0525 0.0610 0.0437 0.0592 0.0411 0.0604  0.0440 0.0696 0.0496
PH93 55 12 0.0018  0.0422  0.0273 0.0222 0.0313 0.0259 0.0275 0.0221 0.0282 0.0225 0.0274  0.0221 0.0328 0.0263
PH94 55 18 0.0002  0.0145  0.0084 0.0079 0.0095 0.0090 0.0084 0.0079 0.0091 0.0086 0.0084  0.0079 0.0105 0.0098
PH95 55 24 0.0008  0.0290  0.0014 0.0060 0.0013 0.0059 0.0014 0.0060 0.0011 0.0044 0.0014  0.0056 0.0009 0.0039
     1.0000    1.0000  1.0000  1.0000 1.0000  1.0000    1.0000 
Standard deviation in italics                   
                               
Hours per week                     
Main     40.7  10.5  39.5 4.7 40.5 5.4 39.6 4.6 39.3 4.3 39.4  4.7 40.5 4.9
Extra       7.6  7.3  9.1 1.4 8.7 1.6 9.1 1.4 9.5 1.6 9.3  1.4 9.2 1.5
Total     48.3  11.7  48.6 4.1 49.2 4.5 48.7 4.0 48.9 3.9 48.7  4.0 49.7 4.2
                               
Hours per year                           
Main     1953  503  1895 225 1946 260 1900 222 1888 208 1893  224 1945 235
Extra       365  351  439 68 417 77 436 66 458 77 446  67 440 74
Total     2319  561  2333 195 2363 215 2336 194 2347 187 2338  191 2385 200
                               
Elasticities     Total hours  Main job     Extra job                 
Wage increase in                      
Hospitals     0.1236  0.1134 0.2527 0.2299 -0.5128 0.4703        
Primary care    0.0141  0.0518 0.0307 0.1131 -0.0412 0.1558        
Private practice    0.0603  0.0689 -0.0221 0.2243 0.4527 0.6261        
Other jobs      0.0230  0.0346 -0.0097 0.0884 0.1677 0.3073        
All sectors        0.2221*  0.0400 0.2636* 0.0614 0.0127 0.1573        






Will increased wages increase nurses’ working hours in the 





Many registered nurses (RNs) in Norway work part-time, or in non-health jobs. The nurses’ 
trade organizations claim that a wage increase will increase the short-term labor supply in 
health care. This paper is an attempt to identify the effects of job-type specific wage increases 
through policy simulations on micro data. The individual’s labor supply decision can be 
considered as a choice from a set of discrete alternatives (job packages). These job packages 
are characterized by attributes such as hours of work, sector specific wages and other sector 
specific aspects of the jobs. The unique data set covers all RNs registered in Norway and their 
families. The spouses’ incomes and age of the children are vital when estimating the labor 
supply of this profession. For married females the results indicate job type specific wage 
elasticities for hours of work of 0.17 in hospitals and 0.39 in primary care. The total hours 
worked in health and non-health jobs combined are actually predicted to be slightly reduced, 
but the change is not significantly different from zero. Single females are somewhat more 
responsive to wage changes than married ones. 92 93 
1. Introduction 
 
The excess demand for nursing labor in the national health services persists in many 
developed countries in spite of systematic increases in the education capacity in order to meet 
the demand. Finlayson, et.al. (2002) reports a nursing shortage in the UK of 10,000 to 22,000 
depending on the way vacancies are calculated. In the US, the national supply of registered 
nurses was estimated at 1.89 million full-time equivalents in 2000 while the demand was 
estimated at 2 million, a shortage of 110,000 or 6 percent, by the U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services (2002). In Norway, the Ministry of Labor and Government 
Administration estimated the number of vacancies at 3,300 full-time positions in 1998. The 
nurse shortage is a problem as it reduces the quality of the services provided. In a survey 
initiated by Nurseweek (2002), three-fourths responded that they in the past year, had 
witnessed a negative impact on the quality of patient care as a result of a greater number of 
patients per nurse and higher turnover among experienced RNs.  
 
Many registered nurses (RNs) work part-time, in non-health jobs or are temporarily out of the 
workforce. Nurses’ trade unions claim that a wage increase will increase not only recruitment 
into the nursing profession, but also the short-term labor supply of those already qualified. 
Higher wages are claimed to increase hours worked by personnel employed in the health 
sector, and attract nurses from non-health activities. When the tax schedule is nonlinear in 
income, estimation of labor supply parameters is difficult. This paper is an attempt to quantify 
these short-term effects through policy simulations in a discrete choice framework. I apply a 
structural labor supply model with nonlinear budget constraints. Structural methods, though 
controversial, are advantageous when the objective is to analyze the effects of a policy 
alternative that may change the budget sets in complicated ways.  
 
The nurses choose the job package that maximizes their utility given a nonlinear budget set 
that incorporates taxes. These job packages are characterized by attributes such as hours of 
work, sector specific wages and other sector specific aspects of the jobs. The three sectors or 
job-types are public hospitals, public primary care services and other “non-health” or “non-
patient” jobs in public administration, private business and NGOs. The model is a static neo-
classical structural labor supply model inspired by approaches like Aaberge, Dagsvik and 
Strøm (1995) and van Soest (1995).  
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I will not analyze the impact of wage increases as an instrument to mobilize those not 
working. One argument for not including this group is the differences in personal 
characteristics compared to those working, as discussed in the data section. Another is the 
small number of people not working in 1995; only 0.9 percent of the workforce, when 
subtracting the group with disability benefits or other social benefits as their main income.  
 
As most registered nurses are women, the literature on female labor supply provides an 
important background to this discussion. Killingsworth and Heckman (1986) provide a 
comprehensive review of research indicating that women’s workforce participation is 
responsive to changes in the wage rate, unearned income, spouse’s wage and marital status, as 
well as having children, particularly of preschool age. The survey indicates that labor supply 
elasticities for females are positive, i.e. the positive substitution effect outweighs the negative 
income effect.  
 
In relation to the nursing profession itself, a survey by Link (1992) summarizes the literature 
and finds that wage levels, and having children, influence labor force participation, although 
the responsiveness to wage changes has declined considerably over time. The latter finding 
reflects the fact that most RNs are now working.  
 
In a recent review of the labor supply literature for nurses, Antonazzo et.al. (2003) confirms 
the increasing use of panel data models, limited dependent variable models, and treatment of 
sample selection issues. They find that results vary considerably depending on the methods 
used, particularly on the effect of wages. The impact of one’s own wage on labor force 
participation is not significant in most of the studies on North American data, whereas there 
are some studies with elasticities greater than one. The impact on hours worked is estimated 
with elasticities from –0.94 to +2.8, depending on sample, time period and gender. The 
impact of an increase in household non-labor income is estimated with elasticities that are 
slightly negative in relation to the participation rate, and insignificant or negative for hours 
worked.   
 
There are fewer British studies available. One example is Phillips (1995) which estimates 
labor market participation elasticities with respect to the wage rate, non-labor income, and 
costs incurred through work, reported for qualified and unqualified nurses. Participation is 
found to be highly responsive to wage changes, and some discontinuity is found in the supply 95 
function. The econometric model traditionally applied to nurses has been a logit model for the 
participation, and a selection-corrected hours-of-work regression.  
 
A newly published study on Norwegian data by Askildsen et al. (2003) applies, however, a 
matched panel data set to estimate wage elasticities ranging from –0.06 to 0.46 depending on 
the setup of regression of hours against log wage. They find that individual and institutional 
features are statistically significant and important for working hours, and find their estimate of 
0.21 most reliable. This paper has a different and larger sample of nurses, including those 
working in non-health jobs, and separates the analysis for single and married females as their 
behavioral response is expected to be different. Two important features of this study are firstly 
the inclusion of the spouse’s income and other non-work income like capital income, transfers 
and savings. Omitting the non-work income is of extra concern when focusing on the married 
nurses, as it might lead to an upward bias of the wage elasticities.  
 
In their agenda for research on nurses’ labor supply Antonazzo et.al. (2003) advertised the 
need for econometric models that can handle nonlinearity in the labor supply function. I argue 
that the application of a discrete choice model, as presented in my study, is a feasible way to 
address this problem. A weakness in many of the existing studies is the small sample size 
and/or the exclusion of nurses not practicing in the health sector. An advantage of the 
matched registered data used in this study is the inclusion of all qualified nurses. Another 
benefit is the possibility to match family characteristics that are important for the nurses’ 
labor supply, such as spouse’s income and children’s age.  
 
In a policy perspective I find that there are reasons to have moderate expectations of what 
wages can achieve as a tool to reduce the overall shortage of nurses. The predictions of this 
paper are that wage changes have a minor impact on hours worked by the personnel employed 
in the health sector. Wage rates probably have a minor impact on nurses’ working hours 
compared to non-pecuniary factors. Furthermore, there are obvious weaknesses in focusing 
solely on the supply side of the labor market for health personnel, and the term ‘nursing 
shortage’ is slightly misleading. A higher wage level may both reduce the employers’ demand 
for nursing hours, as well as affect the hours offered by the nurses.   
 
For married women I find job type specific wage elasticities of 0.166 for the hospital jobs. 
The increase in hours is due to attracting nurses from primary care and non-health jobs, as the 96 
average amount of working hours in the hospital sector is reduced through the wage increase. 
The total hours produced by our sample of RNs in both health and non-health jobs, taking job 
changes into account, are predicted to be inelastic. The wage elasticity for the primary care 
jobs is predicted to be 0.390, attracting labor from hospitals and non-health jobs. A 
simultaneous wage increase for hospital and primary care personnel reduces the number of 
nurses preferring a non-health job. A simulated wage increase for health-jobs by 10% reduces 
the predicted share of nurses preferring a non-health job from 16.8% to 16.1%. The predicted 
wage elasticities of hours worked in this simulation are -0.002 for hospital jobs and 0.153 for 
primary care jobs. The elasticities are only significantly different from zero at a 10% level.  
 
For single women the job specific wage elasticities are stronger, especially in the primary care 
sector. Part of this effect is probably due to the fact that there are relatively few single nurses 
in the primary care sector, as nurses often start their career with a hospital job.  
 
After a presentation of the data and the context in Section 2, the model is presented in Section 
3. In Section 4 the results are elaborated and Section 5 includes some calculations of the 
changes in the job-specific costs and total labor costs of a wage increase in one or more of the 





According to Statistics Norway (2003) there were 77,819 registered nurses below retirement 
age in Norway in 2002, of whom 69,690 were employed. Those not employed were mainly on 
disability pensions, medical and vocational rehabilitation, early retirement or further 
education. Auxiliary nurses with a year of education after college are not included in these 
numbers. Norway is one of the countries with the highest density of nurses with 15.3 working 
nurses per 1,000 population in October 2002. Over 90% of the nurses are women. 91.4% of 
the employed nurses were public employees. Registered nurses receive a minimum of three 
years of education at college level. Personnel in administrative positions have often completed 
a year of administrative training. Nurse specialist training also adds one or two years. 
 
The study presented here is, however, based on the 51,500 nurses below retirement age 
permanently living in Norway in 1995. The Norwegian health services are primarily run by 97 
national and local government authorities. 50% of the nurses in our sample work in public 
hospitals. Close to 26% work in primary health care run by the municipalities in nursing 
homes, home nursing or health clinics. Only 5% are employed by private health services 
working in a private medical clinic or in the pharmaceutical industry. Some 15% work in non-
health areas like public administration or in the service sector. Some of these teach at colleges 
or lower levels, work in occupational health in the industry or in public health administration. 
6% earn their main income from different types of transfers like disability benefits. About 1% 
earn less than the minimum income required to qualify for public pensions, and do not receive 
transfers beyond the same limit of NOK 40,000.  
 
Table 1. Registered nurses by job type in 1995 
Category  Share 
Hospitals  49.9% 
Public primary care  25.7% 
Private healthcare  5.1% 
Non-health   15.3% 
Non-work  
Do not earn sufficient to qualify for national insurance:  
1G≈NOK 40 000 >Labor income>Social benefits.  0.9% 
Disability pensions and social security benefits  6.1% 
 
 
The public health sector is responsible for most of the production of health care services and 
for their financing. Primary health care is the responsibility of municipalities, but a 
considerable share of general practitioners run private practices. Municipalities are also 
responsible for general public health services, home nursing and nursing homes. The demand 
side is dominated by a few large groups of buyers that may be considered monopsonists. For a 
general overview of the Norwegian health care system, see van den Noord et.al. (1998) and 
European Observatory on Health Care Systems (2000).  
 
One explanation for nursing shortages as reported in Hirsch and Schumacher (1995, 1998), is 
that hospitals face an upward sloping labor supply curve which results in a lower wage and 
employment level for nurses than if the market was competitive. “Monopsony would help 
explain reported shortages, since hospitals will list vacancies and desire to hire additional 
workers at the monopsonistic wage, but would decrease their profitability were they to raise 
wages to attract more applicants.” There is a parallel in a public setting, where the health care 98 
institutions are equipped with a fixed budget and an increase in wages could reduce the 
staffing they can afford. The empirical evidence for monopsony power in nursing labor 
markets is, however, sparse.  
 
This paper uses a matched data set covering all registered nurses working in Norway. A 
drawback of using the complete sample of RNs is the lack of information about whether the 
nurses work shifts or regular hours. Askildsen et.al. (2003) point to the fact that the true wage 
effect thus may be underestimated for some groups. The data set is based on several of the 
administrative data registers delivered by Statistics Norway. Using the register of authorized 
health personnel as an identifier we can link information about demography, including 
children, income and employment relations. We also know the spouses’ income and 
employment. It is assumed that this years saving for next years vacation is equal to the 
amount saved last year. Appendix 1 provides details about variable construction, trimming 
procedure and summary statistics for key individual level variables by job category. 
  
Hourly wage is the applied earnings measure, and is calculated by dividing annual earnings by 
hours in a full-time position for those working full-time. These calculated wages are used 
when assigning predicted hourly wages for all nurses in all the three job alternatives in the 
model below. I exploit the richness of the register data in this procedure, including residency 
and observed experience from the past 20 years. I control for the selection effect by applying 
a Heckman two-step procedure, as there is reason to believe that there is a selection process 
driving the decision of where to work, or not work at all. See Appendix 2 for wages, and 
Appendix 3 for taxes.  
 
I considered it likely that the decision process is affected by gender and family status. I have 
chosen to focus the analysis on the two subsamples of married and single females, as women 
dominate the nursing profession. Many individuals registered as single will be cohabitants, 
but when cohabitants have a child together they are registered as married. Table A3 confirms 
the differences in characteristics; single nurses are younger and many of them prefer to live in 
central areas. Almost 30% live in greater Oslo. Two-thirds of the single nurses work at 
hospitals compared to 50% of the married females. 61% of the single nurses work full-time 
compared to 35% of the married ones.  
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In the following model the RNs choose between three job alternatives: Hospitals, public 
primary care and non-health jobs in the service sector and employment in public 
administration. These are the dominating categories of work covering almost 95 percent of 
those working. As reported in Table A2 those working in the private health care sector have 
other individual characteristics, including a higher spouse’s income. Nurses not working and 
those with public transfers as their main source of income, are excluded from this analysis.  
  
In our sample of married females 50% work at the hospitals, 33% in primary care and 17% 
with other non-health tasks. The working hours are not observable, but calculated by division 
of annual income by predicted hourly wage. The hours are then categorized into 9 groups as 
reported in the first column in Table 4. In the estimation of working hours each alternative is 
allocated the average amount of working hours in that category, implying that within each 
category hours offered are uniformly distributed. For those who actually work at hospitals we 
estimate the average weekly working hours to be 28.9, compared to 30 hours in the primary 
care jobs and 25.5 hours in the non-health jobs. For reasons of comparisons with later 
predictions we can construct an imaginary ‘average nurse’ by multiplying the shares for each 
hour category with the mean hours in the categories, and then multiplying by the job-type 
shares. We then get the following distribution of weekly hours by job type: 14.6 hospital 





The model focuses on the supply side of the labor market and implicitly assumes that the 
nurses are employed in the jobs they prefer. This is of courses a strict assumption, but on the 
other hand it was not far from the actual situation in 1995 with plenty of job offers in all 
practice types. However, the model does take account for the fact that most jobs offered are 
full-time jobs and that hospital jobs are more available in central areas.  
 
The nurses choose between job packages, each being defined by a job or practice type i, 
specific choice of hours h, and a wage rate per hour w. The three alternative job types or 
practice types are hospitals, primary care and non-health. There are unobserved job 
characteristics associated with practice type i, that may affect preferences and hence choices. 
As an example we may think of specific skills involved in the job, patient mix or shift work.  100 
 
Because the analyst does not know the nurses’ preferences, I will assume a random utility 
model  
 
Ui=Vi+εi,    (1)  
  
where Ui is the utility when the nurse works hi hours in job type i, Vi is the deterministic 
element in the utility function and εi is a stochastic term with an iid extreme value distribution 
with an expected mean of 0 and a variance of 
22 /6 σπ . The random term εi also captures the 
unobserved job characteristics associated with practice type i. 
 
The utility for job number i is given by  
 
U(C,h,i) = V(C(h),h) + ε(C,h,i),                (2) 
 
where C is the disposable household income after tax per year, h is hours of work representing 
leisure time, and i the unobserved job characteristics.  
 
The budget constraint, for given job number i, is 
 
C=f(hw)+I; h=Hi ,  w=Wi,                                             (3) 
 
where Hi  is the job i specific hours of work, and Wi the pre-tax hourly wage for job i. The 
nurses have a choice between nine categories of hours per week. The categories are 
constructed so that they represent the common work contracts. The categories are represented 
by the mean in each category, h ={18, 21, 25, 28, 30, 33, 35.5, 37.5, 40} hours per week. I 
also exclude non-market opportunities (h=0), meaning that all nurses in the analysis have to 
participate in the workforce. This is not a strong limitation, as almost all nurses observed not 
to be participating in the workforce are categorized as unable to work and granted a disability 
benefit. 
 
Note that for the same job, wage rates may differ across nurses by personal characteristics like 
experience, residency and country background. In addition, for the same nurse, wage rates 101 
may differ across jobs. For all individuals a pre-tax hourly wage is estimated for each job 
applying a Heckman two-step selection correction procedure. See Appendix 2 for the 
estimation of wages.  
 
The f(.) function represents the net-of-tax labor income while I is the family income other 
than the nurse’s own earnings (capital income after tax, spouse’s income after tax, transfers). 
A non trivial assumption made is that the spouse’s hours of work are exogenous as there is 
reason to believe that the spouse’s choice of working hours will correlate, either negatively, 
e.g. if one of the parents must look after the children, or positively as they have preferences 
for spending their leisure together.  
 
In traditional labor supply offered wages are determined by human capital characteristics and 
hours offered are uniformly distributed. However, in real life wages may vary across job types 
for observationally identical workers, and jobs with a specific number of hours may be more 
available in the market than other jobs, e.g. “full-time” jobs. Thus, when the nurses make their 
choice with respect to labor supply, they choose between job-packages with different wage 
and hours profiles.  
 
I assume that the nurses make their choices by maximizing utility, given the job-packages 
available in the market. As already mentioned, the analyst does not observe preferences 
neither does he observe all details of the job-packages available in the market. Let Bi(h,l) 
denote the set of feasible jobs with hours of work Hi equal to h, when the individual lives in a 
geographic location categorized by a centrality dummy l. Let ( , ) i gh l be the frequency of jobs 
in Bi(h,l), which is related to the institutional availability of full-time jobs and the 
geographical location, as hospital jobs are more available in central areas. The geographical 
location only influences the availability of hospital jobs. It follows from above that the utility 
function can be written as 
 




i ε ~ = ε(f(Hi Wi)+I, Hi, i).                   (5) 102 
 
Since hours of work and consumption are given when the job is given, the agent's choice 
problem is a discrete one, namely to find the job that maximizes utility. Let  ( , ) Phl denote the 
probability that the agent chooses a job with hours of work h, when he/she lives in an area 
with centrality l. This is the same as choosing a job (any job) within P(h,l). When the random 
error terms { i ε ~ } are ii extreme value distributed, the probability ( , ) Phl can be expressed as 
 
(,) Phl= P(choosing any job within B(h,l))  
 




exp( ( ; , )) ( , )
,







                          (6) 
 
where D is the set of feasible hours of work and 
 
(h;w,I) v(f(hw) I,h) V/ . ψ σ =+ =               (7) 
 
Due to the assumption of extreme value distributed utilities, it follows readily that the choice 
probabilities are multinominal logits. By setting  ( , ) i gh l=1 in (6) we get the standard 
multinominal logit. The interpretation of the “opportunity density extended version of the 
standard multinominal logit” given in (6), is that the attractiveness of a choice measured by 
exp( ) ψ  is weighted by a function saying how available this choice is in the market. The 
weight is determined by  
 
12 ( , ) exp( ) ii gh l k l ν ν =+                               (8) 
 
where  i k =1 if the main job is full-time (35.5 hours per week or more), and  i k =0 otherwise. 
l=1 if the individual lives in a central area and the choice is the hospital job type, and l =0 
otherwise. For more details about this methodology I refer to Aaberge, Colombino and Strøm 
(1999). 
 103 
In an extended version of the model I also include a component in the opportunity index that 
corrects for the fact that the nurses have an education where the dominating pool of available 
jobs are found with the health care providers. There is however a possible endogeniety 
problem with this formulation, and that is why both alternatives are reported in the next 
section. The modified  (.) g  function is then  
 
12 3 ( , , ) exp( ) ii i gh l m k l m ν νν =+ +                              (9) 
 
where  i m =1 if the job i is with a health care provider, and  i m =0 otherwise.  
 
The deterministic part of the preferences is represented by the following “Box-Cox” type 
utility function,  
 









− −− − −
=+       (10) 
where  
 
01 12 23 3 () X XXX β ββ β β =+ + +       
 
The first element represents the utility from consumption and the second element the utility of 
leisure time. See Aaberge, Dagsvik and Strøm (1995) for an empirical analysis applying this 
specification. An advantage of this specification is that it is flexible enough to yield both 
negative (back-ward bending labor supply curve) and positive wage elasticities. 8,760 is the 
total number of annual hours, from which 8 hours per day are subtracted for sleep. α , λ , γ  
and the  s β′  are unknown parameters. For the utility function to be quasi-concave, we require 
λ <1 and γ <1. Note that if  0 λ →  and  0 γ → , the utility function converges to a log-linear 
function. The characteristics are: X1= age of the nurse, X2= number of children below six 
years of age, X3= 1 if the person is born in Norway, 0 otherwise. An alternative specification 
is to use a semi-parametric approach like van Soest (1995), where the deterministic part of the 
preferences is represented by a polynomial. The parameters (α, λ, γ, β0, β1, β2, 12 , ν ν ,( 3 ν )) are 
estimated in a maximum-likelihood procedure. Note that σ is not identified and is absorbed in 
α and β.  104 
4. Results 
 
The following analysis contains a discussion of the estimated parameters of the model, before 
the observed and predicted choices of working hours and job types are presented. For both 
married and single nurses, the procedures presented in Section 4.1-4.2 are undertaken twice, 
with and without an opportunity index that corrects for the fact that the RNs have an 
education where the dominating pool of available jobs are found with the health care 
providers (Model A and B, respectively). The predicted choices from Model A, with less 
accurate predictions, are presented in Appendix 4, as a backdrop to the predictions from 
Model B discussed in the following two sections. In Section 4.3 an analysis of the total wage 
cost of a job specific wage increase is presented.  
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Model A: Appendix 4.2 




4.1 Married females 
 
From Table 3 we observe that all parameters except 1 β  are sharply determined and that λ  and 
γ  are estimated to yield a quasi-concave utility function. The income term in the utility 
function (10) is estimated with a λ  of –2.8 and an α , the constant in the consumption term, 
of 0.7, meaning that the nurses prefer the job that pays best if otherwise similar. The γ  in the 
leisure component is estimated to –6.4. Like α , the constant  0 β in the leisure term is positive 
and significant, meaning that more hours of leisure increases the utility. Surprisingly  1 β  is not 
significantly different from zero, as one might expect that the nurses would prefer jobs with 
less working hours when they get older. On the other hand they are responsible for their 105 
children earlier in their career and many choose to work part-time. This is confirmed by the 
positive, yet small,  2 β  of 0.03, which I interpret as a higher preference for part-time jobs for 
mothers of children below six years of age, than for the average nurse. The parameters in the 
opportunity index are also significant with  1 ν of 0.8 and  2 ν  of 0.5. It is worth noting that the 
McFadden’s Rho is very low, especially for the married females. One interpretation is that 
wage and working hours are relatively less important than other factors not observed, such as 
shift work, patient load, travel distance from home etc. when choosing a job. It is a similar 
situation for Model B, which takes into account that the dominating pool of jobs for the 
registered nurses is with the health care providers. The parameter  3 ν  is positive and 
significantly different from zero. The signs of the other parameters are unchanged. Observe 
that McFadden’s Rho is slightly higher in the extended model (B), but still worrying low.  
 
Model performance 
The basic model (A) performs poorly in the predictions of job type choices, as it seems that 
the multinominal model distributes the predictions almost evenly: 38% hospital, 30% primary 
care and 32% non-health (Column 2 in Table 4). The predicted choices of hour categories are 
generally in line with the observed ones with half-time and full-time preferred. The extended 
model (B) has much sharper predictions with 52% working at hospitals, 31% working in 
primary care and 17 % in non-health jobs (Column 3 in Table 4). The predicted distribution of 
weekly hours is 14.7 in hospitals, 8.4 in primary care and 4.6 in non-health work. The 
predicted hourly pre-tax wages used in the analysis were on average NOK 159 in the hospital 
sector, NOK 148 in the primary care sector and NOK 187 in non-health.  
 
Out-of-sample predictions 
In order to evaluate the model’s prediction properties, I use the estimated parameters from 
1995 and predict preferred working hours in 2000. I use the pre-tax hourly wages, the tax 
system and the personal characteristics applicable in 2000. This procedure is undertaken for 
all females in 2000 and for those who were married in 1995 and 2000. I compare the 
predictions with the observed choices. Only the predictions of the extended model (B) are 
presented in Table 5.  
 
Looking at all observed married females, the mean price corrected pre-tax hourly wages 
increased by 26% in the hospital sector, 32% in the primary care sector and 14% in non-106 
health. (N=25,242 in 1995 and 25,363 in 2000). The average age was 43.1 in 1995 and 44.3 in 
2000. Part of the wage increase is due to the higher seniority of the 2000 sample, as seniority 
is an important determinant for the wage in the public sector.  
 
The higher wage increase in the public sector, especially at primary care level, makes it 
natural to expect a reallocation of hours to this sector. Before I compare the observed and 
predicted choices in 2000, it is important to emphasize that the public health services were 
significantly strengthened from 1995 to 2000. The capacity boost took place at both care 
levels. Major structural changes in the health care sector make the comparison over time 
complicated.  
 
There was a 14% increase from 1995 to 2000 in the number of employees at psychiatric and 
somatic institutions in the specialist health services. According to Statistics Norway (2001) 
the number of full-time nursing positions increased by 23% to 27,415 in 2000. The number of 
full-time positions for auxiliary nurses was reduced by 4% to 8,386 in 2000, continuing the 
trend that this personnel category is replaced by registered nurses in hospitals.  
 
The number of full-time positions for physicians was increased by 23% to 8,288 in 2000. 
However, there was also a significant increase in the production capacity, partly fuelled by the 
transition to an activity based funding system. In the specialist services, the number of 
discharges increased by 11% to 760,893 in 2000. Outpatient-consultations were increased by 
13%. The number of full-time positions, for all professions, increased by 30% in the primary 
care sector to 89,670 in 2000, reducing the ratio of full-time positions per patients to 0.44.   
 
The first column in Table 5 presents the observed and predicted choices for all married 
females working in 1995 who were also observed in 2000. The next column shows the same 
group’s choices in 2000. 18,244 married females were observed both in 1995 and 2000. The 
average age was 41.3 years in 1995, and naturally 46.3 years in 2000. The third column 
presents all the married females with complete data in 2000.   
 
The observed changes in the five-year period deserve a few comments. Looking at the sample 
observed in both 1995 and 2000, there is a striking increase in the number of nurses employed 
in the primary care sector. There are at least four factors causing this development. Firstly, the 
relative wage has increased in favor of the primary care sector. The sample observed in both 107 
years has a pre-tax hourly wage increase of 20% in the hospital sector, 26% in the primary 
care sector and 9% in the non-health jobs. Secondly, the nurses in the sample are five years 
older in 2000 and they are simply following the normal trend of switching to the primary care 
services with age. One reason is probably an interest in moving their family out of the cities. 
There are less hospital jobs available in the suburbs and rural areas. Thirdly, the significant 
structural changes in the public health sector have boosted the mobility of the workforce. And 
finally, there is also a possibility that some specialized institutions, still not hospitals, are 
categorized as hospitals in 1995 and primary care institutions in 2000, exaggerating the 
changes. The average number of hours worked is stable, however, with a reallocation between 
the sectors as described above.  
 
The predictions respond to the wage changes as expected; an increased share is predicted to 
work in the primary care institutions, with reductions in the others. The average number of 
working hours is underpredicted, and as in 1995 it is the hours in the primary care sector that 
are incorrectly predicted by the model. A conclusion thus seems to be that the model predicts 
the correct directions of changes, but underpredicts the hours. However, it is not surprising 
that the predictions are biased when taking the huge structural changes into consideration.  
 
What happens if the wage increases in the health care jobs? 
A wage increase for hospital personnel might change the hours worked for those already 
working there, and attract nurses from non-health jobs. The introduction of a policy 
simulation, repeating the predictions above and keeping the parameters previously estimated, 
but now with a 10 percent wage increase in the hospital jobs, is a way to predict the net 
magnitude of these effects. The probability of choosing a hospital job increases from 52.4% to 
53.5%, as presented in Table 6, and the predicted hospital working hours increase by 0.3 
hours per week per nurse. With almost 48 weeks of work per year this adds up to 175 extra 
full-time positions. The gain in hospital hours must be weighted against the simulated 
reduction in primary care jobs pf 133 full-time positions, and the reduction in non-health jobs 
totalling 75 positions.  
 
The impact on the total working hours produced by all nurses in the sample, in health and 
non-health jobs, is a small reduction of 0.1 hours per week per nurse, or 33 full-time 
positions. The wage elasticity in the hospital sector is predicted to be 0.166. This pattern of 
changes in the probability of a job type being selected and hours worked repeats itself when 108 
undertaking similar policy simulations for the primary care jobs, for both health jobs and for 
non-health jobs as presented in Table 6.  
 
In wage bargaining the hospital and primary care sectors normally follow the same pattern. 
When increasing the wage in both public health sectors, the model predicts a wage elasticity 
of 0.153 in the primary care sector, and zero (-0.002) in the hospital sector. The model 
predicts an increased probability of choosing a job in both the hospital and the primary care 
sector, but predicts fewer hours worked in average by those employed.  
 
Finally two attempts are made to identify the income effect. First a lump-sum transfer of 
NOK 50.000 is introduced, an amount equivalent to about 27% percent of the average annual 
income. Somewhat surprisingly this slightly alters the predicted mix of job types, as fewer 
RNs are expected to work in hospitals and non-health jobs, matched by more people 
preferring home care and nursing homes. Adding up the working hours for all sectors, the 
model predicts a reduction in expected average hours of 1.6% or more than 300 full-time 
positions. The other attempt is to repeat the simulation with a 10% increase of the non-wage 
income. The income elasticity is found to be –0.063 for all hours, -0.138 for hospital hours 
and 0.075 for primary care hours. The elasticity for primary care hours is not significantly 
different from zero at a 10% level. Generally, many of the elasticities reported in this section 
are only weakly significant. It is important to keep in mind, however, that the standard 
deviation reported in the prediction contains both the uncertainty of the prediction for each 
individual, and information about the distribution of the predictions across individuals. The 
significance level is reported in Table 6, where * represents the 10% level, and ** the 5% 
level.   109 
 
Table 3 Estimation of parameters of the utility function and opportunity densities. Married females. 
     Model A  Model B 
     Estimate Std.error P-value Estimate Std.error P-value
    
  Utility function   
β 0  Constant ’leisure element’  0.052 0.010 [.000] 0.371 0.039 [.000]
β 1  Age  0.000 0.000 [.585] 0.000 0.001 [.558]
β 2  Number of children below 6 years of 
age 0.027 0.005 [.000] 0.095  0.011 [.000]
γ   Exponent ‘leisure element’  -6.415 0.237 [.000] -4.050 0.134 [.000]
α  Constant ‘consumption element’  0.690 0.107 [.000] 2.007 0.109 [.000]
λ  Exponent ‘consumption element’  -2.806 0.268 [.000] -1.508 0.128 [.000]
         
  Opportunity density*   
ν 1  1 if living in a central area, 0 otherwise 0.821 0.015 [.000] 0.530 0.017 [.000]
ν 2  1 if the job is full-time, 0 otherwise  0.533 0.034 [.000] 0.546 0.032 [.000]
ν 3 
1 if the job is with a health care 
provider, 0 otherwise      0.739 0.020 [.000]
           
 Number  of  observations  25,242   25,242 
 Log  likelihood  -80,642   -79,878.5 
   McFadden's Rho  0.03     0.04     
* For the wage equation see Appendix 2. 
 110 
Table 4 Observed and predicted hours for married females 
       Model A  Model B 
Observed and predicted hours    Main model*  Extended model 
Married females    Observed  Predicted Predicted 
N=25242     shares   probability probability 
           
   Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev.
             
Job type choice             
Hospital   0.505  0.378 0.020 0.524  0.052
Primary care    0.328  0.304 0.014 0.308  0.037
Non-health     0.168     0.317 0.010 0.168  0.017
   1.000  1.000 1.000   
             
  
Share (Job type) * 
Mean hours in job type 
Pr (Job type) * 
Mean hours in job type 
Pr (Job type) * 
Mean hours in job type 
Hospital   14.6 15.2 10.9 0.7 14.7  1.6
Primary care    9.9 14.7 8.3 0.5 8.4  1.0
Non-health     4.3 10.0 8.6 0.5 4.6  0.5
All   28.7 7.1 27.8 0.7 27.7  0.9
              
Categories of hours           
Hours Cat.1 (Mean=18h/w)  0.139  0.168 0.022 0.172  0.030
Hours Cat.2 (Mean=21h/w)  0.132  0.154 0.014 0.157  0.019
Hours Cat.3 (Mean=25h/w)  0.118  0.130 0.004 0.131  0.009
Hours Cat.4 (Mean=28h/w)  0.138  0.109 0.003 0.109  0.005
Hours Cat.5 (Mean=30h/w)  0.085  0.094 0.005 0.094  0.005
Hours Cat.6 (Mean=33h/w)  0.091  0.071 0.008 0.071  0.007
Hours Cat.7 (Mean=35.5h/w)  0.138  0.161 0.023 0.146  0.053
Hours Cat.8 (Mean=37.5h/w)  0.086  0.068 0.014 0.071  0.011
Hours Cat.9 (Mean=40h/w)  0.074     0.044 0.012 0.049  0.010
   1.000  1.000   1.000  











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.2 Are single females more responsive to wage? 
It seems reasonable to expect that single females are more flexible in their choices and 
more able to choose jobs with higher working hours and overtime work. On the other 
hand most of them already work full-time, so the potential for increased hours of work 
is less than for married females. The average number of observed hours prior to 
categorization is 1,541 for the single females, compared to 1,353 for married ones. 
The non-work income is naturally much lower for the single females at NOK 43,567, 
compared to NOK 229,537 for the married ones. The average age is 35 years, 8 years 
younger than the married females.     
 
A complicating factor is the choices of the single mothers who are likely to be highly 
restricted by their parenting obligations and depending on childcare, which often is 
difficult to combine with shift work. This group, however, is small. The sample of 
single nurses also includes cohabitants without joint children.  
 
Most of the single nurses are young and work in central areas, often at hospitals. As 
they get older many of the single nurses too move to less central areas and work in the 
primary care sector. However, they do not reduce their hours of work like the married 
ones do in their late twenties and thirties, except for the single mothers. There is a 
selection out of the single status by age. It is thus somewhat problematic that my out-
of-sample prediction is based on those observed as single in both 1995 and 2000. The 
average nurse marries during the first five years after graduation.  
 
The parameters estimated for the single females follow a similar pattern to those of 
the married ones. The estimates are reported in Table 7. For the single nurses, the 
extension of the opportunity index (Model B) has a somewhat different effect on the 
parameter changes in the leisure component in the utility function, when comparing to 
the married nurses. Both 0 β and γ are reduced with this extension. As seen in Table 8, 
the extension of the opportunity index improves the accuracy of the predicted sector 
choices. A higher share of the single nurses prefer hospital jobs and full-time jobs. 
The predicted shares, with the observed in parenthesis, are 68.0% (65.8%) for 
hospitals, 21.2% (21.9%) for primary care and 10.8% (12.3%) for non-health. The 114 
single nurses work more hours than the married ones, 32.1 hours per week predicted, 
32.3 hours per week observed.  
 
Looking at the whole sample available in 1995 and 2000, hospital wages increased on 
average by 9%, the primary care wages by 14% and the non-health wages by 3%. The 
pre-tax hourly wages were on average NOK 154 at hospitals, NOK 146 in primary 
care and NOK 184 in non-health jobs. Limiting the sample to those observed in both 
years, the seniority effect is more important. The hospital wages increased by 23% 
during the five-year period, while wages in primary care and non-health jobs 
increased by 28% and 11% respectively. 
 
The observed changes from 1995 to 2000 indicate almost a doubling of the share 
working in primary care to 0.390 as found in Table 9. The shares of both hospitals and 
non-health jobs are reduced. The average number of working hours, is reduced by 
5.5%, mainly due to the reduced share at hospitals. Looking at the whole sample of 
11,091 single nurses in 2000 confirms this significant change in the share preferring a 
primary care job. But the reduction in hours is smaller when looking at the whole 
sample.  
 
The out-of-sample predictions presented in Table 9 are subject to the same 
complications due to structural changes in the health care sector as discussed for the 
married females. The predictions respond to the relative wage changes in the right 
direction, but underpredict the strength of the effects.  
 
Wage elasticities 
The wage elasticities are higher for the single nurses as presented in Table 10. The job 
specific wage elasticity for nurses working in hospitals is 0.196, while the elasticity 
for primary care jobs is 1.743. Part of this effect is probably due to the fact that there 
are relatively few single nurses in the primary care sector compared to married ones, 
as nurses often start their career with a hospital job. This predicted elasticity should 
thus be interpreted with care. When simulating an increase in both health jobs, the 
probability for choosing a non-health job is reduced to 0.094 from the previous 0.108. 
The predicted wage elasticity is found to be -0.235 for hospital jobs and 0.724 for 
primary care jobs. The predicted elasticity in the primary care sector is only 115 
significantly different from zero at a 10% significance level. The income elasticities 
are not significantly different from zero. The non-wage income of single nurses is 
quite low compared to the married ones. It may thus be unrealistic to expect that a 
10% increase in this component will have any identifiable effect. 
 
To conclude we find that the single nurses seem to be more responsive to wage 
changes than the married ones. The predicted effect is small however, and some of the 
elasticities are only significantly different from zero at a 10% level. Generally the 
effect of a job-specific wage rise is an increase in the number of people and the total 
hours worked in that job type, but with a corresponding reduction in hours in other job 
types. It also seems to be the case that those already working in the job where the 
wage is increased, reduce their expected average working hours slightly.  116 
 
Table 7. Estimation of parameters of the utility function and opportunity densities. Single females.  




     Estimate Std.error P-value Estimate Std.error P-value
       
  Utility function   
β 0  Constant ’leisure element’ 
1.47 0.309 [.000] 0.894  0.179 [.000]
β 1  Age  -0.002 0.003 [.570] 0.001  0.001 [.642]
γ  Exponent ‘leisure element’  -1.424 0.431 [.001] -2.741  0.358 [.000]
     
α 
Constant ‘consumption 
element’ 0.283 0.051 [.000] 0.832  0.096 [.000]
     
λ  Exponent ‘consumption 
element’ -3.592 0.214 [.000] -2.502  0.146 [.000]
        
  Opportunity density*       
ν 1 
1 if living in a central area, 
0 otherwise  1.428 0.03 [.000] 0.977  0.033 [.000]
ν 2 
1 if the job is full-time, 0 
otherwise 0.487 0.053 [.000] 0.538  0.056 [.000]
ν 3 
1 if the job is with a health 
care provider, 0 otherwise     1.137  0.043 [.000]
         
 Number  of  observations 
7,782  7,782   
 Log  likelihood 
-22,762  -22,342.6   
   McFadden's Rho    0.11  0.13     
* For the wage equation see Appendix 2. 
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Table 8 Observed and predicted hours for single females 
Observed and predicted 
hours   Main  model  Extended  model 
Single females   Observed    Predicted  Predicted   
N=7782    shares      probability    probability    
           
  Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev.
Job type choice              
Hospital   0.658 0.474 0.579 0.114 0.680 0.071
Primary care    0.219 0.413 0.182 0.056 0.212 0.061
Non-health     0.123 0.329 0.239 0.062 0.108 0.018
   1.000 1.000 1.000 
             
  
Share(Job type) * Mean 
hours in job type 
Pr (Job type) * Mean 
hours in job type 
Pr (Job type) * Mean hours 
in job type 
Hospital   21.8 16.4 19.1 3.8 22.1 3.2
Primary care    7.2 13.9 6.0 1.7 6.7 1.5
Non-health     3.3 9.2 7.7 2.0 3.3 0.6
              
  
Sum over [Share(Job type) * 
Mean hours in job type] 
Sum over [Pr (Job type) * 
Mean hours in job type] 
Sum over [Pr (Job type) * 
Mean hours in job type] 
All   32.3 6.4 32.7 1.6 32.1 2.3
                        
       
Categories of hours           
Hours Cat.1 (Mean=18h/w)    0.064 0.245 0.039 0.042 0.049 0.064
Hours Cat.2 (Mean=21h/w)    0.057 0.233 0.056 0.034 0.062 0.050
Hours Cat.3 (Mean=25h/w)    0.067 0.250 0.082 0.018 0.082 0.028
Hours Cat.4 (Mean=28h/w)    0.092 0.289 0.096 0.008 0.092 0.014
Hours Cat.5 (Mean=30h/w)    0.082 0.274 0.103 0.008 0.094 0.010
Hours Cat.6 (Mean=33h/w)    0.121 0.326 0.108 0.012 0.089 0.012
Hours Cat.7 (Mean=35.5h/w)    0.225 0.418 0.176 0.062 0.316 0.111
Hours Cat.8 (Mean=37.5h/w)    0.159 0.366 0.173 0.028 0.120 0.025
Hours Cat.9 (Mean=40h/w)     0.132 0.339 0.166 0.030 0.097 0.024




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5. The costs of an active wage policy 
 
The total cost of a policy reform is of course strongly correlated to the change in 
hours worked in the different job types. As shown in the previous sections a job-
specific wage increase is predicted to have a modest impact on the choice of job types 
and hours worked. The analysis so far has focused on the average effect on hours of a 
change in wages. It is, however, not unlikely that the nurses are heterogeneous in their 
response to a wage reform, e.g. according to their position on the wage scale. Using 
individual specific hourly wages in combination with our predicted changes in job 
type and hours for each individual, we capture the total expected changes in wage 
costs. Focusing on wage increases in the public health sector defends disregarding the 
employers’ taxes, e.g. the proportional tax on labor costs. The additional tax paid by 
the public hospitals and nursing homes return as increased tax income in the state 
budget.  
 
A 10% simulated increase in hospital wages will increase the wage costs for the 
hospital jobs for the married females by approximately 1.7 percent, identical to the 
change in hours (Table A8 in Appendix 5). The average cost per hour is calculated to 
NOK 158.6 both prior to and after the simulated wage increase. I must thus be a 
predicted change in the personnel mix, where those with a higher wage than the 
average work less and those with a lower wage than the average work more, 
cancelling out the 10% hourly wage increase. Thus the RNs attracted to the hospital 
by the wage increase have a lower mean hourly salary than those already working at 
hospitals. The average hourly wage in the primary care sector is predicted to be 
reduced by 9.1% to NOK 135.0, as those changing jobs from primary care to hospitals 
have a higher than average wage in the primary care sector. The primary care hours 
are predicted to be reduced by 2.2%, while the costs are reduced by 11.1%. Due to 
reductions in the two other job types, the total costs of all employed married nurses 
will be reduced by 2.7%.  
 
Looking at both hospitals and primary care jobs, a 10% wage increase will reduce the 
non-health hours and wage costs by 4.0%. Of the 166 RNs predicted to leave their 
non-health jobs, 45 find a hospital job and 141 a primary care job. However, the 121 
hospital hours and costs are unchanged, while the primary care hours and costs are 
increased by 1.5%. I interpret this as a reduction of hours for those already in the 
sector, reducing costs in spite of the hourly wage increase. Those entering the hospital 
and primary care jobs have a lower average wage canceling out added costs from the 
wage increases. The predicted changes in the costs for the single nurses mirror those 





The purpose of this study has been to identify the short-term effect of increases in 
hourly wages on hours worked in the health sector, both hoping to boost the hours 
worked by RNs already employed in the health sector and attract personnel from non-
health jobs. Wage is probably increasingly important to attract people to the nursing 
profession as is becomes less of a calling and more of a regular job. But this study 
indicates that once qualified, wage seems to have a modest impact on hours worked 
for the nurses, especially for married women. Wage also has a modest impact on the 
choice of job-type, but a simulated wage increase by 10% in health-jobs merely 
reduces the share of nurses preferring a non-health job from 16.8% to 16.1% for those 
married, and from 10.8% to 9.4% for the single females.  
 
For married women I find job type specific wage elasticities of 0.17 for the hospital 
jobs. The increase in hours is partly due to the attraction of nurses from primary care 
and non-health jobs and partly due to an increase in the hours worked by those 
already working at the hospitals. The wage elasticity is predicted to be 0.39 for 
primary care jobs, and 0.43 for non-health jobs, but these elasticities are only 
significant at lower levels (80% and 90% respectively). For all hours worked by 
married female nurses, health and non-health, the income effect dominates the 
substitution effect with a wage elasticity of -0.026. This elasticity however is not 
significantly different from zero.  
 
For the single women the job specific wage elasticities are stronger, especially in the 
primary care sector. The wage elasticity for hospital hours is 0.20. The elasticity is 
much higher for primary care (1.7), but part of this effect is probably due to the fact 122 
that there are relatively few single nurses in the primary care sector compared to 
married ones, as nurses often start their career with a hospital job. For all hours 
worked by single female nurses, in health and non-health jobs, the wage elasticity is –
0.18. The elasticities for this group are more uncertain, with higher standard 
deviations. But they are all significantly different from zero.  
 
It is worth noting that the predicted effects of a public sector wage increase on the 
hours worked in the National Health Service, as presented in this paper, is reasonable 
close to the estimates presented by Askildsen et al. (2003). They also use Norwegian 
data but a different econometric framework. They combine the analysis for single and 
married RNs and present a wage elasticity of 0.21 as their most reliable estimate.  
 
The conclusion is that wage has the effect of increasing hours worked in the health 
sector. But there is a loss incurred as the average nurse’s working hours are predicted 
to be slightly reduced by such a policy. Single nurses are more responsive to wage 
than those who are married. The complexity of the nurses’ choices and the many other 
characteristics that are important with regard to the choice of job type and hours 
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Appendix 1. Variable construction and trimming procedure. 
 
The data used is based on several of the administrative data registers delivered by 
Statistics Norway, with the register of authorized health personnel as an identifier. 
Our trimming procedure excludes personnel above 66 years of age, as many retire at 
67. Some personnel categories have access to early retirement, but it was not common 
practice for registered nurses in 1995.  
 
Authorized foreign RNs are excluded when they do not have a permanent residency in 
Norway (only temporarily residency code/social security number, F-number), or if 
they have a permanent residency code, but no income or address in Norway. The data 
includes information about annual earnings prior to and after taxation, employment 
status, and demographic variables. All employers are coded by the NACE Standard 
Industrial Classification, which gives us detailed information on their sector and type 
of activity.  
 
Table A1 Sample trimming 
  N 
   
RNs registered in 1995 (permanent residence code only)  63,527
   
Subtracting   
Foreigners with no income in Norway  3,934
RNs with higher education (Not nursing related)  658
67 years or older  2,387
Registered during 1995  2,722
Temporary licenses  40




Table A2 Key variables by sector 
Variable Hospital    
Primary 
care   
Private 
health 
care   
Non-
health    
Non-
work     Transfers  
1995 Mean  St.d.  Mean  St.d. Mean St.d. Mean St.d. Mean St.d. Mean St.d.
                         
Sector share  49.9%    25.7%   5.1%  15.3%  0.9%    6.1% 
N 24,144     13,208   2,617  7,876  479   3,127 
                          
Age 40.0  9.8  42.0  10.1 43.9 9.2 43.1 9.4 50.4 11.3 50.8 11.8
Female=1 92.4%     93.2%   90.9%  86.8%  97.7%   97.2% 
Single=1 23.9%     14.3%   10.4%  14.6%  9.4%   12.0% 
Married=1 64.6%     73.2%   78.6%  69.7%  85.2%   68.0% 
Divorced=1 7.8%     8.2%   7.3%  10.4%  2.5%   10.5% 
Born in  
Norway=1 91.5%     92.2%   91.9%  92.5%  85.6%   91.1% 
Gave birth in  
1994 or  
1995 =1  13.4%    12.7%   8.5%  9.4%  3.3%   1.7% 
# of children  
if parent  2.2  0.9  2.4  1.0 2.4 0.9 2.4 1.0 2.5 1.2 2.6 1.1
                          
Years since  
authorization 14.3  10.4  16.2  11.0 18.7 10.1 17.5 10.3 24.4 12.0 24.9 11.9
Number of years 
worked last  
20 years  13.7  5.3  13.9  5.2 14.9 4.7 14.9 4.8 9.7 5.8 13.0 5.5
Income from  
work 199  810  54 731 193 071  54 028 201 416 87 267 205 423122 333 12 768 14 566 5  402 9 599
Total  
Income 219  410  57 530 215 255  57 450 223 549 93 865 238 877147 162 26 326 54 621 122  104 69 940
Transfers 16  482  22 057  19 245  22 790 16 491 21 743 6 207 13 763 6 207 13 763 109  689 60 705
               
Wage per hour  136  7  128  4 114 7 163 10         
Hours per year   1 470  390  1 510  410 1 770 750 1 260 720         
                      
Hours Cat.1  20.7%     21.6%   22.2%  33.4%          
Hours Cat.2  29.1%     33.0%   26.1%  29.5%          
Hours Cat.3  50.1%     45.4%   51.7%  37.2%          
                          
Spouse's  
total income  315 907  319 714 288 086 
204 
982 395 412 589 663 324 689293 860 371 194 420 800 355  575 417 588
Spouse's 
income  
after tax  214 552  224 655 199 661 
142 
419 260 930 383 139 222 007215 751 257 360 324 146 246  959 325 082
Spouse  
does not work 
=1 8.8%       12.8%    10.3%   12.6%   29.2%    27.8%   
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Table A3 Samples used in the analysis, 1995 
Variable    
Married 
females     
 
Single 
females    
All nurses 
with data    
             
N   25,242  7,782  45,228 
            
Age   43.1 9.2 35.0 8.9 41.17 9.89
Female=1   1  1  0.92 
Single=1   0  1  0.19 
Married=1   1  0  0.68 
Divorced=1   0  0  0.08 
Born in Norway=1    0.93  0.91  0.92 
Gave birth in 1994 or 1995    0.12 0.15  0.13 
Number of children in 1995    2.5 0.9 1.3 0.6 2.1 1.0
# of children if mother    2.5 0.9 1.5 0.7 2.3 1.0
Years since authorization    17.7 10.2 9.3 9.0 15.4 10.6
Number of years worked last 20 years   14.8 4.6 11.2 5.6 13.9 5.2
           
Income from work    185 79772 916 206 58252 403 198 810 71 208
Total income    208 38371 269 222 90749 959 221 576 81 017
Transfers    19 65820 193 13 66524 579 19 136 26 646
Non-work    229 53786 597 43 56780 790 169 530200 345
           
Wage per hour, ca    138 13 135 13 138 14
Hours per year, ca     1,353 485 1,541 379 1,445 477
           
Hours Cat.1 Half time and less    0.30 0.14  0.23 
Hours Cat.2 Part-time    0.35 0.25  0.30 
Hours Cat.3 Full-time    0.35 0.61  0.46 
             
Hospital    0.50  0.66  0.53 
Primary care    0.33  0.22  0.29 
Non-health    0.17  0.12  0.17 
             
Centrality Index 1 (Least Central)    0.08 0.08  0.07 
Centrality Index 2    0.04 0.05  0.04 
Centrality Index 3    0.09 0.09  0.09 
Centrality Index 4    0.02 0.01  0.02 
Centrality Index 5    0.04 0.03  0.03 
Centrality Index 6    0.20 0.14  0.19 
Centrality Index 7    0.52 0.61  0.55 
             
Work Region A Oslo/Akershus    0.19  0.30  0.22 
Work Region East excl.Oslo/Ak.    0.25  0.17  0.24 
Work Region South Agder/Rogaland  0.16  0.09  0.14 
Work Region West    0.18  0.15  0.16 
Work Region North     0.18     0.24    0.19  
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Appendix 2. Wages 
 
Annual income by sector 
I have constructed sector-specific hourly wages for all nurses, including sectors where 
they not are participating. The first step in this process is to sort the jobs by the NACE 
standard industrial classification and aggregate into sectors or practice types. As 
described in table A3 I have chosen to use seven ‘sectors’ when I construct hourly 
wages: a) hospitals, b) public primary care, c) private health practice and d) other non-
health work. Those who earned less than the minimum amount to qualify for pension 
entitlements (1G=NOK 39,340), are categorized as e) not working. Self-employment 
is allocated to the non-health sector.  
 
Hourly wages 
The earnings measure used is hourly wage. I calculated hourly wages for the 
subsample with a full-time job for the whole year by dividing the annual income by 
the normal working hours for the job type concerned. Intuitively there is reason to 
believe that there is a selection into the different job types, driven by unobserved 
factors like preferences and productivity. When I predict hourly wages for each 
individual, also in the job categories where they do not work, I take this selection into 
consideration. I apply a Heckman two-step procedure when estimating the wage 
equations as presented in Table A4, and find a significant selection effect. I repeat this 
procedure for each job category. Table A4 only reports the wage equation for the 
hospital sector. I exclude the equations for the other sectors, as they are parallel. The 
hours ‘observed’ are calculated by dividing the annual income by the hourly wage for 
the job category chosen by the individual.  
 
Experience 
In many empirical studies a labor market experience is proxied by potential 
experience, i.e. age-education-7 (Age of primary school enrolment). This is a 
problematic upper bound for experience which is more upwardly biased for women, 
who tend to be more loosely connected to the labor market, at least in connection with 
maternity leave. This is highly relevant for the nurse profession. I have therefore used 
the number of years with an income qualifying for pension entitlement during the last 
20 years as a measure of experience. The measure is constructed on earnings histories 129 
available from the Norwegian National Insurance Scheme, which was established in 
1967. Individual ‘pension entitlements’ in this scheme are linked to their income 
histories. I have also tested the traditional experience measure but found the measure 
based on ‘pension entitlements’ to be more suitable.  
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Table A4 Wage equation from a Heckman selection model 
   Coef. Std. Err z
   Dependent variable: Wage per hour in the hospital sector          
Female Female=1  -0.033 0.006 -5.84
Regiona Oslo/Akershus  0.043 0.010 4.53
Regionc West  -0.015 0.005 -3.11
Regiond Middle  -0.006 0.006 -1.03
Regione North  -0.013 0.005 -2.35
Age Age  0.122 0.047 2.62
age2 Age^2/10  -0.353 0.164 -2.16
age3 Age^3/1000  0.435 0.249 1.75
age4 Age^4/100000  -0.194 0.139 -1.39
erf95  Years of work experience last 20 years  -0.018 0.011 -1.61
erf952 Experience^2/10  0.408 0.176 2.32
erf953 Experience^3/1000  -2.519 1.118 -2.25
erf954 Experience^4/100000  5.081 2.434 2.09
Cnordic  From Nordic country except Norway=1  0.039 0.008 4.82
coecd_no  From OECD area except the Nordic countries=1  0.006 0.010 0.56
Cglobal Non-OECD  background=1  0.019 0.012 1.61
kommsen1 Centrality index 1 =1   0.019 0.007 2.58
kommsen2 Centrality index 2 =1   0.013 0.006 2.11
kommsen3 Centrality index 3 =1   0.013 0.005 2.65
kommsen4 Centrality index 4 =1   0.061 0.019 3.19
kommsen5 Centrality index 5 =1   0.021 0.009 2.39
kommsen6 Centrality index 6 =1   -0.012 0.005 -2.4
Constant     3.442 0.475 7.24
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Table A4 continued- Selection into the hospital sector 
      
Select             
Female Female=1  -0.657 0.033 -19.96
Regiona Oslo/Akershus  -0.889 0.037 -24.02
Regionc West  0.062 0.032 1.9
Regiond Middle  -0.057 0.036 -1.58
Regione North  0.219 0.034 6.42
Cnordic  From Nordic country except Norway=1  0.014 0.050 0.29
coecd_no  From OECD area except the Nordic countries=1  -0.008 0.065 -0.13
Cglobal Non-OECD  background=1  0.188 0.077 2.42
Age Age  -0.684 0.288 -2.38
age2 Age^2/10  1.817 1.022 1.78
age3 Age^3/1000  -1.948 1.569 -1.24
age4 Age^4/100000  0.652 0.882 0.74
erf95  Years of work experience last 20 years  0.094 0.064 1.47
erf952 Experience^2/10  0.117 1.048 0.11
erf953 Experience^3/1000  -6.147 6.783 -0.91
erf954 Experience^4/100000  23.834 14.933 1.6
Married Married=1  -0.494 0.020 -24.2
b950_5  No. of children Aged 0-5  -0.293 0.018 -16.35
kommsen1  Centrality index 1 =1   0.059 0.051 1.17
kommsen2  Centrality index 2 =1   0.161 0.044 3.62
kommsen3  Centrality index 3 =1   0.096 0.033 2.87
kommsen4  Centrality index 4 =1   -0.234 0.115 -2.04
kommsen5  Centrality index 5 =1   -0.021 0.057 -0.36
kommsen6  Centrality index 6 =1   0.045 0.031 1.45
Constant     8.723 2.922 2.99
      
/athrho    -0.574 0.093 -6.18
/lnsigma    -2.113 0.030 -69.86
Rho    -0.518 0.068 
Sigma    0.121 0.004 
Lambda     -0.063 0.010  
 
Number of obs  24,171   Log likelihood  -6,934.4
Censored obs   17,827  Wald chi2(22)      =  996.11








Table A5 Tax rules applied  
Income = Y  Tax 
0 – 20 954  0 
20 954 – 143 500  0.302Y – 6 328 
143 500 – 212 000  0.358Y – 14 364 
212 000 – 239 000  0.453Y – 34 504 
239 000 -  0.495Y – 44 542 
 
Capital tax 
Capital income is taxed at 28 percent.132 
Appendix 4. Predicted choices of the discrete choice model without the health care 
provider indicator in the opportunity index.  
 
Table A6. Extended model - Married females. Predicted changes in sector choices and working hours in 
policy simulations. (Without  3 ν ).  
                      
    
Predictions 
with    
Predictions 
with    
Predictions 
with   Predictions with  Predictions with   Predictions with 
 Predicted  
a 10% 
increase in   
a 10% increase 
in    
a 10% increase 
in  
a 10% increase 
in  
a 10% increase 
in     NOK 50,000 
           
hospital 
wages    
prim. care 
wages   both  wages   
non-health 
wages    all wages     in transfers 
                                  
 Mean St.dev.  MeanSt.dev. Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. Mean  St.dev. Mean St.dev.
Prob (Sector 
choice)                                 
Hospital   0.3780.020  0.381 0.021  0.376 0.019 0.379 0.020  0.376 0.019  0.377  0.019  0.376 0.017
Primary care   0.3040.014  0.303 0.015  0.308 0.011  0.307 0.012  0.303 0.015  0.305  0.013  0.308 0.010
Non-health     0.3170.010   0.316 0.009    0.316 0.009  0.314 0.009  0.321 0.012  0.317  0.010    0.316 0.009
        1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000     1.000 
                                    
Pr (Sector) * Mean hours 
in sector                               
Hospital 
hours  10.9 0.7  10.9 0.7  10.8 0.6 10.9 0.7  10.8 0.6  10.8  0.6  10.7 0.5
Primary care 
hours   8.3 0.5  8.2 0.5  8.4 0.5 8.3 0.5  8.2 0.5  8.3  0.5  8.3 0.5
Non-health 
hours   8.6 0.5  8.6 0.5  8.6 0.5 8.5 0.5  8.7 0.6  8.6  0.5  8.5 0.5
                                    
Sum over [Pr (Sector) *Mean 
hours in sector]                                
Total   27.8 0.7  27.8 0.6  27.8 0.6 27.7 0.6  27.8 0.6  27.7  0.6  27.6 0.5
                                     
Wage 
elasticities   
(New pred. hours-Old pred. hours)/Old 
pred. hours*10                       
All hours         
-
0.006 0.008  -0.004 0.007  -0.010 0.014  -0.005 0.009  -0.014  0.022  -0.064 0.083
Hospital 
hours         0.062 0.053  -0.056 0.058  0.006 0.014  -0.050 0.056  -0.042  0.061  -0.144 0.180
Primary care 
hours        
-
0.050 0.053  0.124 0.164  0.073 0.109  -0.050 0.056  0.024  0.055  0.083 0.161
Non-health 
hours             
-
0.050 0.053    -0.056 0.058  -0.105 0.107  0.095 0.095  -0.011  0.022    -0.089 0.112
Standard deviation in italics. * Significantly different from zero at a 10% level.  ** Significantly different from zero at a 5% level.   
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Table A7. Single nurses. Predicted changes in sector choices and working hours in policy simulations. 
(Without  3 ν ). 
                                                                 










with    
Predictions 
with  
 Predicted  
a 10% increase 
in  
a 10% 






increase in     NOK 50,000 
           hospital wages  
prim. care 
wages     both wages  
non-health 
wages    all wages     in transfers 
                                
 Mean St.dev.  Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. MeanSt.dev. MeanSt.dev. Mean St.dev.  MeanSt.dev.
Prob (Job type 
choice)                               
Hospital   0.579 0.114  0.603 0.119 0.565 0.114 0.590 0.118  0.567 0.114  0.578  0.117 0.582 0.124
Primary care    0.182 0.056  0.172 0.059 0.202 0.057  0.191 0.059  0.177 0.055  0.187  0.057 0.198 0.061
Non-health    0.239 0.062   0.225 0.063   0.233 0.059   0.219 0.060   0.256 0.066   0.235  0.063 0.220 0.064
   1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000    1.000 
                                    
Pr (Job type) * Mean hours in 
job type                               
Hospital   19.1 3.8  19.5 3.9 18.6 3.7 19.1 3.8  18.6 3.7  18.7  3.8 17.9 3.7
Primary care    6.0 1.7  5.6 1.8 6.6 1.8 6.2 1.8  5.8 1.7  6.1  1.8 6.1 1.9
Non-health   7.7 2.0  7.2 2.0 7.5 1.9 7.0 1.9  8.1 2.2  7.4  2.0 6.7 2.0
                                    
Sum over [Pr (Job type) *Mean 
hours in job type]                                
Total   32.7 1.6  32.4 1.4 32.6 1.5 32.3 1.4  32.6 1.5  32.2  1.3 30.8 0.6
                                     
Wage elasticities  
(New pred. hours-Old pred. hours)/Old pred. 
hours*10                      
All        -0.094* 0.053 -0.027* 0.015 
-
0.116** 0.059  -0.040 0.025  -0.149**  0.073    
Hospital         0.258* 0.142 -0.248* 0.140  0.020 0.037  -0.223 0.137  -0.182  0.129    
Primary care          -0.629* 0.372 1.034* 0.558  0.339 0.236  -0.223 0.137  0.129  0.108    
Non-health              -0.629* 0.372   -0.248* 0.140   -0.843* 0.437   0.551* 0.304   -0.330*  0.190        
Standard deviation in italics. * Significantly different from zero at a 10% level.  ** Significantly different from zero at a 5% level.   
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Appendix 5. The predicted costs of a simulated wage increase.  
 
Table A8. Extended model - Married females with basic model (A). Predicted cost changes in policy 
simulations.  
    
Predictions 
with    
Predictions 











increase in    
a 10% 






increase in     NOK 50,000 
          
hospital 
wages    
prim. care 
wages     both  wages   
non-health 
wages    all wages     in transfers 
                           
 Mean  St.dev. Mean  St.dev.  Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev.
                      
Predicted total net wage cost per sector. In million NOK per year: 48 weeks, 7,782 
individuals                
Hospital   2  831  313 2  879  323  2  529 268 2  830 305 2  550 273 2  805  295  2  484 240
Primary care  1 511  190 1  343  176  1  568 187 1  533 189 1  361 172 1  520  187  1  400 167
Non-health   940  116 919  113  924 111 903 109 1  080 141 1  037  128  924 111
All sectors    5 282  259 5  140  253  5  021 243 5  266 250 4  991 254 5  362  258  4  807 209
                                     
Difference in net wage costs in million NOK between predictions before and after the wage 
increase.                
Hospital         47     -302    -1   -281   -26     -348 
Primary care        -168    57    22   -150   9     -111 
Non-health         -22     -16    -37   139   96     -17 
All sectors          -142     -261    -16   -292   79     -475 
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Table A9.  Single nurses with basic model (A). Predicted cost changes in policy simulations.  
                                     
    
Predictions 






with    
Predictions 
with  
N=7782  Predicted  
a 10% increase 
in    
a 10% increase 
in    
a 10% increase 
in  
a 10% increase 
in  
a 10% 
increase in     NOK 50,000 
             hospital wages    
prim. care 
wages   both  wages   
non-health 
wages    all wages     in transfers 
                                  
 Mean St.dev.  Mean St.dev.   Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. MeanSt.dev. Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev.
                                    
Predicted total net wage cost per sector. In million NOK per year: 48 
weeks, 7,782 individuals                     
Hospital   1  279 189  1  304 196  1  107 156 1  248 180 1  139 164 1  227 173  1  005 134
Primary 
care   331 74  304 82  424 76 390 83 325 74 383 82  371 80
Non-
health   207 38  188 35  197 34 180 32 259 52 226 42  185 35
All sectors   1 817 149  1  797 140  1  727 128 1  817 132 1  724 137 1  836 133  1  561 86
                                    
Difference in net wage costs in million NOK between predictions before and after 
wage increase.                  
Hospital         26   -172    -31   -139   -52   -273 
Primary 
care         -27   92    58   -6   52   40 
Non-
health         -18   -10    -27   53   19   -22 
All sectors         -20    -90    1   -93   19   -256 










Nurses’ labor supply with endogenous choice of care level and 






Many countries face a ‘nursing shortage’, and increasing wages is argued to lead to an 
increase in the short-term labor supply in health care. Omitting shift work and level of care in 
the evaluation of such policies may lead to biased estimates of the wage elasticities. Shift 
work has a documented negative impact on workers’ health and social life, effects which are 
compensated for with higher wages and shorter working hours. International studies have also 
documented that hospital jobs often involve relatively unpleasant characteristics such as a 
high degree of stress and job hazards. 
  
Focusing on registered nurses (RN) employed in the public health sector, this paper presents 
an econometric analysis that allows the nurses to compose their ‘job package’ in three steps 
by choosing: a) hospital or primary care, b) daytime or shift work and c) one of four 
categories of hours. The utility maximization problem is solved by discretizing the budget set 
and choosing the optimal job package from a finite set of alternatives. The nested structure is 
estimated on high quality Norwegian micro data. There is some variation in the 
responsiveness to wage between shift and day workers and by care level. The job-specific 
elasticities are small but positive. However, the simulation of a wage increase in all job types, 
when conditioning the analysis to those already participating in the sector, indicates a slight 






One segment of the literature addressing “shortages” of health personnel focuses on the wage 
impact on labor supply. Shift work, in particular night work, is known to have a negative 
impact on the health and well-being of workers. Yet it is impossible to deliver inpatient health 
services without shift work. Intuitively there is reason to believe that shift workers respond 
differently to a wage increase than those working daytime hours. For one thing, the burden 
involved in working more may increase more rapidly for shift workers who often work 
nighttime. For another thing, changes in the wage level of daytime jobs may cause shift-
workers to switch to those.  
 
A very small number of existing labor supply studies take these differences between shift 
labor and regular daytime labor into account. Askildsen et.al. (2003) claim that it is important 
to correct for shift work, as omitting such institutional features will bias the wage effect. “The 
reason is twofold. If shift hours are considered burdensome, a wage compensation is required 
(Moore and Viscusi, 1990). If this compensation is insufficient, lower labor supply is offered, 
and the estimated wage effect will be downwardly biased. It may also be the case that shift 
workers just consider it too demanding to work long hours, and respond less to wage changes 
than those working on ordinary daytime contracts.” Shift work is, however, only one 
important factor when choosing a nursing job. There are for instance many differences 
between a hospital and a primary care job such as patient characteristics, types of nursing 
tasks, preventive versus curative focus, teamwork opportunities, stress levels and travel 
distance.  
 
Focusing on wage as a policy instrument, this paper is an attempt to explicitly include both 
the choice between shift work and daytime hours and between hospital and primary care jobs, 
in a labor supply model of registered nurses (RNs). The nurses maximize utility given a 
nonlinear budget set that incorporates taxes in a static neo-classical structural labor supply 
model. The approach is inspired by Aaberge, Dagsvik and Strøm (1995) and van Soest 
(1995).  
 
The physical strain of shift work is well documented. An overview by Costa (1996) reports 
that shift work, particularly night work, can disturb cardiac rhythms, interfere with work 
performance and efficiency over 24 hrs, strain family and social relationships and impair 140 
sleeping and eating habits. Costa especially stresses that “Shift and night work may have 
specific adverse effects on women’s health in relation to family roles and hormonal and 
reproductive functions.” Ohida et.al (2001), in a study of young female nurses in Japan, 
observe a significant association between working night shifts and using alcohol to help 
induce sleep, and between shift work and daytime drowsiness. 
 
To compensate for the extra strain, shift workers often work shorter hours than those with a 
regular schedule. Partly because the agreed weekly hours are lower for shift workers, and 
partly because shift workers often prefer less than a full-time job to be able to look after their 
children and maintain their social life. This leads us to the positive aspects of shift work. 
Many workers prefer shift work in order to better cope with challenges outside the workplace, 
without leaving the work force. Many shift workers know that they will return to daytime 
hours later in life, but given their current situation shift work is preferred.  
 
In the literature review by Antonazzo et.al. (2003) of nurses’ labor supply, they emphasize the 
need to address the relative importance of pecuniary and non-pecuniary job characteristics. 
“E.g. compensation for shift work is crucial for the nurses’ income, but shift work is reported 
as demanding, especially if you are in a full-time job.” Shift work is, however, only one 
important factor when choosing a nursing job. In this paper the nurses first have to choose the 
preferred care level. As mentioned above there are many differences between a hospital and a 
primary care job, and international studies of the nursing labor market have noted large 
earnings differences between similar hospital and non-hospital RNs. Schumacher and Hirsch 
(1997) explain half of the hospital wage advantage in their study to be unmeasured worker 
ability. The remainder is likely to reflect compensating differentials for hospital disamenities. 
Due to the centralized wage bargaining for public employees, wage differences between care 
levels are more moderate in Norway.  
 
In their review of nursing labor supply, Antonazzo et.al. (2003), find a huge variation in 
results, particularly on the effect of wages, depending on the methodological framework 
applied. The impact of own wage on labor force participation is not significantly different 
from zero in most of the studies, whereas there are a few studies with elasticities greater than 
one. The impact on hours worked is estimated with elasticities from –0.94 to +2.8 depending 
on sample, time period and gender. The impact of an increase in household non-labor income 
is estimated with elasticities that are slightly negative in relation to the participation rate, and 141 
insignificant or negative for hours worked. An exception is Phillips (1995), which finds 
participation to be highly responsive to wage. The abovementioned study by Askildsen et al. 
(2003) estimates a wage elasticity from –0.05 to 0.46 depending on the econometric 
specification when regressing hours against the log wage. They argue that the alternative with 
an elasticity of 0.21 seems most reasonable due to their correction for sample selection and 
wage endogeneity. They find that individual and institutional features are statistically 
significant and important for working hours.  
 
Askildsen et al. is a natural reference point as their analysis uses some of the data registers 
used in my study. The approaches are, however, significantly different in some respects, 
making similar results less likely. Their sample includes both married and single females. 
They do not include non-work income, including spouse’s income. The taxes on labor income 
is also not included. In my study I focus on the single individuals who are expected to be 
more flexible in their response to wage changes. Taxes and non-work income like asset 
income and child allowance are included in this analysis. Askildsen et al. includes shift work 
in their analysis, but only as a measure to correct for the differences in wage rates for those 
working shifts. In my study, the alternatives of shift work or regular daytime work are 
presented as separate job packages with different hourly wages. The impact of other non-
pecuniary aspects of shift work, like night work, on individual welfare is captured by the error 
term. Thus while Askildsen et.al. only focus on how wages should be corrected for the fact 
that wages in shift work are higher than in non-shift work, I account explicitly for the same 
fact, but also for the fact that changes in wages may have an effect on job choices. Other 
variables than wages may also affect the choices of shift work versus non-shift work.  
 
Sæther (2004) focuses on the prospects of attracting nurses to the public health sector from 
non-health jobs. That paper also applies a discrete choice framework and identifies a wage 
elasticity for hospital jobs of 0.17, and of 0.39 in primary care. Here, in the present paper I 
attempt to explicitly include the shift dimension into the model. The cost of this approach is 
the need to focus only on the subsamples of nurses working in the public sector. On the other 
hand, when we no longer need to identify the wages in non-health jobs, we can utilize the 
richness of the high quality register data for health personnel containing wages and hours in 
addition to the shift information.  
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In this paper the nurses face three subsequent choices. First, the choice of care level, a 
hospital job or a primary care job like in a nursing home, home nursing or a health center. 
Secondly the choice of working shifts or regular daytime, and finally the choice of working 
hours. The motivation for this modeling is to better inform policymakers of the possible 
impact of wage as an instrument, focusing on making the predicted effect on all public health 
hours more accurate and on possible differences between personnel working shifts and regular 
hours.  
 
A comparison of the predictions of the model to the observed choices is encouraging. Both 
with regards to the choices between a hospital or a primary care job, and the choice between 
shift work and a regular daytime job. The predicted distribution of hours seems less accurate. 
The main difficulty is for the model to predict the high share working full-time without extra 
hours. 
 
The prediction of choices is repeated for policy simulations where the wages in some or all of 
the job alternatives are increased. Conditioning on participation in the public health care 
sector, I first present the effects of job type-specific wage increases. A 10% increase in 
hospital pre-tax wages increases the predicted share choosing a hospital job with 3.4%. The 
short-term labor supply, measured in hours, is estimated to have an elasticity of 0.20 in the 
hospital jobs, but the high level of uncertainty makes it not significant from zero at a 10% 
level. The wage elasticity for primary care hours is higher, and significant at a 10% level. A 
simulation of a 10% increase in wages in all shift jobs, both hospital and primary care jobs, 
predicts an increase in the share preferring shift work with 2.9%. The wage elasticity for shift 
hours is 0.153. The wage elasticity for daytime hours is higher, but with great uncertainty in 
the predictions. 
 
A simulation of a wage increase in all job types predicts a somewhat different response. A 
10% increase in the pre-tax hourly wages for those already employed in the public health 
sector is predicted to lead to a 1.43% decrease in hours worked. The predicted reduction is 
mainly an effect of more nurses preferring part-time and extended part-time work. There is 
little predicted change from daytime to shift work with shorter contracted hours, nor any 
systematic change between the care levels. When wages in all jobs are increased, the model 
predicts a slight reduction in hospital hours, and even more for primary care hours. The 
response in primary care hours is however not significantly different from zero. In response to 143 
a wage increase in all job types the shift hours are slightly reduced but the effect is not 
significantly different from zero. There is no significant difference in the response between 
shift and non-shift hours.  
 
The complicated structure of the choices and the many factors in addition to wage influencing 
the choice of job type and hours are among the factors causing a relatively high level of 
uncertainty in the predictions. Keeping in mind that the analysis is restricted to the short-term 
impact on working hours of those already participating in the public health care sector, the 
lesson is that changes in wage has a limited impact on the working hours. A job-specific wage 
increase attracts nurses from other jobs and thus increases the hours produced in that job. The 
costs seem to be a slight reduction in the average hours of work for those enrolled prior to the 
wage increase.  
 
An overall wage increase for all public employees seems to reduce the hours of work slightly 
for those already employed. On the other hand we know from other studies, like Sæther 
(2004), that such wage increases will attract nurses from other sectors in the economy leading 
to a modest increase in the hours worked.   
 
The next section introduces the data and context, before a formal model is presented in 
Section 3. After a description of findings in Section 4, Section 5 concludes.  
 
 
2. Data  
 
The public health care providers are the dominant employers for Norwegian registered nurses. 
In 2002, 91.4 percent of those working within health and social services were public 
employees. This paper is based on data from the Norwegian Association of Local and 
Regional Authorities (NALRA), organizing employers in municipalities and counties. The 
employers organized in NALRA employed almost all public staff, with the exception of some 
national hospitals. Being prior to the hospital ownership reform, the counties demanded RNs 
for their hospitals, and the municipalities needed personnel for their health centers, nursing 
homes and home nursing.  
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In 2002, there were 77,819 registered nurses, of which 90% participated in the labor market. 
Those not participating were undertaking further education or enrolled in one of the social 
security programs, such as disability pension, medical and vocational rehabilitation and early 
retirement. For a general overview of the Norwegian health care system, see van den Noord et 
al. (1998) and European Observatory on Health Care Systems (2000).  
 
The attractiveness of limiting the analysis to the NALRA employees is the superiority of the 
data quality. Each individual has a record of monthly working hours and pay in October. The 
income is separable into the basic salary and a fixed monthly benefit component including 
compensation for shift work. In addition, there is a separate component for overtime pay. 
Shift work is regulated by law and through agreements between NALRA and the nursing 
union. A registered nurse works 37.5 hours per week in a full-time position with daytime 
hours. Selecting a job that includes shift work will reduce this to 35.5 hours per week. Part-
time work is common and expressed as a percentage of full-time. The character of the shift 
work varies, from a combination of daytime and evenings, to a combination of days, evenings 
and nights. Weekend work every third or fourth week is also common. Due to aggregation of 
the different compensation payments, I am unable to separate between the different shift 
forms. Each shift type has characteristics, however, that may be difficult to rank. As 
summarized by ICN (2000), evening and night shifts are frequently less staffed, and nurses 
have difficult access to safe transport and basic comforts such as hot meals. Rotating shifts 
have been associated with more sleep disturbance, digestive problems, fatigue and alcohol 
intake, as well as impaired psychological health and work performance. Kostiuk (1990) and 
Lanfranchi et al. (2002) apply a similar shift measure.  
 
The sample is restricted to single females including cohabitants without joint children. Sæther 
(2004) showed that the singles are somewhat more responsive to wage changes than the 
married, and it is thus reasonable to analyze the wage responses of singles and married 
separately. Also to limit the effect of spouses’s income on the hours of work I have chosen to 
focus on the singles. An extension of the analysis to include married females and male RNs is 
left for future work.  
 
The number of observations is 4042 in 1995 and 8124 in 2000. The most preferred alternative 
by far is a hospital job with shift work, followed by a primary care job with shift work. The 145 
general tendency is that RNs prefer shift work earlier in life, switching to daytime work as 
they get older.  
 
The data set is based on the NALRA data matched with other administrative data registers 
delivered by Statistics Norway. The set includes information about demography, income and 
employment relations and the age of children. Appendix 1 provides details on the variable 
construction, trimming procedure and summary statistics for key individual level variables by 
job category. 
  
Hourly wage is the applied earnings measure, calculated by dividing monthly earnings by 
reported monthly hours. These observed hourly wages are used when assigning predicted 
hourly wages for all nurses in all possible job alternatives in the model, and not only the 
alternative actually chosen. The alternatives available for NALRA workers are hospital jobs 
with shift work, hospital jobs with daytime hours, primary care jobs with shift work and 
primary care jobs with daytime hours. I exploit the richness of the register data in this 
procedure, including residency and observed experience. When estimating the wage equation 
I control for the selection effect applying a Heckman two-step procedure, as there is reason to 
believe that there is a selection process driving the decision of where to work. See Appendix 2 
for the wages, and Appendix 3 for the taxes.  
 
 
3.  Model   
 
This paper presents a static neo-classical structural labor supply model with single decision-
makers. The individual’s utility depends on income, leisure and other characteristics of the 
jobs. The utility maximization problem is solved by discretizing the budget set and choosing 
the optimal care level, shift type, leisure and income combination from a finite set of 
alternatives. 
 
Conditioning on their participation in the public health care sector, nurses are facing a chain 
of choices in the composition of their “job package”. Firstly a choice between a hospital or 
primary care job (i =A, B), secondly whether to work shifts or regular daytime (j =1, 2), and 
finally the choice of category of hours  ijk h (k=1,…,4). Nurses working shifts face different 146 
contractual arrangements than those working daytime. Hours are shorter and the hourly wage 
is higher. The feasible working hours are grouped into the following categories: part-time, 
extended part-time, full-time, and extended full-time. Extended full-time is a nurse in full-
time position working overtime, but also includes nurses working at more than one hospital 
where the total workload totals more than 100%. The hours per week in the categories are hi1k 
={18.4, 27.5, 35.5, 38.8} if the nurse works shifts, and hi2k ={19.6, 29.6, 37.5, 40.8} if the 
nurse works non-shift. Each ‘job package’ has a pre-tax wage rate per hour  ( ) ij ijk wh defined by 
the level of care i and shift type j. The offered wage is a piecewise linear relation of hours 
capturing the agreed terms in overtime compensation. In addition there are other job 
characteristics (i, j) that may affect preferences and hence choices. As an example we may 
think of specific skills involved in the job, patient mix and responsibility.   
 
Let Cijk be disposable household income after tax per year when the nurse works hijk hours in 
the main job i with shift category j with a wage per hour of wij (hijk). Hourly wage being 
dependent on hours worked is relevant only for those working extended overtime when they 
are compensated for overtime work. 
 
The pre-tax labor income  ijk r with job specific hours  ijk h is given by 
 
() ijk ij ijk ijk rw h h =                       (1) 
 
Disposable income corresponding to the job package i,j,k is given by the budget constraint 
 
() ijk ijk ijk Cr T rI =− +                   (2) 
 
The net-of-tax income Cijk is the sum of the after tax earnings in the job,  ( ) ijk ijk rT r − , and 
other income, I, summarizing capital income after tax, transfers and savings. The tax, T(rijk), 
is progressive with the tax brackets in the Norwegian tax system.  
 
I assume that the nurses make their choices by maximizing utility, given the job-packages 
available in the market. Thus, 
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ijk (,, ) max , , ,
ijk




(, , , ) . ijk ijk hwi j D ∈                      (4) 
 
The first element in the utility function represents the net-of-tax income. The second element 
is the leisure time represented with the sum of hours worked. The last elements are 
representations of other characteristics of the job packages i,j.  
 
The set D is the opportunity set, i.e. it contains all the opportunities available to the 
individual. I do not include non-market opportunities in D, and I have also excluded jobs not 
covered by the NALRA register. Note that for the same nurse, wage rates may differ across 
jobs and whether they work regular hours or not. In traditional labor supply offered wages are 
determined by human capital characteristics, and offered hours are uniformly distributed. 
However, in real life wages may vary across sectors for observationally identically workers, 
and jobs with a specific number of hours may be more available in the market than other, say 
“full-time”, jobs. Thus, when the nurses make their choice with respect to labor supply, they 
choose between job-packages with different wage and hours profiles. See Aaberge, 
Colombino and Strøm (1999) for the modeling of labor supply along these lines. 
 
The preferences are unknown to the analyst, neither does he observe all details of the job-
packages available in the market. I will therefore assume a random utility model  
 
Uijk=uijk+εi j k ,                        (5) 
  
where Uijk is the utility when the nurse works hijk hours for employer i with shift j. uijk is the 
deterministic element in the utility function and εijk is a stochastic term with an iid extreme 
value distribution with an expected mean of 0 and a variance of 
22
2 /6 µπ . The random term 
εijk captures the unobserved attributes of the ‘job packages’. 
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Let ( ) ijk ijk Ph  be the unconditional probability that hijk  hours are worked in job i with shift type 
j. 
 
{} ,, ()P r ( m a x ) ijk ijk ijk qsr qsr D Ph U U
∈ ==                 (6) 
 
However, to explain the choice structure, I will start with the two last elements in the choice 
chain and work backwards. The choice of shifts or daytime and the choice of working hours, 
can be integrated into one expression. Let  Ajk h be the number of working hours k (k=1,2,3,4), 





























,  j=1,2, k=1,2,3,4        (7) 
 
where the η -function is an opportunity index as the employers have a higher supply of shift 





τ µ η =                                            (8) 
 
where 1 j s =  if the job is based on shift work and  0 j s =  if not.  τ  is a parameter.  
 
The expected consumer surplus is given by (Ben-Akviva and Lerman, 1985). For those 
preferring a hospital job we have  
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where A1 represents shift work at the hospital and A2 represents daytime work. The parallel 
expression for primary care as the first choice is 
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2 µ is not identified and is thus absorbed in the utility function. Following Ben-Akiva and 
Lerman (1985) it can be shown that in this case we get the following expression for the 
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where  21 / µ µµ =  is possible to identify.  1 µ takes care of the uncertainty in the choice 
between a hospital and a primary care job. µ is a measure of degree of dependence in 
unobserved utility among the alternatives in the upper nest. The statistic 1-
2 µ  is a measure 
used as an indication of correlation, in the sense that as µ  rises, indicating less correlation, 
this statistics drops. (McFadden, 1978). A value of µ =1 indicates complete independence 
within the nests, i.e. no correlation. When µ =1, representing independence among the 
alternatives, the GEV distribution becomes the product of independent extreme value terms. 
In this case the nested logit model reduces to the standard logit model. The value of µ  must 
be within a particular range for the model to be consistent with the utility-maximizing 
behavior. If µ  is between zero and one, the model is consistent with utility maximization for 
all possible values of the explanatory variables. (Train, 2003).    
 
I have also introduce an opportunity index related to location  ( ) d δ . While there are primary 
care jobs for nurses in all municipalities in the country, the availability of hospital jobs is 
scarce in less urban areas. To correct for these differences in the opportunity sets, an indicator 
of centrality is applied. d=1 if the nurse lives in an urban area, and zero otherwise. The 




θ δ =                                 (12) 
 
with θ  as an unknown parameter.  
 
The probability of choosing a primary care job is P(B)=1-P(A). The unconditioned 
probabilities are thus  150 
 
(, ) (| ) ( ) Ajk Ajk Ph A Ph APA = ;  j=1,2 , k=1,2,3,4                      (13) 
 
( ,) ( |)() Bjk Bjk Ph B Ph BPB = ;  j=1,2 , k=1,2,3,4                      (14) 
 
The likelihood function is then  
 
(, ) (, ) s ijk s ijk
sA sB
LP h A P h B
∈∈
=∏∏                            (15) 
 
Economic theory does not impose the functional form of the utility function. Van Soest 
(1995) prefers a polynominal representation of the utility function. Aaberge et.al. prefer the 
‘Box-Cox’ function. This structural form of the utility function gives an opportunity to 
interpret the parameters as opposed to a polynomial representation of the utility function. An 
implication of the MaCurdy et al. (1990) critique is that seemingly flexible functional forms 
may not be flexible anymore once quasi-concavity or monotonicity is imposed. Even though 
we do not impose these conditions explicitly, it might still be the case that the structure of the 
model implicitly will force the estimates to satisfy quasi-concavity. For example, a wrongly 
shaped utility function would lead to high probabilities of choosing the corners of the budget 
frontier. The focus on single females reduces the numbers of unobserved complicating factors 
in the behavioral responses, making facing such complications less likely. The alternative of 
applying a polynomial to estimate the utility function non-parametrically may give a better fit 
but is “less grounded” in economic theory.  
 
The deterministic part of the preferences in this paper is thus represented by a variation of a 
“Box-Cox” utility function. Quasi-concavity is not imposed, but checked ex post to confirm 
that the estimated preferences are quasi-concave. I let  2 / Ajk Ajk vu µ = , and  2 / Bjk Bjk vu µ = .  
 
 
6 (/ 3 1 0 ) 1









 =+ − ⋅ −               (16) 
where  
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8760 is the number of total annual hours, while α , λ , and the  s β′  are unknown parameters. 
For the utility function to be quasi-concave, we require λ <1. Note that if  0 λ →  the utility 
function converges to a log-linear function. The characteristics are: X1= age of the nurse, 
X2=1, if shift work, = 0 if daytime work. The parameters (α, λ, β0j, β1, β2j,τ ,µ ,θ ) are 
estimated using a maximum-likelihood procedure. Note that µ2  is not identified, and is 





Before focusing on the policy simulation making it possible to calculate wage elasticities, the 
parameters estimated are presented and a comparison is made of the choices predicted with 
those observed. 
 
From Table 1 we observe that all parameters are sharply determined and that the estimate of 
λ  yields a quasi-concave utility function. Parameters attached to the income term in the 
utility function (16) are estimated with a λ  of –1.68 and an α  - the constant in the 
consumption term - of 0.84, meaning that the nurses prefer the job that pays best if otherwise 
similar. In the leisure component, the constant  0 β in the leisure term is positive and 
significant, which means that more hours of leisure increases the utility. Somewhat 
surprisingly  1 β  is negative, as one might expect that the nurses would prefer jobs with less 
working hours when they get older. This may be caused by the fact that some of the young 
nurses have small children and therefore choose part-time jobs. As expected personnel 
working shifts prefers jobs with shorter working hours. Their additional hour of work is much 
more likely to be at nighttime, making it more demanding than extending the working hours 
during daytime. The effect seems to be slightly stronger for hospital personnel, with a  2A β of 
10.20 and a  2B β  of 7.93. µ , the degree of independence in unobserved utility among the 
upper nests, is estimated to 0.71, but it is not significantly different from 1, and the model is 
thus not necessarily better than the standard multinominal logit model. Remember however, 
that this parameter is weighted by the centrality of residency, τ . The parameter θ  in the 152 
opportunity index, taking into account the dominating offer of shift jobs, is also significant 
with a value of 1.27. McFadden’s Rho is reported to 0.175.  
 
Table 1 Estimation of parameters of the utility function and opportunity densities.  
    
   EstimateStd.errorP-value 
     
  Utility function   
0 β   Constant - ’leisure element’  
5.651 1.358[.000] 
1 β   Age 
-0.118 0.031[.000] 
2A β  Shift Work in hospitals 
10.200 0.890[.000] 
2B β  Shift Work in primary care 
7.926 0.941[.000] 
     
α   Constant - ‘consumption element’  0.836 0.212[.000] 
λ   Exponent - ‘consumption element’ 
-1.677 0.231[.000] 
     
µ   Degree of independence in unobserved utility among the alternatives 0.709 0.266[.008] 
     
  Opportunity density*   
τ   1 if living in a central area, 0 otherwise  1.150 0.067[.000] 
θ   1 if the job is shift work, 0 otherwise 
1.274 0.046[.000] 
       
Number of observations  4042  
Log likelihood  -9243.97  
McFadden's Rho  0.175  
For the wage equation see appendix 2. 
 
 
How well does the model predict? 
A comparison of the predictions of the model with the observed choices is encouraging, both 
with regard to the choice between a hospital and a primary care job and the choice of shift 
type. As reported in Table 2, 71.7% are predicted to choose a hospital job, while 73.1% are 
observed working at a hospital. 81.9% are predicted to work shifts, while 82.1% are observed 
with such arrangements. The predicted distribution of hours seems less accurate. The main 
difficulty is for the model to predict the high share working full-time without extra hours. 
Aggregating the probabilities for part-time and full-time jobs respectively gives a prediction 
of 45% (35% observed) working part-time and 65% (55% observed) working full-time. A 
common approach is to introduce an opportunity index to model the fact that the availability 153 
of jobs is peaked around certain categories of hours. This is not a feasible strategy here as the 
number of alternative hours is limited to four in this model due to the complicated nested 
structure leading to 16 possible alternatives of choice combinations.  
 
58.7% are predicted to work in a hospital job with shift work (61.3% observed), 13% in a 
hospital job without shift work (11.8% observed), 23.3% in a primary care job with shift work 
(20.8% observed) and 5.0% in primary care without shift work (6.1% observed). The 
predicted average of total weekly hours is 31.9 (32.1 hours per week observed). If we let the 
“average nurse” represent the distribution of total working hours, that is 31.9 hours per week, 
18.7 hours (19.9 hours observed) will be worked in a hospital job with shift work and 4.1 
hours (3.9 hours observed) with regular daytime. 7.5 hours (6.2 hours observed) will be 




From a policy perspective an important feature of structural modeling is the ability to present 
relevant out-of-sample predictions. To evaluate the model I use the parameters estimated from 
the 1995 data and predict the choices in 2000. The sample is now all the 8124 single females 
in 2000, still including cohabitants without joint children. The hourly wages are predicted 
from the observed data in 2000. There were changes in the average relative wages after 1995 
making shift work better compensated in 2000. In addition, the wage growth was higher in the 
hospital sector making the average hourly wage identical between the care levels in 2000. 
Daytime work wages were, however, 12% lower in the hospital sector and 18% lower in the 
primary care sector. In a situation with excess demand for nursing labor there is reason to 
expect that nurses respond to the relative wage changes with a higher share preferring jobs in 
the hospital sector, and jobs with shift work.  
 
There were, however, extensive changes during this 6-year period both in institutional 
features, like the introduction of a new financing system for hospitals, and a significant 
increase in the number of nurses employed in the public sector. This increase was matched by 
a rise in production levels, though not proportionally with the increase in personnel. In 
specialist health services, the psychiatric and somatic institutions increased the number of 
full-time nursing positions by 23% to 27,415 in 2000 (Statistics Norway, 2001). The number 
of full-time positions increased in primary care too; 30% for all professions. In the samples 154 
included here the share working in primary care was 27% in 1995 and 38% in 2000. These 
changes in sample shares can partly be due to an increase in the number of primary care 
institutions reporting to the NALRA register. With such extensive changes in the health 
sector, it is probably to push our luck to expect accurate predictions of a model based on cross 
section parameters in 1995.  
 
In the right column in Table 3, the observed and predicted choices are presented for the nurses 
observed in 2000. The average age is 34.5, the same as for the sample from 1995 presented in 
Table 2. We see that 73.3% are predicted to chose a hospital job (61.7% observed). The 
model is thus responding to the relative increase in the hospital wages since 1995 and predicts 
an increase in this share. 82.4% are predicted to work shifts, which also is an expected 
increase due to the relative increase in shift wages. The observed choices indicate, however, a 
slight reduction in the share to 80.7%.  
 
As above the model has difficulties in predicting the high share working full-time. The model 
predicts a reduction in the full-time hours from 55% to 50%. While the level is too low, the 
direction of change is correct with an observed share of 60% working full-time in 2000 
compared to 65% in 1995.  155 
 
Table 2. Observed and predicted choices in 1995. 
 Observed  Predicted 
 N=4042  Means  Std.dev.  Means Std.dev.







Hospital 0.731    0.717 0.116
Primary 0.269      0.283 0.116
 1.000     1.000 
         
Shift 0.821    0.819 0.034
Daytime 0.179      0.181 0.034
 1.000     1.000 
          





Part-time 0.157    0.169 0.124
Extended part-time  0.189    0.277 0.035
Full-time 0.508    0.295 0.056
Extended full-time  0.147     0.259 0.087
 1.000     1.000 







Shift – hospital  0.613    0.587 0.102
Daytime – hospital  0.118    0.130 0.032
Shift – primary  0.208    0.233 0.094
Daytime –primary  0.061     0.050 0.026
 1.000     1.000 







Hours – hospital shift  19.9  16.6 18.7 3.5
Hours – hospital daytime  3.9  11.1 4.1 1.3
Hours – primary shift  6.2  12.5 7.5 3.1
Hours - primary daytime  2.1  8.5   1.6 1.0
 32.1  6.9  31.9 2.6
    
Age 34.5  8.6 
 156 
Table 3. Out-of-sample predictions. Observed and predicted choices in 2000.  
   Observed in 1995 and 2000    Observed in 2000    
                                
   Observed    Predicted Observed Predicted 
      Means Std.dev.  MeansStd.dev.  MeansStd.dev. MeansStd.dev. 
          
  
Job-type 







Hospital   0.579    0.731 0.118 0.617 0.733 0.114 
Primary     0.421      0.269 0.118  0.383   0.267 0.114 
   1.000     1.000  1.000  1.000 
                   
Shift   0.752    0.820 0.030 0.807 0.824 0.026 
Daytime     0.248      0.180 0.030  0.193   0.176 0.026 
   1.000     1.000  1.000  1.000 
                 
Hours of work   
Category 







Part-time   0.178    0.213 0.110 0.175 0.193 0.100 
Extended part-time   0.261    0.277 0.033 0.228   0.285 0.031 
Full-time   0.458    0.271 0.047 0.503 0.281 0.044 
Extended full-time     0.102      0.239 0.084 0.093  0.241 0.072 
   1.000     1.000  1.000  1.000 
                
  
Job-type 







Shift – hospital    0.453    0.599 0.103 0.515 0.603 0.099 
Daytime – hospital   0.126    0.132 0.026 0.102 0.131 0.025 
Shift – primary    0.299    0.221 0.094 0.292 0.222 0.093 
Daytime –primary     0.122      0.048 0.026 0.091  0.045 0.023 
   1.000     1.000  1.000  1.000 












Shift – hospital    14.0  16.1  18.3 3.1 16.2 16.4 18.6 3.0 
Daytime – hospital   4.4  11.9  4.0 1.1 3.6 10.8 4.0 1.0 
Shift – primary    8.5  13.6  6.9 3.0 8.5 13.8 7.0 3.0 
Daytime -primary     4.2  11.5    1.5 0.9 3.1 10.0 1.4 0.8 
   31.2  7.1  30.8 2.3 31.4 7.0 31.0 2.0 
             
Age   39.1  7.1      34.5 7.8   
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A policy experiment 
In order to identify the wage elasticities, a policy experiment is introduced. We now look at 
desired hours only and not actual hours. The predictions presented above are repeated while 
increasing pre-tax wage rates and leaving the tax system unaffected. Table 4 presents the 
predicted choices before and after a job–specific wage increase or an increase in all wages 
simultaneously. The simulated wage changes is also illustrated by Figures 1-3. Table 5 
presents the matching elasticities, or sum of elasticities for wage increases in all job types. 
The elasticities are calculated by  100 ( )/ *(100/10) www hhh − , where  0 w h  is predicted average 
weekly hours prior to the policy reform and  1 w h is the same expression afterwards. The 
elasticity is divided by 10, as the policy simulation introduced a 10% wage increase. 
 
Job specific wage increases 
When targeting the simulated wage increases to the hospital jobs, the probability of selecting 
a hospital job is increased from 71.7% to 74.1%. The hospital hours are increased with an 
elasticity of 0.200, although not significantly at a 10% level. At the same time the sum of 
hours for both care levels is reduced. The predicted reduction in total hours is 1.1% for a 10% 
wage increase in the hospital jobs. An increase in primary care wages mirrors the changes 
predicted from an increase in hospital wages, but the magnitude is larger at 0.75. The next 
policy simulation is an increase in shift wages only. The wage elasticity for the shift hours is 
found to be 0.153. The elasticities were 0.158 for hospital shift hours and 0.130 for primary 
care shift jobs.  
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Hospital vs. primary 











Figure 1. Predicted shares for hospital and primary care jobs depending on simulated wage changes. 
 
Shift vs. daytime 

































Figure 3. Predicted shares for the four categories of hours depending on simulated wage changes. 
 
 
General wage increases 
The second column in Table 4 shows a 10% increase in all wages. In a policy perspective this 
may be more realistic in a scenario with centralized wage bargaining like in Norway. The 
predicted change is a reduction in average hours worked per week to 31.5, a reduction of 
1.5%. Annually this adds up to more than three working days lost per nurse due to the income 
effect of a wage increase. Of course the sensitivity of labor supply to the wage rate varies over 
the sample, but for the policy analysis we focus on the aggregated elasticities. As reported in 
Table 5 a 10% wage increase in all public sector jobs leads to a reduction of hours with 1.4%.  
The predicted reduction is mainly an effect of more nurses preferring part-time and extended 
part-time. There is little predicted change between the care levels nor any systematic change 
from daytime to shift work with shorter contracted hours. The job-specific changes due to a 
general pre-tax hourly wage increase is a reduction of 1.2% for hospital hours and a reduction 
of 2% for primary care hours. The corresponding reductions for shift hours are 1.3% and 
1.1% for the daytime hours. Most of these predicted changes are not significantly different 
from zero, with the exception of all hours and the hospital hours (at a 5% level). This result is 
somewhat surprising as the sample consists of single females who are traditionally more 




A discrete choice labor supply model incorporating self-selection and choice of shift work 
was developed and estimated on single female Norwegian registered nurses. Conditioning on 
their participation in the public health care sector, the nurses are facing a chain of choices in 
the composition of their “job package”. Firstly a choice between a hospital and a primary care 
job, secondly whether to work shifts or regular daytime and finally the choice of one of four 
categories of hours. A high share of the RNs work shifts, and thus face different contractual 
arrangements than those working daytime. The hours are shorter and the hourly wage is 
higher, but the health strain related to shift work is also well documented. The choices are 
predicted with the existing contractual arrangements and then repeated for policy simulations 
where the pre-tax wage rates in all or some of the job alternatives are altered.  
 
First, I increase wages for only one of the care levels or one of the shift types. A simulated 
increase in hospital wages predicts a wage elasticity of 0.20 for the hospital hours, however 
not significantly different from zero. This result is mirrored for a wage increase in the primary 
care sector, however with a larger and significant effect. A simulated wage increase for shift 
jobs predicts a wage elasticity of 0.15. This is mirrored by the daytime hours, but with a 
higher degree of uncertainty. One reason for the high level of uncertainty for the primary care 
and regular daytime hours is probably the fact that there are relatively few single nurses 
observed in these categories. The complicated structure of the choices and the large number of 
factors in addition to wage influencing the choice of job type and hours, are other reasons for 
the relatively high level of uncertainty in the predictions.  
 
The simulation of a 10% wage increase in all “job packages” predicts no or a slightly negative 
response in hours worked in the public health care sector. The predicted reduction is mainly 
an effect of more nurses preferring part-time and extended part–time work. There is little 
predicted change between care levels, nor any systematic change from daytime to shift work, 
with shorter contracted hours. The response is somewhat stronger for primary care hours than 
for hospital hours, but the primary care response is also predicted with higher uncertainty. The 
shift hours respond to a simulated increase in wages in all job types with a slight reduction in 
hours offered, while the response in regular hours is somewhat lower. Neither of these 
responses in hours are significantly different from zero.  
 163 
It seems reasonable to assume that the increase in wage rates for all nurses might lead some 
people to renounce the shift work compensation, as the daytime job pays ‘sufficiently’. The 
simulation of a wage increase in all jobs predicts no such reallocation. The reduction in hours 
is due to a change from full-time to part–time, but with a stable allocation of hours between 
care levels and shift types.   
 
Bearing in mind that the analysis is restricted to the short-term impact on working hours of 
those already participating in the public health care sector, the lesson is that changes in wage 
has a limited impact on working hours. To the extent that such changes are found, the effect 
seems to be slightly negative when measuring total hours offered. One way to interpret this 
result is that conditioned on the decision to participate in the work force there are other factors 
that are as least as important for the hours worked as wage. Intuitively there is reason to 
believe that shift workers respond differently to a wage increase than those working daytime 
hours. The predictions from the model presented in this paper weakly support such beliefs, 
but due to the high level of uncertainty in the model, the differences in wage elasticities are 
not significant.  
 
My conclusion is thus that as an instrument to reallocate hours between job packages, job-
specific wage increases are effective, but incur a loss as the total number of hours worked is 
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Appendix 1. Variable construction and trimming procedure. 
 
The data used is based on several of the administrative data registers delivered by Statistics 
Norway, with the register of authorized health personnel as an identifier. Our trimming 
procedure excludes personnel above 66 years of age, as many retire at 67. Some personnel 
categories have access to early retirement, but it was not common practice for registered 
nurses in 1995.  
 
Authorized foreign RNs are excluded when they do not have a permanent residency in 
Norway (only temporary residency code/social security number, F-number), or if they have a 
permanent residency code, but no income or address in Norway. The data includes 
information about annual earnings prior to and after taxation, employment status, and 
demographic variables. All employers are coded by the NACE Standard Industrial 
Classification, which gives us detailed information about their sector and type of activity.  
 
Table A1 Sample trimming 
  N 
  
RNs registered in 1995 (permanent residence code only)  63 527
   
Subtracting   
Foreigners with no income in Norway  3 934
RNs with higher education (Not nursing related)  658
67 years or older  2 387
Registered during 1995  2 722
Temporary licenses  40
Missing in some variables  2 335
Not employed by NALRA (Or working in a NALRA institution not reporting)  27 280
NALRA employees  24 171




Table A2 Key variables by sector 
1995     All    Hospital        
Primary 
care        
     Shift     Daytime    Shift     Daytime
      
 Variable     Mean  St.dev. Mean St.dev. MeanSt.dev. Mean St.dev. MeanSt.dev. 
                     
Sector share    100%   0.613 0.487 0.118 0.323 0.208  0.406 0.061 0.239
N   4042    2477  477  842    246 
                       
Age   34.5  8.6 33.4 7.6 40.7 10.7 33.5  8.3 37.3 8.9
Born in Norway=1    0.93  0.25 0.93 0.25     0.94  0.24 0.94 0.23
Gave birth in 1994 or 1995    0.15  0.36 0.14 0.35 0.09 0.28 0.25  0.43 0.09 0.29
Live in a central area     0.66  0.71 0.74 0.48  0.56
(Cat. 6&7 out of 7)         
        
Income from work, NOK    205660  39756 207113 38088 210962 42531 195368  40218 215981 42358
Social security benefits, NOK    12 756  21181 10303 19109 15011 25677 18039  22470 15001 22880
Total income, NOK     221050  41868 219789 38433 229691 48778 215466  40048 236102 57974
                       
Hours per year                        
Part-time   0.16  0.36 0.12 0.33 0.22 0.41 0.24  0.43 0.08 0.27
Extended part-time    0.19  0.39 0.19 0.40 0.09 0.29 0.24  0.43 0.12 0.33
Full-time   0.51  0.50 0.49 0.50 0.55 0.50 0.46  0.50  0.74 0.44
Extended full-time    0.15  0.35 0.19 0.39 0.14 0.35 0.05  0.22  0.06 0.23
                    
Predicted mean wage per hour, 
NOK 
Prior to shifts and other 
compensation payments*                    
Hospital – daytime     104.1  5.90 103.7 6.0 106.5 5.0 103.4  5.8  105.5 5.1
Hospital – shift work     96.1  5.52 95.6 5.6 98.9 4.7 95.6  5.2  98.2 4.7
Primary care – daytime    105.5  3.31 105.3 3.3 107.4 2.8 105.0  3.1  106.7 2.9
Primary care – shift work     103.7  3.58 103.4 3.6 105.5 3.1 103.2  3.4  105.1 3.1
                    
* The average hourly compensation is NOK 11.7 for hospital nurses working shifts and NOK 3.73 for daytime workers. For primary care 
nurses the compensation pay is NOK 16.4 per hour for those working shifts and NOK 5.9 for daytime workers.  
 
 
Appendix 2. Hourly wages by care level and shift type 
 
Job specific hourly wages are constructed for all the alternatives, including ‘job packages’ 
with a different care level and shift type than for their actual job. The first step is to sort the 
jobs by the NACE standard industrial classification and aggregate into two care levels. The 
job types are then categorized by shift type into two alternatives: Regular daytime or shift 
work compounding all other shift combinations. Only public positions within institutions 
organized by NALRA are included: A) Hospitals with and without shift work and B) primary 
care jobs with and without shift work.  
The earnings measure used is hourly wage. I have calculated hourly wages for the job in 
which they were  observed. This is possible due to detailed data of monthly income and 
working hours for the NALRA employees. Intuitively there is reason to believe that there is a 169 
selection into the different job types driven by unobserved factors such as preferences and 
productivity. I take this selection into consideration when predicting hourly wages for each 
individual, also in the job categories where they do not work. A Heckman two-step procedure 
is applied when estimating the wage equations as presented in Table A3, with a significant 
selection effect. I repeat this procedure for each job category. Table A3 only reports the wage 
equation for hospital jobs with regular daytime work. Only the basic salary is included in this 
regression. Compensation for management tasks and strenuous work is not included. I 
exclude the equations for the other job alternatives, as they are parallel. The wage prediction 
is undertaken for all NALRA employees, not only single ones. The wage rates are quite 
homogenous due to the centralized wage bargaining. The wage rate is mostly driven by work 
experience. I have used number of years with an income qualifying for pension entitlement 
during the last 20 years as a measure of experience. The measure is constructed on earnings 
histories available from the Norwegian National Insurance Scheme. A management position 
or additional specialization in a subdiscipline of nursing are possible ways to increase 
earnings. Some institutions in severe need of personnel offer a higher additional compensation 
and wage rates beyond the level agreed upon in the central bargaining for their number of 
years of work experience. The nurses’ age is important with regard to their choice of job type. 
A representative “work life cycle” is to start of with a full-time job with shift work. After the 
first maternity leave a part-time job is preferred. As the children grow older the hours of work 
are increased again. As the nurses grow older, there will gradually be a higher share that 
prefers daytime work only. The first job is normally in a central area where the colleges and 
hospitals are located, but with age many relocate to less central areas. Due to our subsample 
of single nurses the average age is only 34.5 years, and on average it is 9 years since they 
were licensed.    170 
Table A3. Wage equation  
   Heckman selection model  Coef. Std. Err z
   Dependent variable: Wage per hour in the hospital sector       
Female Female=1  -0.0430 0.0058 -7.35
Regiona Oslo/Akershus  0.0053 0.0112 0.47
Regionc West  -0.0019 0.0050 -0.38
Regiond Middle  0.0038 0.0057 0.67
Regione North  0.0929 0.0056 16.49
Age Age  0.0691 0.0555 1.25
age2 Age^2/10  -0.1711 0.1899 -0.90
age3 Age^3/1000  0.1686 0.2834 0.60
age4 Age^4/100000  -0.0529 0.1557 -0.34
erf95  Years of work experience  last 20 years  -0.0067 0.0144 -0.46
erf952 Experience^2/10  0.2275 0.2237 1.02
erf953 Experience^3/1000  -1.7856 1.3783 -1.30
erf954 Experience^4/100000  4.4604 2.9214 1.53
Cnordic  From Nordic country except Norway=1  -0.0026 0.0084 -0.31
coecd_no  From OECD area except the Nordic countries=1  0.0105 0.0109 0.96
Cglobal Non-OECD  background=1  -0.0303 0.0162 -1.87
kommsen1 Municipal  centrality  index 1 =1 – Least central  -0.0172 0.0077 -2.23
kommsen2  Municipal centrality index 2 =1   -0.0172 0.0070 -2.47
kommsen3  Municipal centrality index 3 =1   -0.0552 0.0052 -10.71
kommsen4  Municipal centrality index 4 =1   -0.0195 0.0150 -1.30
kommsen5  Municipal centrality index 5 =1   0.0085 0.0090 0.94
kommsen6  Municipal centrality index 6 =1  (7= Most central)  -0.0075 0.0049 -1.52








































   Coef. Std. Err z 
       
/athrho   0.085 0.202 0.42 
/lnsigma   -2.440 .0177335 -137.60 
      
rho   0.085 0.200 
sigma   0.087 0.002 
lambda   0.007 0.018  
 
Log likelihood  -5471.45
Number of obs   24171
Censored obs    20553
Uncensored obs  3618
Wald chi2(22)       865.6
Prob >chi2       0
 
 




Table A4 Tax rules applied  
Income = Y  Tax 
0 – 20 954  0 
20 954 – 143 500  0.302Y – 6 328 
143 500 – 212 000  0.358Y – 14 364 
212 000 – 239 000  0.453Y – 34 504 
239 000 -  0.495Y – 44 542 
 
Capital tax 
Capital income is taxed at a rate of 28 percent. 
   select          
Female Female=1  -0.2191 0.0380 -5.77 
Regiona Oslo/Akershus  -0.6368 0.0422 -15.09 
Regionc West  0.0867 0.0359 2.42 
Regiond Middle  0.0577 0.0405 1.43 
Regione North  0.1038 0.0386 2.69 
Cnordic  From Nordic country except Norway=1  -0.0218 0.0565 -0.39 
coecd_no  From OECD area except the Nordic countries=1  -0.0932 0.0752 -1.24 
Cglobal Non-OECD  background=1  -0.2286 0.0995 -2.30 
Age Age  0.7607 0.3577 2.13 
age2 Age^2/10  -2.5423 1.2481 -2.04 
age3 Age^3/1000  3.9098 1.8884 2.07 
age4 Age^4/100000  -2.2747 1.0473 -2.17 
erf95  Years of work experience  last 20 years  -0.1937 0.0823 -2.35 
erf952 Experience^2/10  3.3933 1.3208 2.57 
erf953 Experience^3/1000  -21.3902 8.3671 -2.56 
erf954 Experience^4/100000  47.4317 18.1047 2.62 
married Married=1  0.0392 0.0233 1.68 
b950_5  No. of children aged 0-5  -0.0596 0.0188 -3.17 
kommsen1 Municipal  centrality  index 1 =1 – Least central  0.1356 0.0566 2.40 
kommsen2  Municipal centrality index 2 =1   -0.0244 0.0507 -0.48 
kommsen3  Municipal centrality index 3 =1   -0.0127 0.0377 -0.34 
kommsen4  Municipal centrality index 4 =1   0.3051 0.1147 2.66 
kommsen5  Municipal centrality index 5 =1   -0.0849 0.0639 -1.33 
kommsen6  Municipal centrality index 6 =1  (7= Most central)  0.0802 0.0348 2.31 
Constant     -9.6467 3.7106 -2.60 












When entering the job market registered nurses (RNs) face job alternatives with differences in 
wages and other job attributes. Previous studies of the nursing labor market have shown large 
earnings differences between similar hospital and non-hospital RNs. Corresponding 
differences are found in some of the analyses of shift and regular daytime workers.  
 
In the first part of this paper I analyze the wage differentials in the Norwegian public health 
sector, applying a switching regression model. I find no hospital premium for the shift RNs 
and a slightly negative hospital premium for the daytime RNs, but it is not significant for the 
hospital job choice. I find a positive shift premium. The wage rate is 19% higher for the shift 
working hospital RNs and 18% for the sample of primary care workers. The shift premium is 
only weakly significant for the shift work choice for the sample of hospital RNs, and not for 
the primary care RNs. I identify some selection effects.  
 
In the second part of the paper I focus on the shift compensation only, and present a structural 
labor supply model with a random utility function. This is done to identify the expected 
compensating variation necessary for the nurses to remain on the same utility level when they 
are “forced” from a day job to a shift job. The expected compensating variations are derived 
by Monte Carlo simulations and presented for different categories of hours. I find that on 
average the offered combination of higher wages, shorter working hours and increased 
flexibility overcompensates for the health and social strains related to shift work.  
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1. Introduction 
 
When entering the job market registered nurses (RNs) face job alternatives with differences in 
wages and other job attributes. Previous studies of the nursing labor market have shown large 
earnings differences between similar hospital and non-hospital RNs, and corresponding 
differences are found in some of the analyses of shift and regular daytime work.  
 
I will analyze the wage differentials in the public health sector using two different 
methodological approaches. In the first part of this paper I analyze the wage differentials with 
a switching regression model similar to the set-up presented in Lanfranchi et al. (2002). I 
examine the existence of wage differentials between RNs working in hospitals and primary 
care institutions, and between shift and daytime workers. I control for the shift dimension 
when I focus on the hospital premium, and for the care level when I analyze the shift 
premium.  
 
In an attempt to better capture the impact of preferences and choice I introduce a structural 
labor supply model with a random utility function in the second part of this paper. I limit the 
analysis to the shift compensation and shift choice, as the hospital premium is found to be 
insignificant. The RNs maximize utility, given a nonlinear budget set that incorporates taxes. 
The individual’s labor supply decision can be considered as a choice from a set of discrete 
alternatives (job packages). These job packages are characterized by attributes such as hours 
of work, sector specific wages, shift type, and other job-type specific aspects. The approach is 
inspired by i.a. Aaberge, Dagsvik and Strøm (1995) and van Soest (1995). I use the structural 
framework to identify the expected compensation necessary for the nurses to remain on the 
same utility level when they are “forced” from a daytime job to a shift job. Using Monte 
Carlo simulations I present the distributions of the expected compensating variations for 
different categories of hours. The model may also be looked upon as a framework to inform 
public employers when deciding what size of wage compensation to offer.  
 
Rosen (1986) gives an introduction to the literature on compensating variations. 
“The theory of equalizing differences refers to observed wage differentials required to 
equalize the total monetary and non-monetary advantages or disadvantages among work 
activities and among workers themselves.” These ideas go back to the writings of Adam 176 
Smith. As presented by Rosen, the evidence of compensating variations related to a broad 
scope of working conditions, is mixed.  
 
It is a well–known fact that the inability to observe workers’ full labor market productivity 
can bias estimates of compensating wage differentials derived from cross-sectional labor 
market data. Hwang et al. (1992) demonstrate that the bias is a function of three factors: (i) 
the average share of total hourly remuneration taken in the form of wages, (ii) the proportion 
of wage dispersion due to the differing tastes of workers, and (iii) the degree of unobserved 
productivity heterogeneity. Their results provide the key for determining the likely size of the 
bias when estimating compensating wage differentials with real data.  
 
Many nursing services must be accessible on a twenty-four hour basis, making shift work a 
necessity. This opens up an opportunity to combine work and family life, which is often 
especially appreciated during the years with small children. However, while shift work may 
bring some wanted flexibility to nurses’ work schedule and additional income, it often 
introduces additional hardship on nurses providing services in complex environments and 
demanding interpersonal situations.  
 
The health strain of shift work is well documented. As far back as in 1713, Bernardino 
Ramazzini (Costa, 1996) pointed out the harmfulness of shift work, in particular night work. 
He wrote of the bakers, who ‘work at night, so when the others sleep they stay awake, while 
trying to sleep during the day like animals who escape the light: hence, in the same town there 
are men living in antithetic life in comparison with the others’. The medical interest for such a 
problem started between the two world wars and has increased over the past decades.  
 
A broad overview of concerns related to shift work is presented by Costa (1996). Shift work, 
particularly night work, can have a negative impact on the health and well-being of workers, 
particularly in four spheres: a) biological: due to the disturbance of normal circadian rhythms 
of psychophysiological functions, beginning with the sleep/wake cycle; b) working: coming 
from fluctuations in work performance and efficiency over the 24 hour span, with consequent 
errors and accidents; c) social: dealing with difficulties in maintaining the usual relationships 
both at family and social level, with consequent negative influences on marital relations, care 
of children and social contacts; d) medical: deterioration of health, which can manifest itself 
in disturbances of sleeping and eating habits and, in the long run, in more severe disorders 177 
that deal prevalently with the gastrointestinal, neuropsychical and, probably, cardiovascular 
functions. Costa especially stresses that shift and night work may have specific adverse 
effects on women’s health in relation to the hormonal and reproductive function.” In a study 
on young female nurses, Ohida et al. (2001) find a significant association between working 
night shifts and the use of alcoholic beverages to help induce sleep, as well as daytime 
drowsiness. 
 
Lanfranchi et al. (2002) report a significant shift premium. The wage rate for shift workers is 
16% higher than for daytime workers. This premium compensates workers who do not self-
select into shift work. They find that the shift premium is significant for shift work choice, 
and conclude that for their sample the shift choice is a result of wage differentials rather than 
shift preferences.  
 
One study focusing on RNs is Schumacher and Hirsch (1997). They find that on US data the 
shift premium to evening shift RNs is close to 4 percent, while for night shift RNs it is almost 
12 percent. They find a small insignificant premium for working rotating or split shifts over 
day shifts. Even though shift premiums are significant wage determinants, they account for 
just under 10 percent of the cross-sectional wage differential between hospitals and health 
practitioners’ offices, and little of the differential between hospitals and nursing homes. 
 
Lehrer et al. (1991) refer to the differences in job attributes between hospital and non-hospital 
settings. If hospital jobs involve relatively unpleasant characteristics such as a high degree of 
stress and job hazards, then in order to attract nurses of a given quality, hospitals must pay a 
compensating differential. In this paper I do not, however, compare hospital RNs with 
colleagues working in a practitioner's office, but with nurses working shifts at nursing homes 
and in home nursing. They may have an equal need for compensation to care for a less 
prestigious patient group often with less qualified colleagues and poorer staffing than is the 
case at the hospitals.     
 
An understanding of the hospital premium is important, especially given what is expected to 
be a large shift of medical care delivery away from hospitals towards outpatient settings. 
Schumacher and Hirsch (1997) argue that a plausible explanation for the hospital premium is 
that “hospitals demand, attract, and retain higher quality nurses than do employers in the non-
hospital sector, and these skills are not reflected fully in measured variables”. They report a 178 
hospital RN advantage of roughly 20 percent based on a cross-sectional analysis. When they 
extend their analysis to a longitudinal analysis they find that one third to half of the advantage 
is due to unmeasured worker ability. The remainder is likely to reflect compensating 
differentials for hospital disamenities. Older studies include Link (1988) who finds that there 
was a hospital premium of around 13 percent in 1984 (but does not find a premium with 1977 
data). Booton and Lane (1985) use data from a 1981 survey of Utah RNs and find that the 
hospital premium is largest for associate degree RNs (21 percent) and smallest for diploma 
RNs (15 percent). Lehrer et al. (1991), using a sample of Illinois RNs, note the large 
difference in earnings between hospital and non-hospital RNs. Although it is not the focus of 
their paper, they suggest that the premium may reflect a compensating differential.  
 
While there seems to be a hospital premium in the US health care sector, the setting is quite 
different in a National health sector in a Scandinavian country with a tradition for centralized 
wage bargaining and a monopsonistic buyer. The nurses union and NALRA bargain the wage 
nationally
5. However, there is some room for local adaptations of the wage policy. Hospitals 
and municipalities that have severe staff shortages or a high rate of turnover, offer higher 
wages than nationally agreed upon as well as other benefits in order to become a more 
attractive workplace.   
 
Shift hours in Norway are compensated with both an hourly wage premium and shorter 
mandated working hours for a full-time position. Health workers may choose shift work 
because of compensating wage differentials, but it is also possible that they have preferences 
for shift work. Compared to other studies of compensating variation, my study has the 
advantage of focusing on differentials within a single occupation, so that preferences and 
abilities are more homogeneous than for broader groups of workers. I find a positive shift 
premium, but no positive hospital premium. Actually, the hospital premium for the sample of 
daytime working RNs is slightly negative. The shift premium influences the shift choice for 
the hospital RNs. I also identify some selection effects.   
 
                                                 
5 In many European countries, compensating wage differentials are set by industry-wide collective bargaining 
and are adopted by non-unionized firms in the same industry. Hamermesh (1999) points to the fact that these 
bargained differentials are wider than the mostly market-generated premia that exist in the United States. 179 
As there is no hospital premium, I focus on the shift dimension in the application of the 
random utility model. I find that for most RNs the offered combination of a shift wage 
premium, shorter working hours and the flexibility of hours, overcompensates the negative 
effects of shift work.  
 
This paper is organized as follows: In section 2 the data and setting is presented. In section 3 a 
switching regression model with endogenous switching is established and the results 
presented. In section 4 a strategy for estimating compensated variation in a random utility 
model is presented. Section 5 discusses the results from the two approaches and concludes. 
 
 
2. Data  
 
The public health care providers are the dominant employers of Norwegian registered nurses. 
In 2002, 91.4 percent of those working within health and social services were public 
employees. The Norwegian Association of Local and Regional Authorities (NALRA), 
organize employers in municipalities and counties who own the public institutions, with the 
exception of some national hospitals. There were 77,819 registered nurses in 2002, of whom 
90% participated in the labor market. Those not participating were undertaking further 
education or enrolled in one of the social security programs, such as disability pension, 
medical or vocational rehabilitation or early retirement. For a general overview of the 
Norwegian health care system, see van den Noord et al. (1998) and European Observatory on 
Health Care Systems (2000).  
 
This study uses a sample of 11,542 female registered nurses employed by NALRA 
institutions in 2000. Being prior to the national hospital ownership reform, the counties 
demanded RNs for their hospitals, and the municipalities needed personnel for their health 
centers, nursing homes and home nursing. The attraction of limiting the analysis to NALRA 
employees is the information on hours of work and shift type. The data is only reported for 
one month by October 1
st. The NALRA register data is matched with annual labor income and 
other administrative data registers delivered by Statistics Norway. The set includes 
information about work experience and various sociodemographic variables, like the age of 
children and spouse’s income. I exclude nurses with other jobs than the NALRA job, and 
those not employed during the whole year.  180 
 
I focus on the occupational sub-category specified as “Registered Nurses” in the NALRA 
register, which is a group that normally has not undertaken any postgraduate training. I thus 
exclude midwifes and registered nurses working as nursing specialists or ward administrators. 
By restricting the analysis to the “ordinary” RNs I avoid the comparisons of groups with 
different formal qualifications and different management tasks. Daytime work, however, is 
strongly related to management tasks, and by omitting this personnel category from the 
analysis the sample of daytime RNs becomes relatively small compared to the shift worker 
sample. This may bias the results in that RNs incorporate a specialization and/or a 
management premium when choosing daytime work. The decision to exclude specialized 
nurses and health administrators allows me to focus on the hospital premium and the shift 
premium, but the alternative of including the other personnel categories is highly relevant in 
further research.     
 
Registered nurses dominate the hospital nursing services whereas auxiliary nurses play a more 
important role in nursing homes and in home nursing. At the local health centers and 
municipal casualty clinics the nursing staff consists mostly of RNs. Hospital nurses are 
generally confronted with more complicated and acute cases than nurses at the primary care 
level. However they normally work in teams with other RNs, and the patients are younger and 
with better prospects than those in nursing homes. In the nursing homes the RNs lead teams of 
auxiliary nurses and nurse assistants. Nurse assistants are personnel without any health 
qualification. In home nursing you work more independently but deal with more trivial health 
problems related to aging. 
 
Shift work is regulated by law and through agreements between NALRA and the nursing 
union. A registered nurse works 37.5 hours per week in a full-time position with daytime 
hours. Selecting a job that includes shift work will reduce this to 35.5 hours per week. Part-
time work is common and expressed as a percentage of full-time. The character of the shift 
work varies, from a combination of daytime and evenings to a combination of days, evenings 
and nights. Weekend work every third or fourth week is also common. Due to aggregation of 
the different compensation payments, I am unable to separate between the different shift 
forms. Kostiuk (1990) and Lanfranchi et al. (2002) apply a similar shift measure.  
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The alternatives available for NALRA nurses are hospital jobs with shift work, hospital jobs 
with daytime hours, primary care jobs with shift work and primary care jobs with daytime 
hours. The sample is almost equally divided between hospital and primary care jobs. Shift 
work is far more common than daytime work. See Table 1 for an overview of observed 
choices and hourly wages. Appendix 1 provides summary statistics for key individual level 
variables. 
 
Table 1 Observed job alternative and hourly wage.  
 Number  of  Hourly  wages     
   workers Mean St.dev. Min. Max.
Hospital daytime  803 146.5 12.9 121.2 184.3
Hospital shift work  5,154 172.2 20.1 126.3 225.2
Primary care daytime  589 146.8 13.5 120.2 188.8
Primary care shift work  4,996 172.7 19.4 128.7 225.5
Total sample  11,542       
 
Hourly wage is the applied earnings measure, calculated by dividing annual earnings reported 
to the tax authorities by the reported hours from the NALRA register. The reason why I do 
not apply the reported NALRA hourly wage, but instead construct the wages from annual 
income reports, is that only a small share of the NALRA institutions reports the wage 
completely. Shift compensation and other benefits are often unreported. From the RNs with 
complete data I can, however, observe that none of the RNs has a wage outside the wage 
interval NOK 120 – NOK 230. I thus omit the constructed wages outside this interval, a total 
of 1,404. These observations probably represent wrongly reported full-year participation or 
RNs who have changed their workload during the year, making the hours reported by October 
1 misleading.  
 
The observed mean wage is higher in shift work (NOK 172) than daytime work (NOK 147), 
but there seems to be almost no difference between the mean in hospital and primary care 
jobs. Remember that these wages are not yet corrected for individual characteristics. Hospital 
nurses are generally younger than primary care nurses, they work in more urban areas and 
have fewer children. Similarly, shift workers are younger than daytime workers. Corrections 
for these observed variables will be addressed below.   
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3. A switching regression model  
 
3.1 The model 
 
Lanfranchi et al. (2002) demonstrate how the estimation of a shift premium and shift choice 
fits well into the framework of switching regression models with endogenous switching. I 
follow their strategy but extend the focus to four types of job premiums for registered nurses 
in the public sector:  
 
a)  the shift premium for hospital nurses,  
b)  the shift premium for primary care nurses,  
c)  the hospital premium for shift working nurses, and  
d)  the hospital premium for nurses working regular daytime.  
 
I undertake four separate rounds of analysis, but I introduce the model with a notation suitable 
for the estimation of a shift premium. The estimation of a hospital premium is parallel. By 
categorizing the sample into different sub-categories I am able to apply the relatively simple 
set-up from Lanfranchi et al. but still use the richness of the data. I also avoid the pooling of 
samples as it seems reasonable to expect that the shift premium is different from hospital to 
primary care nurses, and similarly that the hospital premium is different for nurses working 
shifts and those working regular daytime. See i.a. Lanfranchi et al. (2002) for a discussion of 
the problems that arise with pooling of the data.  
 
The starting point is:  
 
shift wages:   s ss wX u β =+                            (1a) 
 
day wages:   dd d wX u β =+                            (1b) 
 
shift choice:   ()
*
sd SZw w v ηδ =+ − +                          (1c) 
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where  s w and  d w  are log hourly wages, the vector X includes standard wage equation 
variables, while  s u and  d u  are error terms in the wage equations. The subscript s and d refer to 
shift work and regular daytime work.  
 
There may be selectivity into shift work. Let 
* S  be a latent variable for shift work with the 
corresponding binary variable S. S = 1 if 
* 0 S ≥  and S = 0 if 
* 0 S < . Z is a vector of variables 
influencing shift choice (including potential instruments), and v an error term. The term 
s d ww −  captures the shift premium.  
 
The error terms may be correlated giving rise to selectivity bias. Following Lanfranchi et al. 
(2001), let 
s uv σ  and 
d uv σ  represent the covariances between the error term in the choice 
equation, v, and the error terms in the wage equations,  s u and  d u  The covariance 
s uv σ  can be 
expected to be positive while 
d uv σ  can be expected to be negative. Suppose that we study a 
worker with abilities not captured by the exogenous variables in the shift work wage equation. 
These abilities are reflected in a higher wage. This in turn will give rise to a positive error 
term  s u . In addition, suppose that because of this higher wage the person becomes more 
likely to choose shift work than what is captured by the explanatory variables in the shift 
choice equation. We will then have a positive error term v. Moreover, the covariance 
s uv σ  will 
be positive. There will, in other words, be a positive selection into shift work. On the other 
hand, a positive selection into daytime work would imply that 
d uv σ  is negative.  
 
The reduced form of the choice equation is: 
 
()
* () sd s d SZ Xu u v ηδ β β δ =+ − + −+                            (2) 
 
which can be reparametrized to 
* SZ v η =+    . Following Maddala (1983), we can compute the 
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where including  ( ) /
s uv σφ +Φ  and  ( ) /
d uv σφ −Φ  in the respective wage equation will control 
for selectivity. φ  and Φ are the density and distribution functions of the standard normal 
evaluated at  Z η   . If we estimate the wage equation (1a) and (1b) without controlling for 
selectivity we will get biased estimates if the covariances are nonzero. Most likely, we will 
tend to underestimate the shift premium.  
 
The wage equations (1a) and (1b) and the choice equation (1c) is a switching regression 
model with endogenous switching. We can use it to estimate whether there are shift premiums 
and whether the shift premiums affect shift choice.  
 
The next steps are firstly, to estimate the reduced form (2) using a probit to get  ˆ η . I then 
compute  ()
ˆ ˆZ φ η    and  ()
ˆ ˆZ η Φ   . Secondly, I estimate the wage (3a) and (3b), including selection 
terms, to get  ˆ
s β  and  ˆ
d β ,  ˆ
s uv σ ,  ˆ
d uv σ , and compute the estimated expected wage premium 
() () ˆˆ ˆˆ sd sd ww X ββ −=− . I then estimate the structural form (1c) using probit to get  ˆ δ . If  ˆ
s uv σ  
and  ˆ
d uv σ  are significant in the wage equations, the correction for sample selection is needed. 
The above procedure is then repeated for case b) – d). The results are presented in Tables 2 
and 3 in Appendix 2 where they are presented in pairs by shift choice (a and b) and hospital 
choice (c and d).   
 
 
3.2 Wages, shift premiums, and shift choice. 
 
I will first present the results for the model of shift choice and the shift premium. The results 
are reported separately for the two samples; the hospital RNs (a) and the primary care RNs 
(b).  
 
Reduced form choice. I start by estimating the reduced form probit for shift choice (2) for the 
subset of hospital workers. Table A2.i column 1 in Appendix 2.1 reports marginal effects of 185 
the reduced form, whereas the next columns report standard errors and t-values. I will later 
discuss the parameters in the shift choice function to the structural form choice equation.  
 
While Kostiuk (1990) and Lanfranchi et al. (2002) had access to data from different sectors 
with variations in contract terms, shift bonuses and shift rates for the different industries, I do 
not have any similar variation in data as all RNs get the same public sector contract. I must 
relate the shift choice to family life like marital status and children. Shift work gives less 
leisure time with your spouse and we should therefore expect that married nurses are less 
likely to choose shift work. On the other hand, shift work means increased flexibility to be 
there for your children and their activities in daytime. It is thus likely that parents of small 
children are more likely to choose shift work.  
 
None of the family characteristics are likely to have any direct influence on the wage. There is 
a possible indirect effect as having smaller children leads many nurses to reduce their 
workload or withdraw from the labor market temporarily thereby getting lower job tenure, 
which influences their salary. In many empirical studies the labor market experience is 
proxied by potential experience, i.e. age-education-7
6. This is a problematic upper bound for 
experience that is more upwardly biased for women, who tend to be more loosely connected 
to the labor market, at least in connection with maternity leave. In this study I have, however, 
controlled for the number of years with an income qualifying for pension entitlement during 
the last 23 years as a measure of experience. The measure is constructed on earnings histories 
available from the Norwegian National Insurance Scheme, which was established in 1967. 
Individual ‘pension entitlements’ in this scheme are linked to their income histories.  
 
Wage equations. The results from the reduced form probit can be used to control for sample 
selection when estimating wage equations for shift workers and daytime workers. The wage 
equations are presented in Table A3.i in Appendix 2.1. The first two sets of results (column 1-
3 and 4-6) are for the sample of hospital RNs. For the shift workers neither age nor experience 
is significant. The only dummy for country origin that is significant is the one for non-OECD 
countries. The county dummies are significant and with one exception they are negative 
compared to the reference of the capital Oslo. This is as expected as the reference group 
                                                 
6 The RNs in this sample started in the primary school when aged 7. Today the children start school the year they 
get 6.  186 
working for Oslo municipality has a separate wage contract with a somewhat higher wage. 
The dummies for municipal centrality are not significant, with the exception of one that is 
weakly significant for an intermediary centrality. For the daytime workers in the sample of 
hospital RNs there is a significant age effect where the wage is reduced by age. According to 
the agreed contract with the labor union, experience is one of the strongest criteria for 
increased wage. It is thus surprising that age has a negative sign in the wage equation. One 
possible explanation is that younger nurses are more willing to work overtime, somewhat 
increasing their average salary. Most dummies for county of residency are significant and 
negative.  
 
Although weakly significant, the selection term coefficients suggest a positive selection into 
shift work and no significant selection into daytime work. The RNs select themselves into 
shift work because of preferences or comparative advantages. This differs from the findings 
of Kostiuk (1990) who finds no effect of self-selection of workers into shift work, and 
Lanfranchie et al. (2002) who find that shift workers seem to prefer to avoid shift work. The 
shift wage premium, which is (weakly) significant for the choice of shift work in the 
structural probit results (Table A2.i column 4), increases the preference for shift work. I find 
no selection into daytime work, in contrast to the findings of Kostiuk and Lanfranchie et al.  
 
The estimated wage equations are somewhat different for the sample of primary care nurses. 
Experience, county dummies and one centrality dummy for the second highest centrality level 
are significant for the shift working primary care nurses. None of the explanatory variables 
are significant for the daytime workers. This accentuates the homogeneity of the sample with 
little variation in wages. For the shift working primary care RNs there is a negative selection 
into shift work, as opposed to the shift-selection term for the hospital RNs. There is no 
significant selection into daytime jobs. In the structural probit model (in Table A2.i column 
10) there is no significant effect of the shift wage premium on shift choice for the sample of 
primary care RNs.  
 
Structural form choice equations. Table A2.i column 4 and 10 presents the marginal effects in 
the structural form (1c) for the sample of hospital and primary care nurses respectively. The 
corresponding standard errors and t-values are also reported. As already mentioned, the shift 
premium is weakly significant for the shift choice for the hospital RNs and not significant for 
the primary care RNs. The top rows of Table A2.i report the results for variables only 187 
appearing in the choice equation. Both the dummy for marital status and the number of 
children below 6 years of age are significant, and the signs are as expected for the sample of 
hospital RNs. The number of children from 6 to 11 years of age is only weakly significant. 
None of the three selection variables are significant for the sample of primary care RNs. The 
lack of variable significance for the latter group is not easily interpreted but hospital RNs are 
generally younger than primary care RNs and a smaller percentage is married.  
 
The bottom rows report the results for variables also appearing in the wage equations. For the 
hospital RNs, age becomes weakly significant, as well as experience. The probability of 
selecting a shift job is estimated to decrease by age and experience.  
 
Whereas it is less likely for a RN from one of the other Nordic countries to choose a shift job, 
it is more likely for RNs from other countries. For the hospital sample, the county dummies 
are mostly positive and significant for the shift choice, but not for the primary care sample. 
The centrality dummies are not significant.  
 
The two wage equations for shift and daytime workers can be used to compute the shift 
premium for each person in the sample. The average shift premium for the sample of hospital 
nurses is 19.3%, while the shift premium for the sample of primary care nurses is 18.1%. The 
shift premiums are sharply determined with t-values of 293.3 and 330.0. 
 
 
3.3 Wages, hospital premiums, and hospital choice. 
 
I now shift the focus to the analysis of hospital versus primary care choice and the hospital 
premium. Tables A2.ii and A3.ii in Appendix 2.2 presents the results for two samples; the 
RNs working shifts (c), and the RNs working regular daytime hours (d).  
 
Reduced form choice. I start by estimating the reduced form probit for hospital choice (2) in 
the subset of shift working RNs. Table A2.ii column 1 reports marginal effects of the reduced 
form. Marital status and children may be correlated with hospital choice in several ways. 
Given the stress and demanding environment at a hospital many RNs prefer to switch to a 
primary care job that is easier to combine with family life when they get children. There is 
also an indirect geographical effect as many RNs move out of the city centers to the suburbs 188 
and rural areas when they become parents. With most hospitals centrally located, they are able 
to reduce their travel time if they take a job in a nursing home or in home nursing.  
 
Wage equations. The wage equations for the sample selection models with hospital choice are 
presented in Table A3.ii in Appendix 2.2. The first two sets of results (column 1-3 and 4-6) 
are for the sample of shift RNs. In contrast to the primary care workers, age, experience or 
country background is not significant in the wage equation for the hospital workers. Most 
geographical dummies are strongly significant and negative, meaning that they earn less than 
the RNs working in Oslo, the capital. There is a positive and significant selection into both 
hospital and primary care jobs for the sample of shift working RNs.  
 
Few of the variables are significant in the two wage equations for the sample of daytime 
working RNs. Age and experience and some of the county dummies are significant for the 
hospital workers. There is no selection effect for the hospital workers. For the primary care 
workers there is a weakly significant positive selection effect.   
 
Structural form choice equations. Table A2.ii column 4 and 10 presents the marginal effects 
in the structural form (1c) for hospital choice for the samples of shift and daytime RNs 
respectively. The hospital premiums are not significant for the hospital choice for any of the 
two samples. For the sample of shift working RNs, marital status and the number of children 
from 6 to 11 years of age is significant for the choice of a hospital job. For the sample of RNs 
working regular daytime only the number of children from 6 to 11 years of age is (weakly) 
significant.  
 
The results for the explanatory variables also used in the wage equations are as follows. For 
the sample of shift working RNs, age is a negative and significant variable in the structural 
form equation of hospital choice, whereas experience is not. The opposite is the case for the 
daytime working RNs. Of the shift working nurses, those with a non-OECD background are 
less likely to choose a hospital job. Of the day-working nurses, those from the other Nordic 
countries are more likely to choose a hospital job, but this effect is only weakly significant. 
Most of the geographical dummies are strongly significant and negative for both samples 
meaning that they are less likely to work in a hospital job than the reference group in the 
capital.  
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The average hospital premium for the sample of shift working nurses is -0.04%, while the 
hospital premium for the sample of daytime working nurses is –1.7%. The hospital premium 
for the nurses working shifts are, however, not significantly different from zero with a t-value 
of 1.37. The t-value is 18.73 for the nurses working daytime. 
 
A summary of results so far 
Before I present the random utility model, I will summarize the results so far. The first finding 
is that there is a highly significant shift premium of 19.3% for the sample of hospital RNs and 
18.1% for the primary care RNs. However, the shift premium is only weakly significant for 
the shift work choice for the sample of hospital RNs, and not for the primary care RNs. There 
seems to be a positive selection into shift work for the nurses working in hospitals, but a 
negative selection into shift work for the nurses in primary care jobs. There is no selection 
effect into the daytime jobs.  
 
I find no hospital premium for the shift RNs, and a slightly negative hospital premium of –
1.7% for the daytime working RNs, but it is not significant for the hospital job choice. There 
is a positive selection into hospital and primary care jobs for the sample of shift RNs. There is 
no selection into hospital jobs and a positive selection into primary care jobs for the day-
working RNs. 
 
The selection equation (1c) may be looked upon as a simplified choice model where the 
individual wage rate determines the selection of job type. The random utility model presented 
in the next section takes choices one step further to integrate choice and a richer specification 
of preferences in the modeling. I will restrict the analysis to the shift choice and shift 
compensation as the hospital premium seems to be of minimum significance in the Norwegian 
public health sector.  
 
  
4. Compensating variation in random utility models 
 
4.1 A random utility model 
 
In order to calculate the compensating differentials in utility terms, I present a static neo-
classical structural labor supply model with single decision makers. The individual’s utility 190 
depends on income, leisure and other characteristics of the jobs. The utility maximization 
problem is solved by discretizing the budget set and choosing the optimal shift type, leisure 
and income combination from a finite set of alternatives. Conditioning on their participation 
in the public health care sector, the nurses are facing a choice between a shift job or a day job 
(i = s,d). As explained above I omit the analysis of the hospital premium in this part of the 
paper.  
 
Because the analyst does not know the nurses’ preferences, I will assume a random utility 
model  
 
() ( ) () () ,, , ,, U Chi V C h h eChi =+ ,                 ( 4 )  
 
where U is the utility when the nurse works h hours with shift type i (shift job or a day job). C 
is disposable income. V is the deterministic element in the utility function and ε is a stochastic 
term with an iid extreme value distribution with an expected mean of 0 and a variance of 
22
* /6 σπ . The random term ε also captures the unobserved job characteristics associated with 
the workload and shift type.  
 
The budget constraint, for a job with shift type i, is 
 
C=f(hw)+I; h=Hik ,  w=Wi(Hik),                                            (5) 
 
where Hik  (i=d,s,  k=1,…,9) are the specific hours of work for the alternative with shift type i 
and hours of work k, and Wi(Hik) the pre-tax hourly wage for the job-package with shift type i 
when the individual is working Hik hours. The wage is a piecewise linear relation capturing 
the agreed terms of overtime compensation. Note that for the same job, wage rates may differ 
across nurses by personal characteristics like experience, residency and country background. 
In addition, for the same nurse, wage rates may differ with shift type. For all individuals a 
pre-tax hourly wage is estimated for each shift type applying a Heckman two-step selection 
correction procedure. The f(.) function represents the net-of-tax labor income while I is the 191 
family income other than the nurse’s own earnings (capital income after tax, spouses income 
after tax, and transfers)
7.  
 
Each category of hours is centered on a common choice of working hours, e.g. 50%, 75% and 
100% of a full-time position. There are also categories for extended full-time, covering nurses 
in full-time positions working overtime, or people with jobs at more than one hospital where 
the workload totals more than 100%. As the nurses working shifts face different contractual 
arrangements than those working daytime, the hours are shorter for this group
8.  
 
I assume that the nurses make their choices by maximizing utility, given the job-packages 
available in the market. Let B(i,h) denote the set of feasible jobs with hours of work Hik equal 
to h, with shift type i. Let ( ) i gh be the frequency of jobs in B(i,h), which is related to the 
institutional availability of full-time jobs. It follows from above that the utility function can be 
written as 
 




() () () () ,, , ik ik i ik ik f HW H IH ik εε =+                 (7) 
 
Since hours of work and consumption are given when the job-package is given, the agent's 
choice problem is a discrete one, namely to find the job-package that maximizes utility. Let 
(, ) Pih denote the probability of the agent choosing a job-package with shift type i and hours 
of work h. This is the same as choosing a job-package (any job-package) within B(i,h). When 
the random error terms { ik ε  } are iid extreme value distributed, the probability ( , ) Pih can be 
expressed as 
                                                 
7 A non-trivial assumption made is that the spouse’s hours of work is exogenous, as there is reason to believe 
that the spouse’s choice of working hours will correlate, either negatively, e.g. if one of the parents must look 
after the children, or positively as they have preferences for spending their leisure time together. 192 
 
(, ) Pih= P(choosing any job-package within B(i,h))  
 




exp( ( , ; , )) ( )
,









                                   (8) 
 
where B is the set of feasible combinations of shift type and hours of work, and 
 
() ( ) () ik ik i ik ik ik (i,h;w,I) v f H W H I,H V / . ψ σ =+ =               (9) 
 
Due to the assumption of extreme value distributed utilities it follows that the choice 
probabilities are multinomial logits. By setting  ( ) i gh= 1 in (8) we get the standard 
multinomial logit. The interpretation of the “opportunity density extended” version of the 
standard multinomial logit, given in (8), is that the attractiveness of a choice measured by 
exp( ) ψ  is weighted by a function saying how available this choice is in the market. The 
weight is determined by  
 
( ) exp( ) ii gh k ς =                                       (10) 
 
where  i k  = 1 if the main job is full-time with shift type i (35.5 hours per week if shift, 37.5 
hours per week if daytime), and  i k  = 0 otherwise. For more details about this methodology I 
refer to Aaberge, Colombino and Strøm (1999). 
 
The deterministic part of the preferences is represented by the following “Box-Cox” type 
utility function:  
 
                                                                                                                                                          
8 The hours per week in the categories, based on the observed means, are Hi ={11.5, 17.9, 21.6, 26.3, 28.2, 30.6, 
35.4, 36.6, 40.7} if the nurse work shifts and Hi ={12.2, 18.9, 22.8, 27.8, 29.8, 32.3, 37.4, 38.6, 42.9} if the 
nurse does not work shifts. 193 
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The first element represents the utility from consumption and the second element the utility of 
leisure time. See Aaberge, Dagsvik and Strøm (1995) and Aaberge, Colombino and Strøm 
(1999) for an empirical analysis applying this specification. One advantage of this 
specification is that it is flexible enough to yield both negative (backward bending labor 
supply curve) and positive wage elasticities.  
 
A minimum consumption of NOK 50,000 is introduced in the consumption element. 8,760 is 
the total number of annual hours, from which 12 hours per day for sleep and rest is subtracted 
in the leisure element. κ  ,λ , γ  and the s ρ′  are unknown parameters. For the utility function 
to be quasi-concave, we require λ <1 and γ <1. Note that if  0 λ →  and  0 γ → , the utility 
function converges to a log-linear function.  
 
An alternative specification is to use a semi-parametric approach like van Soest (1995), where 
the deterministic part of the preferences is represented by a polynomial. 
Due to the calculation of the compensating variation (CV) below I stay with the Box-Cox 
formulation.  
 
The characteristics are: X1 = Age of the nurse/10. X2 = Number of children below six years of 
age. X3 = Number of children between 6 and 11 years of age. X4 = 1 if the person is born in 
Norway, 0 otherwise. X5 = 1 if the person is married, 0 otherwise.  194 
The parameters (κ, λ, γ,  0 ρ , q ρ ,ς ) are estimated in a maximum-likelihood procedure. Note 
that σ is not identified and is absorbed in κ  and ρ ’s.  
 
Compensating variation 
We are interested in the value in utility terms of a change of shift type from daytime job d to 
the shift job s, for a specific workload. We measure the utility with the expected value of the 
compensating variation  h z .  
 
First we define  h z  in  
 
(( ) , ) (( ) , ) dh dh sh h sh UCw L UCw z L =−                          (13) 
or  
 
(( ) , ) (( ) , ) dh dh dh sh h sh sh vCw L vCw z L ε ε += − +                                                      (14) 
 
If the shift alternative is more attractive than the day job for a given workload measured in 
percentage of a full-time position,  h z  is a measure of the over-compensation of the shift job.  
 
Given the choice of a Box-Cox function from (11), we can insert it into (14). For a specific 
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I will try to identify the size of  k z  using a Monte Carlo simulation. However, to simplify this 
process I first rearrange (15) to the following expression 
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k K is deterministic and can be calculated for each individual when we have estimated the 
parameters of the model. (16) may now be represented as  
 
() ( ) 0 skk kd k s k Cw z C K
λ
κε ε −− = + −                            (18) 
 
We know that the difference between two extreme value variables is logistic distributed. 
Thus, if  dk ε and  sk ε are iid extreme values, then 
*
dsk dk sk ε εε = − follows the logistic distribution. 
The next step is to simulate  k z using a Monte Carlo simulation where I take 50 draws from the 
logistic distribution for each category of hours for each individual. For each draw of 
*
dsk ε , I 




0 ˆ ˆ max 0, skk k d s k Cw z C K
λ
κε −− = +                            (19) 
 
This is to avoid that the consumption you give up as measured by  ˆk z  gives you a lower 
consumption than the minimum level of  0 C . The result is two formulas to calculate  ˆk z : 
 
If 
* ˆ 0 kd s k K ε +≤  then  0 ˆ () ks k zC w C =−                         (20) 
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for each individual n, and each category of hours k. The last step is to calculate the mean per 










= ∑                               (23) 
 
Given that the utility function can be given a cardinal interpretation I may present the mean 
and the standard deviation of  k CV  and plot the distribution for each category of hours. If I 
restrict the utility function to be ordinal, I can only report the number of nurses who have a 
0 kn CV >  and  0 kn CV ≤ .  
 
 
4.2 Estimation and results 
 
Job-specific wages and disposable income 
The first step in the estimation procedure is to derive predicted hourly wages not only for the 
shift type and care level they actually work in, but also for the other alternatives.  The wages 
are individual specific depending on personal characteristics like age, experience, country 
background and residency, and are estimated by a Heckman selection correction procedure. 
Overtime hours are compensated in accordance with the agreed terms. As the wages were 
discussed in detail in Section 3, I will only refer to Table A4 in Appendix 3. Above, I used a 
two-step Heckman procedure with a Probit model for covering the probabilistic structure of 197 
choice. Here, the latter is logistic, but the outcome on the wages of a Logit instead of a Probit 
is minimal (Dagsvik et al. (1987)).   
 
A disposable income is calculated for each job package, defined by care level, shift type and 
categories of hours. I use the predicted hourly wages, and actual non-linear tax rates to 
calculate labor income after tax, and add the actual capital income, social security benefits 
and spouse’s income. The first column in Table A8 presents the difference in disposable 
income for a shift job versus a day job for the nine categories of hours. The mean shift 
premium is positive and higher in hospitals as shown in Section 3.2, but for all alternative 
hours there are some individuals who have a negative shift premium. The mean difference is 
NOK 19,000 for a full-time position in the hospital sector or approximately 4% of the 
disposable income for the day alternative. This is illustrated for the case of full-time jobs by 
the histogram of the difference in disposable income in favor of the shift jobs in Figure A1, 
Quadrant 1.  
 
Estimation of structural parameters  
Based on the knowledge of disposable income and leisure measured by hours of work for all 
alternative job packages for each individual, I estimate the structural model. The parameters 
are estimated separately for the samples of hospital and primary care nurses. Remember that 
for the same percentage of a full-time job the nurses work shorter hours if they work in a shift 
job. I have restricted the sample to those with a non-work income between NOK 100,000 and 
NOK 500,000 in order to limit the impact of outliers in the analysis.  
 
From Table A5 we observe that almost all parameters are sharply determined and that λ  and 
γ  are estimated to yield a quasi-concave utility function. For the hospital nurses the income 
term in the utility function (11) is estimated with λ  to be 0.285, and α  to 2.828 such that 
increased income increases the deterministic utility.  
 
The γ  in the leisure component is estimated to -0.320.  0 β  is positive with a value of 6.567, 
meaning that the average individual has an increased utility of jobs with shorter working 
hours. The other  s β  are, however, negative. This means that the RNs tend to choose jobs 
with less part-time work the older they are, and that the same goes for nurses with children 
aged between 6 and 11 and married nurses. The number of children below 6 years of age is 198 
not significant. The g-function in (8) with a dummy representing a full-time position is 
represented with the significant parameter ς of 1.064. 
 
The parameters estimated for the primary care nurses follows the same pattern as for the 
hospital RNs with the exception of some of the  s β . Age is not significant, but age squared is 
significant and has a negative sign. Surprisingly 3 β , the parameter for the number of children 
below 6 years of age is negative, as well as the parameters for the number of children between 
6 and 11 years, marital status, and whether you are born in Norway.  
 
Deterministic utility 
The second group of columns in Table A6 presents the difference in deterministic utility 
between the shift job and the daytime job. It is worth noting that the mean difference is 
positive in favor of the shift jobs for all categories of hours. This is illustrated for the case of 
full-time jobs by the histogram of the difference in deterministic utility in favor of the shift 
jobs in Figure A1, Quadrant 2.  
 
Compensating variation 
The results from the Monte Carlo simulations are presented in the third group of columns in 
Table A6. The compensating variation is presented for the variable  k CV  for the nine 
alternative categories of hours. For all alternatives the mean is positive, with the exception of 
the jobs with shortest working hours, the category of 32.5% of a full-time position, which has 
a negative mean. However, a positive  k CV means that the RNs on average are so satisfied 
with their shift jobs, being rewarded with higher wages, shorter working hours and increased 
flexibility, that they actually would accept a lower wage than they are offered today and still 
be better or equally well off with a shift job. For a full-time job the  k CV  equals NOK 26,000 
or 5.7% of the annual disposable income for the household. The minimum value for the 
simulated  k CV  is -63,680 NOK and the maximum is NOK 96,500. For the full-time 
alternative 90 % has  7 0 CV >  meaning that the majority gains from having a shift job, or in 
other words that the RNs could accept a reduction in the shift compensation and still prefer 
the shift alternative. For half-time jobs the percentage with  4 0 CV >  is 62% of the RNs, while 199 
for those working in a one third of a full-time position, we have that  1 0 CV >  for 29% for the 
hospital RNs and 27% for the primary care RNs.  
 
Generally the differences between shift jobs and daytime jobs are smaller in primary care both 
when focusing on the shift premium measured in disposable income, and compensating 
variation expressed by  k CV . For all categories of hours a histogram for  k CV  and the share 
with a positive  k CV  are presented in Figure A2 and A3. In Figure A4 and A5 the  k CV  is 
plotted by age for 50%, 75% and 100% positions for hospital and primary care jobs. The 
compensation needed seems to be rather stable across age groups.  
 
I have not conditioned on the RNs’ actual choices in the calculation of the  k CV . I still 
consider the calculations as a relevant approximation of the compensation necessary. The 
statistical derivation of a more correct expression, contingent on their actual choices is 





In the first part of this paper I applied a switching regression model to identify the 
compensating differentials for registered nurses. The first finding was that there is a 
significant shift premium of 19.3% for the sample of hospital RNs and 18.1% for the primary 
care RNs. However, the shift premium is only weakly significant for the shift work choice for 
the sample of hospital RNs, and not significant for the primary care RNs. There seems to be a 
positive selection into shift work for the nurses working in hospitals, but a negative selection 
into shift work for the nurses in primary care jobs. There is no selection effect into the 
daytime jobs.  
 
In contrast to the previous published results I found no hospital premium for the shift RNs, 
and a slightly negative hospital premium of –1.7% for the daytime working RNs. The 
negative hospital premium is not significant for the hospital job choice. There is a positive 
selection into hospital and primary care jobs for the sample of shift RNs. There is no selection 
into hospital jobs and a positive selection into primary care jobs for the dayworking RNs.  200 
 
In the second part of the paper I focused on the shift premium and shift choice as the hospital 
premium seems to be of minimum significance in the Norwegian public health sector. I 
presented a structural labor supply model with a random utility function to identify the 
expected compensation necessary for the nurses to remain on the same utility level when they 
are “forced” from a day job to a shift job. The expected compensating variations were derived 
by Monte Carlo simulations and the distribution presented for different categories of hours. I 
found that on average the offered combination of higher wages, shorter working hours and 
increased flexibility overcompensated for the health and social strain related to shift work. 
The simulations indicated that the average nurse would choose a shift job even if the shift 
compensation was reduced by 5% of the disposable income.  
 
It is widely known that a focusing only on wage differentials may be misleading when 
evaluating compensating mechanisms, as the other attributes of a nursing job, such as job 
flexibility and working hours, also compensate the negative effects of shift work. A structural 
labor supply model with a random utility function makes it possible to better include the non-
pecuniary characteristics of jobs in the analysis, and thus to better inform the policy makers 
who are trying to find an optimal compensation package in a public health sector with a 
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Appendix 1 Key variables 
 
 
Table A1 Key variables 
    
Female registered nurses in 2000  Mean Std Dev
    
N 11,542 
Age 40.2 10.2
Born in Norway=1  0.92 0.27
Single 0.29 0.45
Married 0.60 0.49
Number of children  2.0 1.0
    
Lives in a central area (Cat. 6&7 out of 7)  0.70 0.46
Years since graduation  13.3 11.0
Number of years employed (income >1G) since 1967  10.9 7.6
Hours per year   1,363 347
Work shifts  0.88 0.33
% Position   0.81 0.21
Income from work, NOK  237,914 56,953
Social security benefits, NOK  21,037 28,229
Total income, NOK   264,990 68,815
Income after tax  196,376 50,422
    
Age of spouse (N=7,753)  45.7 9.6
Total annual income, spouse  403,774 416,579
Annual income after tax, spouse  277,146 328,507
 205 
Appendix 2.1. A switching regression model to identify the shift premium 
 
Table A2.i Shift choice, probit models, marginal effects. (Case a and b) 
                       
 
Case a) 
Shift work choice if hospital RNs   
Case b)  
Shift work choice if primary care RNs 
  Reduced form    Structural form  Reduced form   Structural form 
                       
Variable dF/dx Std. E. t-values  dF/dx Std. E. t-values dF/dx Std. E. t-values dF/dx  Std. E. t-values 
      
Shift premium        3.555 1.951 1.78      1.917  2.762 0.7 
                     
Married -0.020 0.009 -2.24  -0.036 0.012 -2.82 0.002 0.009 0.2 -0.001  0.010 -0.08 
No. of children <6 years of 
age  0.027 0.010 2.75  0.048 0.015 3.09 0.024 0.009 2.52 -0.014  0.056 -0.26 
No. of children aged 6-11  0.008 0.007 1.16  0.015 0.008 1.86 0.005 0.007 0.77 -0.003  0.014 -0.24 
                     
Age -0.047 0.112 -0.42  -0.893 0.477 -1.83 0.202 0.116 1.75 -0.013  0.331 -0.04 
Age^2/100 0.168 0.399 0.42  2.992 1.599 1.83 -0.736 0.408 -1.8 0.093  1.263 0.07 
Age^3/1000 -0.259 0.616 -0.42  -4.338 2.319 -1.83 1.166 0.625 1.86 -0.224  2.098 -0.11 
Age^4/10000 0.144 0.349 0.41  2.288 1.226 1.82 -0.672 0.351 -1.91 0.168  1.260 0.13 
Experience -0.027 0.017 -1.59  -0.079 0.033 -2.31 -0.054 0.017 -3.07 -0.092  0.057 -1.62 
Experience^2/100 0.062 0.258 0.24  0.746 0.453 1.61 0.465 0.266 1.74 0.778  0.524 1.49 
Experience^3/1000 0.156 1.524 0.1  -3.875 2.671 -1.43 -1.610 1.569 -1.02 -2.444  1.980 -1.24 
Experience^4/10000 -0.598 3.032 -0.2  8.017 5.584 1.41 1.655 3.117 0.53 2.107  3.188 0.66 
Born in a Nordic country 
excl. Norway  -0.051 0.023 -2.5  -0.095 0.038 -3.03 -0.018 0.025 -0.75 -0.051  0.060 -0.98 
Born in an OECD country 
excl. Nordic  0.033 0.020 1.44  0.083 0.014 2.19 -0.042 0.033 -1.45 0.031  0.079 0.33 
Born in a non-OECD country  0.040 0.020 1.64  0.074 0.015 2.39 0.047 0.020 1.79 0.056  0.021 1.88 
                     
Place of residency 
(C3=Oslo)                     
County 1 Østfold  0.076 0.009 5.3  0.091 0.008 4.44 0.059 0.029 1.44 0.089  0.032 1.25 
County 2 Akershus  0.038 0.013 2.49  0.050 0.012 3.07 0.028 0.042 0.59 0.091  0.047 0.83 
County 4 Hedmark  0.075 0.010 4.23  0.046 0.026 1.36 0.057 0.029 1.37 0.091  0.030 1.12 
County 5 Oppland  0.089 0.007 5.81  0.101 0.006 3.95 0.075 0.020 2.12 0.091  0.020 1.77 
County 6 Buskerud  0.079 0.008 5.71  -0.351 0.424 -1.09 0.023 0.045 0.46 0.018  0.048 0.34 
County 7 Vestfold   0.071 0.010 4.3  0.077 0.009 4.62 0.042 0.037 0.91 0.090  0.036 0.94 
County 8 Telemark  0.075 0.010 4.34  0.042 0.029 1.19 0.038 0.038 0.8 0.078  0.041 0.97 
County 9 Aust-Agder  0.068 0.011 3.75  -0.027 0.088 -0.34 0.027 0.043 0.56 0.078  0.045 0.85 
County 10 Vest-Agder  0.082 0.007 6.93  0.049 0.026 1.48 0.059 0.028 1.46 0.073  0.027 1.57 
County 11 Rogaland  0.071 0.008 5.65  0.051 0.016 2.48 0.045 0.036 1.01 0.082  0.046 1.09 
County 12 Hordaland  0.051 0.010 4.18  -0.023 0.055 -0.44 0.056 0.032 1.33 0.101  0.043 1.07 
County 13 Sogn og Fjordane  0.053 0.018 2.12  -0.295 0.316 -1.25 0.061 0.027 1.5 0.075  0.025 1.58 
County 14 Møre og Romsdal  0.056 0.015 2.8  0.027 0.027 0.89 0.065 0.029 1.58 0.083  0.031 1.61 
County 15 Sør-Trøndelag  0.081 0.007 7.41  0.103 0.009 4.23 0.022 0.045 0.45 0.087  0.047 0.79 
County 16 Nord-Trøndelag  0.085 0.007 6.15  0.059 0.021 1.96 0.070 0.023 1.89 0.082  0.022 1.88 
County 17 Nordland  0.063 0.013 3.29  0.055 0.015 2.66 0.051 0.033 1.16 0.093  0.038 1.05 
County 18 Troms  0.052 0.021 1.76  0.085 0.011 2.45 0.028 0.042 0.59 0.089  0.049 0.84 
County 19 Finnmark  0.056 0.023 1.67  0.091 0.007 2.34 0.031 0.043 0.62 0.037  0.042 0.73 
                     
Municipal Centrality (7=Most 
central)                     
Municipal Centrality 1  0.038 0.018 1.77  -0.001 0.036 -0.04 -0.027 0.016 -1.78 0.010  0.050 0.2 
Municipal Centrality 2  -0.013 0.025 -0.55  0.000 0.024 0 0.012 0.021 0.54 -0.031  0.075 -0.45 
Municipal Centrality 3  -0.003 0.023 -0.15  0.038 0.025 1.28 -0.001 0.019 -0.06 0.047  0.059 0.66 
Municipal Centrality 4  -0.003 0.043 -0.08  -0.803 0.274 -1.77 0.021 0.017 1.15 0.013  0.022 0.55 
Municipal Centrality 5  0.026 0.017 1.4  -0.069 0.075 -1.09 -0.041 0.023 -1.99 -0.003  0.052 -0.06 
Municipal Centrality 6  0.000 0.016 0.02    -0.015 0.019 -0.8 -0.002 0.015 -0.15 0.040  0.055 0.65 
                      
Log likelihood 
-






1,774.3    
chi squared  696.53      699.78   214.24   214.72    
Significance  level  0.000     0.000   0.000   0.000    
pseudo R2  0.1479      0.1485   0.0569   0.0571    
Number of observations  5,957         5,957        5,585        5,585      
(*) dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1                 
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Table A3.i Wage equations, sample selection models. Shift RNs and daytime RNs (Case a and b). 
                       
 
Case a) 
Wage equations if hospital RNs   
Case b)  
Wage equations if primary care RNs 
                        
  Shift workers    Daytime workers  Shift workers    Daytime workers 
                       
 Coef.  Std. E. t-values    Coef. Std. E.t-values  Coef. Std. E.t-values  Coef. Std. E. t-values 
                       
Age 0.015  0.039 0.37 -0.215 0.107 -2.02 0.026 0.048 0.54 0.082 0.167 0.49 
Age^2/100 0.013  0.147 0.09 0.779 0.368 2.11 -0.058 0.175 -0.33 -0.238 0.593 -0.4 
Age^3/1000 -0.102  0.238 -0.43 -1.204 0.554 -2.17 0.039 0.275 0.14 0.289 0.913 0.32 
Age^4/10000 0.095  0.140 0.68 0.673 0.305 2.2 0.002 0.158 0.01 -0.123 0.513 -0.24 
Experience 0.004  0.005 0.73 -0.007 0.021 -0.35 0.018 0.006 2.94 -0.043 0.030 -1.42 
Experience^2/100 0.037  0.087 0.43 0.238 0.272 0.88 -0.100 0.092 -1.1 0.402 0.349 1.15 
Experience^3/1000 -0.469  0.555 -0.84 -1.733 1.502 -1.15 0.177 0.566 0.31 -1.350 1.792 -0.75 
Experience^4/10000 1.139  1.171 0.97 3.848 2.860 1.35 0.095 1.176 0.08 1.255 3.299 0.38 
Born in a Nordic country 
excl. Norway  0.005  0.008 0.6 0.006 0.016 0.35 0.015 0.009 1.63 -0.012 0.023 -0.54 
Born in an OECD country 
excl. Nordic  0.017  0.011 1.54 0.040 0.026 1.58 -0.005 0.012 -0.41 0.001 0.028 0.05 
Born in a non-OECD country   0.022  0.011 2.1 0.032 0.027 1.21 0.006 0.012 0.48 0.062 0.047 1.33 
                       
Place of residency (C3=Oslo)                      
County 1 Østfold  -0.040  0.010 -4.13 -0.051 0.031 -1.65 -0.125 0.055 -2.29 -0.017 0.095 -0.18 
County 2 Akershus  -0.032  0.008 -3.98 -0.036 0.016 -2.3 -0.100 0.054 -1.85 -0.002 0.090 -0.03 
County 4 Hedmark  -0.026  0.012 -2.14 -0.069 0.035 -1.98 -0.132 0.055 -2.42 -0.013 0.095 -0.14 
County 5 Oppland  -0.041  0.013 -3.22 -0.046 0.044 -1.04 -0.141 0.055 -2.55 -0.012 0.102 -0.11 
County 6 Buskerud  0.023  0.011 2.15 -0.098 0.031 -3.12 -0.069 0.054 -1.28 -0.052 0.090 -0.57 
County 7 Vestfold   -0.045  0.011 -4.15 -0.063 0.030 -2.07 -0.116 0.055 -2.12 -0.008 0.092 -0.09 
County 8 Telemark  -0.019  0.011 -1.64 -0.062 0.033 -1.86 -0.104 0.054 -1.91 -0.022 0.092 -0.24 
County 9 Aust-Agder  -0.026  0.012 -2.19 -0.084 0.031 -2.7 -0.122 0.055 -2.23 -0.043 0.091 -0.48 
County 10 Vest-Agder  -0.018  0.010 -1.7 -0.067 0.031 -2.12 -0.113 0.055 -2.07 -0.029 0.095 -0.31 
County 11 Rogaland  -0.010  0.008 -1.21 -0.042 0.025 -1.66 -0.092 0.054 -1.7 -0.010 0.091 -0.11 
County 12 Hordaland  -0.034  0.007 -4.74 -0.071 0.017 -4.08 -0.123 0.054 -2.27 -0.003 0.092 -0.03 
County 13 Sogn og Fjordane  -0.018  0.014 -1.28 -0.102 0.029 -3.47 -0.114 0.055 -2.07 -0.023 0.096 -0.24 
County 14 Møre og Romsdal  -0.018  0.010 -1.7 -0.045 0.026 -1.73 -0.124 0.055 -2.26 -0.030 0.096 -0.31 
County 15 Sør-Trøndelag  -0.027  0.009 -3.04 -0.033 0.029 -1.16 -0.137 0.054 -2.52 -0.045 0.090 -0.51 
County 16 Nord-Trøndelag  -0.015  0.012 -1.27 -0.066 0.036 -1.83 -0.134 0.055 -2.44 -0.028 0.099 -0.29 
County 17 Nordland  -0.053  0.011 -4.97 -0.076 0.028 -2.67 -0.118 0.054 -2.17 -0.008 0.094 -0.09 
County 18 Troms  -0.057  0.015 -3.69 -0.043 0.034 -1.27 -0.125 0.054 -2.31 -0.032 0.090 -0.35 
County 19 Finnmark  -0.089  0.017 -5.26 -0.062 0.046 -1.36 -0.104 0.055 -1.88 -0.069 0.093 -0.74 
                       
Municipal Centrality (7=Most 
central)                       
Municipal Centrality 1  -0.006  0.008 -0.73 -0.029 0.030 -0.96 -0.006 0.007 -0.9 -0.008 0.017 -0.48 
Municipal Centrality 2  0.002  0.009 0.24 0.008 0.021 0.39 -0.007 0.009 -0.87 -0.018 0.027 -0.67 
Municipal Centrality 3  -0.007  0.008 -0.85 0.007 0.021 0.33 -0.008 0.007 -1.05 0.021 0.022 0.98 
Municipal Centrality 4  -0.014  0.014 -1.02 -0.133 0.053 -2.5 0.002 0.009 0.19 0.017 0.023 0.74 
Municipal Centrality 5  0.013  0.008 1.67 -0.018 0.019 -0.92 0.014 0.009 1.56 0.001 0.025 0.02 
Municipal Centrality 6  0.004  0.006 0.72 0.000 0.015 -0.03 -0.012 0.006 -1.96 0.011 0.015 0.74 
                       
Selection term  0.057  0.032 1.76 0.022 0.048 0.45 -0.136 0.066 -2.04 -0.118 0.087 -1.36 
                       
Constant 4.755  0.381 12.48   7.107 1.116 6.37   4.840 0.486 9.97   4.366 1.568 2.78 
                       
sigma  ui                       
R2  0.1429       0.1369     0.0716     0.0816  
R S S                        
Number of observations  4,863          758         4,652         550     
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Appendix 2.2. A switching regression model to identify the hospital premium 
 
Table A2.ii Hospital choice, probit models, marginal effects (Case c and d). 
                    
 
Case c)  
Hospital choice if shift RNs       
Case d)  
Hospital choice if daytime RNs   
  Reduced form     Structural form    Reduced form     Structural form 
                         
Variable dF/dx Std. E. t-values   dF/dx Std. E.t-values  dF/dx Std. E.t-values     dF/dx Std. E.t-values
        
Hospital premium       -0.915 0.756 -1.21    -4.368 4.305 -1.02
             
Married -0.049 0.012 -4.02   -0.056 0.013 -4.17 0.017 0.035 0.48   0.027 0.037 0.74
No. of children <6 years of 
age 0.000 0.013 -0.03   0.000 0.013 -0.02 0.017 0.039 0.42   0.027 0.041 0.67
No. of children aged 6-11  -0.046 0.010 -4.72   -0.052 0.011 -4.8 -0.054 0.028 -1.95   -0.088 0.044 -2.02
             
Age -0.815 0.139 -5.85  -0.858 0.144 -5.97 -0.293 0.490 -0.6   -0.905 0.780 -1.16
Age^2/100 2.857 0.511 5.59   3.052 0.536 5.7 1.027 1.706 0.6   3.025 2.616 1.16
Age^3/1000 -4.361 0.810 -5.39   -4.707 0.859 -5.48 -1.578 2.578 -0.61   -4.348 3.770 -1.16
Age^4/10000 2.422 0.469 5.16  2.637 0.502 5.25 0.888 1.430 0.62   2.272 1.985 1.15
Experience -0.004 0.018 -0.24   -0.013 0.020 -0.68 -0.167 0.083 -2.01   -0.179 0.085 -2.11
Experience^2/100 0.309 0.310 1   0.461 0.334 1.38 2.808 1.188 2.36   3.718 1.505 2.48
Experience^3/1000 -2.823 1.952 -1.45  -3.743 2.096 -1.79 -15.701 6.715 -2.34   -24.005 10.674 -2.26
Experience^4/10000 7.120 4.055 1.76  8.929 4.324 2.07 28.749 12.928 2.22   49.125 24.043 2.05
Born in a Nordic country 
excl. Norway  0.029 0.030 0.97  0.025 0.031 0.82 0.117 0.070 1.55   0.151 0.074 1.85
Born in an OECD country 
excl. Nordic  0.016 0.037 0.43   0.039 0.041 0.95 -0.160 0.109 -1.48   -0.080 0.135 -0.6
Born in a non-OECD country  -0.136 0.036 -3.69   -0.132 0.036 -3.56 -0.013 0.151 -0.09   0.022 0.152 0.15
             
Place of residency 
(C3=Oslo)             
County 1 Østfold  -0.534 0.014 -17.3   -0.518 0.021 -11.93 -0.612 0.036 -7.44   -0.573 0.064 -4.65
County 2 Akershus  -0.530 0.014 -17.64   -0.514 0.021 -11.8 -0.611 0.039 -8.2   -0.626 0.036 -7.58
County 4 Hedmark  -0.535 0.011 -17.59   -0.520 0.019 -10.59 -0.614 0.031 -7.43   -0.611 0.031 -7.44
County 5 Oppland  -0.532 0.012 -17.22   -0.518 0.019 -11.75 -0.616 0.028 -7.23   -0.555 0.100 -2.72
County 6 Buskerud  -0.518 0.014 -16.6  -0.496 0.025 -9.38 -0.634 0.028 -8.94   -0.646 0.025 -7.17
County 7 Vestfold   -0.509 0.016 -15.1   -0.493 0.022 -11.29 -0.616 0.036 -7.29   -0.628 0.032 -6.75
County 8 Telemark  -0.507 0.015 -15  -0.488 0.025 -9.72 -0.627 0.027 -7.85   -0.625 0.027 -7.9
County 9 Aust-Agder  -0.506 0.015 -14.68   -0.484 0.027 -8.51 -0.623 0.029 -7.88   -0.630 0.025 -7.2
County 10 Vest-Agder  -0.494 0.018 -14.97  -0.469 0.030 -9.11 -0.562 0.049 -6.5   -0.513 0.080 -4.17
County 11 Rogaland  -0.558 0.014 -19.12   -0.540 0.023 -11.98 -0.654 0.031 -9.51   -0.644 0.034 -8.92
County 12 Hordaland  -0.531 0.018 -16.95  -0.504 0.031 -9.74 -0.548 0.056 -6.68   -0.590 0.060 -5.57
County 13 Sogn og Fjordane  -0.521 0.012 -15.03   -0.506 0.020 -9.82 -0.593 0.042 -5.91   -0.609 0.035 -5.54
County 14 Møre og Romsdal  -0.584 0.011 -20.12   -0.569 0.018 -11.81 -0.659 0.030 -8.25   -0.617 0.066 -4.18
County 15 Sør-Trøndelag  -0.435 0.025 -12.02   -0.380 0.057 -5.09 -0.577 0.048 -7.1   -0.485 0.124 -2.85
County 16 Nord-Trøndelag  -0.526 0.014 -16.78   -0.504 0.027 -9.01 -0.584 0.044 -6.4   -0.501 0.122 -2.68
County 17 Nordland  -0.545 0.013 -17.69   -0.536 0.016 -14.28 -0.628 0.034 -7.52   -0.644 0.030 -6.3
County 18 Troms  -0.567 0.007 -22.63   -0.563 0.008 -18.06 -0.654 0.020 -9.63   -0.650 0.021 -9.48
County 19 Finnmark  -0.514 0.012 -13.21   -0.513 0.012 -13.26 -0.502 0.085 -3.69   -0.403 0.164 -1.97
             
Municipal Centrality (7=Most 
central)             
Municipal Centrality 1  -0.217 0.021 -9.62   -0.216 0.021 -9.5 -0.462 0.054 -6.65   -0.563 0.089 -3.66
Municipal Centrality 2  0.042 0.028 1.48   0.049 0.029 1.69 0.152 0.072 1.9   0.240 0.096 1.96
Municipal Centrality 3  0.088 0.025 3.45  0.090 0.025 3.5 0.193 0.060 2.8   0.143 0.083 1.58
Municipal Centrality 4  -0.336 0.026 -10.19   -0.352 0.028 -9.48 -0.493 0.073 -4.32   -0.633 0.029 -1.86
Municipal Centrality 5  -0.035 0.026 -1.34   -0.030 0.026 -1.13 -0.214 0.072 -2.96   -0.386 0.160 -2.02
Municipal Centrality 6  0.016 0.020 0.82     0.031 0.023 1.33  0.069 0.056 1.21     -0.002 0.092 -0.02
             
Log likelihood  -5,992.8    -5,992.1 -747.42    -746.88
chi squared  2,082.8     2,084.2 401.9     402.9
significance level  0.000     0.000 0.000     0.000
pseudo R2  0.148     0.1482 0.2119    0.2124
Number of observations  10,150    10,150 1,392     1,392   
(*) dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1                     
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Table A3.ii Wage equations, sample selection models. Hospital RNs and primary care RNs. 
(Case c and d) 
        
  
Case c)  
Wage equations if shift RNs   
Case d)  
Wage equations if daytime RNs 
                          
    Hospital workers    Primary care workers    Hospital workers     Primary care workers 
                              
      Coef.    Std.E. t-values   Coef.   Std.E.t-values   Coef.    Std.E. t-values   Coef.     Std.E. t-values 
Age   -0.058  0.043 -1.34 -0.135 0.052 -2.58 -0.214 0.107 -2 -0.118  0.127 -0.93
Age^2/100   0.262  0.160 1.64 0.481 0.186 2.59 0.773 0.370 2.09 0.470  0.441 1.07
Age^3/1000   -0.474  0.255 -1.86 -0.745 0.286 -2.61 -1.196 0.555 -2.15 -0.799  0.666 -1.2
Age^4/10000   0.297  0.149 1.99 0.421 0.161 2.61 0.669 0.306 2.18 0.485  0.370 1.31
Experience   0.006  0.005 1.17 0.015 0.005 2.79 -0.010 0.021 -0.5 -0.032  0.023 -1.4
Experience^2/100   0.041  0.086 0.47 -0.083 0.090 -0.92 0.256 0.294 0.87 0.453  0.340 1.33
Experience^3/1000   -0.589  0.553 -1.07 0.040 0.564 0.07 -1.793 1.627 -1.1 -2.162  1.930 -1.12
Experience^4/10000   1.532  1.170 1.31 0.489 1.168 0.42 3.946 3.070 1.29 3.436  3.698 0.93
Born in a Nordic country excl. 
Norway   0.011  0.008 1.38 0.020 0.009 2.14 0.002 0.015 0.12 0.011  0.023 0.48
Born in an OECD country 
excl. Nordic    0.015  0.011 1.39 -0.009 0.011 -0.75 0.044 0.025 1.77 0.004  0.026 0.16
Born in a non-OECD country    0.008  0.011 0.79 -0.015 0.012 -1.24 0.036 0.025 1.47 0.026  0.037 0.69
                        
Place of residency (C3=Oslo)                        
County 1 Østfold    -0.099  0.015 -6.46 -0.335 0.064 -5.25 -0.040 0.035 -1.16 -0.210  0.127 -1.65
County 2 Akershus    -0.084  0.015 -5.63 -0.323 0.064 -5.05 -0.033 0.031 -1.08 -0.161  0.124 -1.29
County 4 Hedmark    -0.095  0.019 -5.09 -0.359 0.065 -5.5 -0.058 0.043 -1.35 -0.209  0.130 -1.61
County 5 Oppland    -0.108  0.017 -6.32 -0.352 0.065 -5.45 -0.031 0.044 -0.69 -0.239  0.132 -1.81
County 6 Buskerud    -0.035  0.015 -2.29 -0.290 0.064 -4.55 -0.087 0.040 -2.16 -0.225  0.132 -1.71
County 7 Vestfold     -0.097  0.015 -6.5 -0.319 0.063 -5.06 -0.053 0.037 -1.45 -0.184  0.128 -1.43
County 8 Telemark    -0.072  0.015 -4.72 -0.311 0.063 -4.92 -0.052 0.045 -1.16 -0.210  0.133 -1.58
County 9 Aust-Agder    -0.081  0.016 -4.89 -0.337 0.064 -5.29 -0.074 0.041 -1.82 -0.216  0.131 -1.64
County 10 Vest-Agder    -0.068  0.013 -5.33 -0.298 0.062 -4.81 -0.055 0.026 -2.08 -0.201  0.119 -1.69
County 11 Rogaland    -0.071  0.015 -4.61 -0.317 0.065 -4.92 -0.033 0.038 -0.87 -0.198  0.131 -1.51
County 12 Hordaland    -0.081  0.013 -6.39 -0.321 0.063 -5.13 -0.066 0.022 -2.96 -0.162  0.116 -1.4
County 13 Sogn og Fjordane    -0.077  0.019 -3.93 -0.333 0.065 -5.12 -0.096 0.039 -2.44 -0.216  0.127 -1.7
County 14 Møre og Romsdal    -0.092  0.021 -4.46 -0.368 0.067 -5.5 -0.040 0.045 -0.87 -0.238  0.133 -1.79
County 15 Sør-Trøndelag    -0.062  0.009 -6.72 -0.300 0.060 -5.05 -0.022 0.026 -0.85 -0.186  0.119 -1.56
County 16 Nord-Trøndelag    -0.078  0.016 -4.85 -0.341 0.064 -5.33 -0.053 0.033 -1.6 -0.228  0.124 -1.84
County 17 Nordland    -0.116  0.018 -6.55 -0.343 0.065 -5.29 -0.069 0.042 -1.64 -0.195  0.129 -1.51
County 18 Troms    -0.156  0.029 -5.4 -0.414 0.070 -5.91 -0.038 0.060 -0.64 -0.228  0.141 -1.62
County 19 Finnmark    -0.150  0.022 -6.9 -0.334 0.066 -5.1 -0.057 0.046 -1.22 -0.206  0.119 -1.74
                        
Municipal Centrality (7=Most 
central)                        
Municipal Centrality 1    -0.033  0.010 -3.34 -0.058 0.009 -6.28 -0.024 0.042 -0.58 -0.048  0.034 -1.42
Municipal Centrality 2    0.007  0.009 0.79 0.004 0.009 0.49 0.007 0.023 0.3 0.003  0.031 0.09
Municipal Centrality 3    0.000  0.008 0.05 0.009 0.008 1.15 0.007 0.025 0.28 0.049  0.026 1.87
Municipal Centrality 4    -0.054  0.017 -3.15 -0.068 0.014 -4.85 -0.132 0.063 -2.11 -0.058  0.041 -1.43
Municipal Centrality 5    0.007  0.008 0.84 -0.004 0.008 -0.5 -0.015 0.022 -0.71 -0.005  0.024 -0.19
Municipal Centrality 6    0.004  0.006 0.69 -0.010 0.006 -1.73 -0.001 0.016 -0.05 0.024  0.016 1.54
                        
Selection term    0.071  0.019 3.79 -0.159 0.024 -6.58 0.000 0.040 0.01 -0.090  0.051 -1.76
                        
Constant     5.533  0.428 12.94   6.964 0.579 12.03   7.145 1.121 6.38   6.368  1.363 4.67
Notes. The dependent variable is the log hourly wage rate. 
 209 
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Table A4 Predicted hourly wages 
                                      
Heckman selection model                    
two-step estimates  Hospital RNs          Primary care RNs       
Hourly  wage    Shift     Day     Shift     Day    
                     
   Coef.  Std. E.  t-values Coef.  Std.  E.  t-values Coef.  Std.  E.  t-values Coef.  Std.  E.  t-values 
Age -0.039  0.091  -0.440  -0.261  0.127  -2.060 0.140  0.081  1.720  -0.070 0.120  -0.580 
Age^2/100 0.198  0.337  0.590  0.926 0.439  2.110  -0.476 0.293 -1.630  0.311  0.419  0.740 
Age^3/1000 -0.376  0.541  -0.690  -1.410 0.658  -2.140  0.707 0.460 1.540  -0.571  0.635  -0.900 
Age^4/10000 0.246  0.318  0.770  0.778 0.363  2.140  -0.385 0.264 -1.460  0.366  0.353  1.040 
Experience 0.012  0.012  0.990  -0.006 0.022  -0.260  0.004 0.011  0.400 -0.010  0.019  -0.530 
Experience^2/100 -0.083  0.201  -0.410 0.260  0.311  0.840 0.058 0.175  0.330  0.109 0.281  0.390 
Experience^3/1000 0.321  1.292  0.250 -2.053  1.743  -1.180 -0.617 1.090  -0.570  -0.270 1.616  -0.170 
Experience^4/10000 -0.606  2.733 -0.220  4.750  3.354  1.420 1.484  2.254  0.660  -0.013 3.163  0.000 
Born in a Nordic country 
excl. Norway  -0.005  0.019  -0.250  0.001  0.016 0.040  0.003  0.018 0.170  -0.003 0.021  -0.120 
Born in an OECD country 
excl. Nordic  -0.009  0.025  -0.360  0.035  0.029 1.210  -0.018  0.021  -0.830 0.022  0.023  0.940 
Born in a non-OECD country   0.009  0.023  0.390  0.053 0.031  1.690  -0.001 0.021 -0.070  0.022  0.037  0.600 
County 1 Østfold  -0.021  0.022  -0.940 -0.033  0.023  -1.450  0.138  0.119 1.160  -0.073  0.109  -0.670 
County 2 Akershus  -0.026  0.018 -1.420  -0.026  0.016 -1.560  0.171 0.125  1.370  -0.029 0.109  -0.260 
County 4 Hedmark  -0.014  0.026  -0.560 -0.041  0.029  -1.410  0.151  0.126 1.200  -0.065  0.107  -0.610 
County 5 Oppland  -0.028  0.025  -1.110 -0.015  0.032  -0.480  0.158  0.128 1.230  -0.091  0.109  -0.830 
County 6 Buskerud  0.017  0.019  0.890  -0.097  0.022 -4.380  0.192  0.123  1.560  -0.076 0.111  -0.690 
County 7 Vestfold   -0.043  0.022  -1.980  -0.046 0.025  -1.840  0.142 0.120  1.190 -0.045  0.109  -0.410 
County 8 Telemark  -0.010  0.024 -0.420  -0.048  0.028 -1.700  0.166 0.124  1.330  -0.056 0.103  -0.540 
County 9 Aust-Agder  -0.035  0.025 -1.420  -0.071  0.026 -2.700  0.140 0.123  1.140  -0.070 0.113  -0.620 
County 10 Vest-Agder  -0.028  0.017 -1.660  -0.051  0.018 -2.750  0.167 0.124  1.340  -0.086 0.113  -0.770 
County 11 Rogaland  0.002  0.018  0.130  -0.023 0.018  -1.320  0.179 0.123 1.460  -0.048  0.107  -0.450 
County 12 Hordaland  -0.025  0.016 -1.570  -0.066  0.014 -4.840  0.155 0.124  1.250  -0.051 0.108  -0.480 
County 13 Sogn og Fjordane  0.001  0.032 0.020  -0.073  0.034  -2.120  0.169 0.125  1.350  -0.084 0.115  -0.730 
County 14 Møre og Romsdal  -0.019 0.022  -0.860  -0.036 0.026  -1.360  0.159 0.124  1.280  -0.091 0.115  -0.790 
County 15 Sør-Trøndelag  -0.033  0.015 -2.250  -0.011  0.017 -0.660  0.146 0.130  1.120  -0.069 0.113  -0.610 
County 16 Nord-Trøndelag  -0.023  0.020 -1.110  -0.037  0.026 -1.430  0.159 0.127  1.250  -0.100 0.110  -0.910 
County 17 Nordland  -0.042  0.023 -1.820  -0.063  0.028 -2.250  0.164 0.126  1.300  -0.055 0.112  -0.500 
County 18 Troms  -0.022  0.039  -0.570 -0.027  0.038  -0.730  0.156  0.128 1.220  -0.058  0.111  -0.530 
County 19 Finnmark  -0.076  0.038  -2.000 -0.037  0.054  -0.700  0.181  0.131 1.380  -0.099  0.116  -0.850 
Municipal Centrality 1  -0.006  0.017  -0.370  -0.028 0.033  -0.850  -0.011 0.011 -1.010  0.007  0.013  0.530 
Municipal Centrality 2  0.017  0.020 0.830  -0.002  0.025  -0.090 0.004  0.016  0.250  -0.022 0.026  -0.830 
Municipal Centrality 3  -0.009  0.018  -0.520  0.008 0.024  0.350  -0.005 0.014 -0.330  0.023  0.021  1.110 
Municipal Centrality 4  0.004  0.032  0.130 -0.145  0.059  -2.460 -0.002 0.015  -0.110  0.002 0.020  0.110 
Municipal Centrality 5  0.011  0.018  0.640  -0.015 0.022  -0.700  0.013 0.015 0.850  0.024  0.017 1.450 
Municipal Centrality 6  0.004  0.013  0.340 -0.001  0.018  -0.080 -0.002 0.012  -0.170  0.015 0.014  1.020 
Constant 5.288  0.877  6.030 7.630  1.325  5.760 3.419  0.857 3.990  5.598  1.250 4.480 
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Table 4 continued. Selection term.  
                     
Selection term  Hospital RNs          Primary care RNs       
  Shift     Day     Shift     Day    
                      

















                      
Married -0.038  0.069  -0.550  -0.127 0.204  -0.620 -0.130 0.068  -1.930 -0.130 0.244 -0.530 
No. Of children <6 
years of age  -0.268  0.070  -3.830  -0.512  0.191  -2.680 -0.295 0.061  -4.810 -0.242 0.215 -1.120 
No. of children aged 6-
11 -0.204  0.055  -3.720  -0.049 0.157  -0.310 -0.092 0.048  -1.920 -0.215 0.168 -1.280 
                      
Age -0.953  0.816  -1.170  -0.620 2.434  -0.250  2.080 0.726  2.870 -6.314 6.847 -0.920 




















Experience 0.097  0.099  0.980  0.036 0.401  0.090 -0.172 0.101  -1.690 -0.662 0.647 -1.020 





































Born in a Nordic country 
excl. Norway  -0.231  0.131  -1.770  0.100  0.326  0.310 -0.154 0.148  -1.040 -0.161 0.536 -0.300 
Born in an OECD 
country excl. Nordic  -0.369  0.160  -2.300  -0.600 0.492  -1.220 -0.069 0.192 -0.360 4.964  .  . 
Born in a non-OECD 
country   -0.144  0.173  -0.830  5.439  . .  -0.278  0.153  -1.820  5.306  . . 
County 1 Østfold  0.705  0.196 3.590  0.452  0.609 0.740 2.008  0.332  6.040 1.931  0.816 2.370 
County 2 Akershus  0.185  0.140 1.330  0.356  0.358 0.990  2.396 0.334  7.160  1.895 0.751  2.520 
County 4 Hedmark  0.502  0.228  2.210  5.853 .  .  2.465  0.351  7.030 1.546  0.796 1.940 
County 5 Oppland  0.644  0.230  2.800  5.297 .  .  2.679  0.355  7.550 1.877  0.852 2.200 
County 6 Buskerud  0.081  0.148  0.550  -0.660  0.382 -1.730 2.246  0.337  6.670 2.557  0.825 3.100 
County 7 Vestfold   0.211  0.179  1.180  0.407 0.600  0.680  2.044 0.342  5.970 1.775  0.830 2.140 
County 8 Telemark  0.390  0.202 1.940  0.171  0.635 0.270  2.300 0.351  6.540  1.484 0.778  1.910 
County 9 Aust-Agder  0.008 0.189  0.040  0.315 0.651 0.480  2.239  0.354 6.320 7.280  .  . 
County 10 Vest-Agder  0.042 0.129  0.330  0.211 0.400 0.530  2.362  0.337 7.000 7.178  .  . 
County 11 Rogaland  0.466  0.139 3.370  0.674  0.516 1.310 2.324  0.326  7.140 1.757  0.740 2.370 
County 12 Hordaland  0.303  0.119 2.540  -0.108  0.256  -0.420  2.372 0.327  7.260  1.805 0.747  2.420 
County 13 Sogn og 
Fjordane 0.697  0.414  1.680  5.841  .  . 2.404  0.359  6.690 7.453  .  . 
County 14 Møre og 
Romsdal 0.123  0.184  0.670 0.310  0.587  0.530 2.378  0.338 7.040 7.450  .  . 
County 15 Sør-
Trøndelag 0.076  0.111  0.680  0.694  0.530 1.310  2.789  0.358 7.780 7.075  .  . 
County 16 Nord-
Trøndelag 0.066  0.161  0.410  5.765  .  . 2.557  0.350  7.320 2.199 0.843  2.610 
County 17 Nordland  0.389  0.196 1.990  0.309  0.633 0.490  2.482 0.343  7.230  2.517 0.848  2.970 
County 18 Troms  5.177  .  .  4.938  .  . 2.593  0.337  7.700 2.382 0.845  2.820 
County 19 Finnmark  0.492  0.427  1.150  5.320 .  .  2.794  0.448  6.240  7.363 .  . 
Municipal Centrality 1  0.052  0.157 0.330  -0.103  0.705  -0.150 -0.010 0.108  -0.090 -0.288 0.323 -0.890 
Municipal Centrality 2  0.341  0.193 1.770  -0.683  0.581  -1.180  0.237 0.175  1.360 -0.622 0.589  -1.060 
Municipal Centrality 3  -0.070  0.156  -0.450  0.018 0.555  0.030  0.069 0.135  0.510 -0.422 0.571 -0.740 
Municipal Centrality 4  0.623  0.421  1.480  -0.343 0.788  -0.430 -0.170 0.134 -1.270 5.272  .  . 
Municipal Centrality 5  0.028  0.150 0.180  -0.031  0.595  -0.050  0.180 0.160  1.130 -0.304 0.407  -0.750 
Municipal Centrality 6  0.011  0.124  0.090  -0.115 0.447  -0.260  0.216 0.103 2.110 0.012  0.335 0.030 
_cons 
11.21












                     
Mills lambda  0.244  0.111  2.200 0.099  0.058  1.690 0.203 0.079  2.560 -0.015 0.049  -0.290 
rho  1*     1*     1*     -0.170    
Number of observations  5,154      803      4,996      589     
Wald chi2 
216.1
6    
115.4
5    
226.1
0     68.35    
Prob >chi2  0.000        0.000        0.000        0.242       
Note: two-step estimate of rho = rho is being truncated to 1               
                     
* For the hours above 100%, which means 35.5 hours per week for shift workers and 37.5 hours per week for daytime workers, 
the hourly wage is increased by 50%.   
** Marital status and number of children are used as selection variables to correct for the selection into the respective 
job-types. Mills lambda is the selection correction. 211 
 
Table A5 Estimated parameters in the RUM model 
    Shift vs. daytime work      Shift vs. daytime work   
    for hospital nurses      for primary care nurses workers 
                
               
      Est.  St. E.  t-values     Est.  St.  E.  t-values 
                
  Utility function             
β0  Constant ’leisure 
element’ 
6.567 0.884  7.427    3.688 0.788  4.681 
β1 
Age/10 -0.325  0.062  -5.243   0.371  0.267  1.389 
β2 
Age/10 squared         -0.068  0.030  -2.282 
β3 
No. of children < 6 years 
of age  -0.098 0.087  -1.123    -0.175 0.068  -2.575 
β4 
No. of children 5< years 
of age<12  -0.269 0.074  -3.656    -0.252 0.054  -4.688 
β5  Born in Norway          -0.240  0.100  -2.408 
β5  Married -0.601  0.114  -5.289   -0.225  0.076  -2.976 











                
α   Constant ‘consumption 
element’ 







0.285 0.148  1.922    0.405 0.149  2.725 
                
  Opportunity density*             
ς   1 if the job is full-time, 0 
otherwise 
1.064 0.082  12.976    0.758 0.091  8.311 
               
                
 
Number of observations 
3,354      
3,928    
  Log likelihood  -8,835.5       -10,136.5    
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure A1 Hospital nurses – Full-time 
Clockwise: 
Quadrant 1: The difference in disposable income for full-time jobs (shift job – daytime job). 
Quadrant 2: The difference in deterministic utility for full-time jobs (shift job – daytime job). 
Quadrant 3: Compensating variation (
7 CV ) for full-time jobs (shift job – daytime job). 
Quadrant 4: Share with positive and negative 













































Figure A2. Shift compensation for hospital nurses 
The mean of the compensating variation,
k CV , by categories of hours. 





































Figure A3. Shift compensation for hospital nurses 
The share of the nurses with 




 CV (NOK) 50% Position  CV (NOK)  75% Position
 CV (NOK)  100% Position










Figure A4. Shift compensation for hospital nurses. 
The mean of the compensating variation,




 CV (NOK) 50% Position  CV (NOK)  75% Position
 CV (NOK)  100% Position










Figure A5. Shift compensation for primary care nurses 
The mean of the compensating variation, 





Page    Correction  from  first  print 
 
6, last para   Hospital  operational expenses (text inserted) 
20, second para  Please observe that the figure is just a cross-sectional snapshot, and 
should be interpreted with caution. (text inserted). 
 
21, first para   a peak (not its) 
 
46, third para   The analyst has incomplete knowledge or information about variables 
entering the choice set B, and one way to take account of this 
incomplete knowledge is to specify probability distributions for these 
variables. (text inserted and revised). 
 
64, 65      small replaced with modest 
 
71, 3 para    private hourly wages (not income) 
 
109, table    The parameter γ is included (not included by mistake) 
 
113, para 4    Table 7 (not Table 6) 
 
153, last para  , but it is not significantly different from 1, and the model is thus not 
necessarily better than the standard multinominal logit model. (text 
inserted) 
 
196, third para  
last sentence  ordinal (not cardinal) 
 